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I 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This thesis represents the first attempt, to the best of my knowledge, to obtain a 
deeper understanding of firms’ forward-looking risk disclosure patterns, and their 
determinants from the perspective of corporate governance issues and ownership 
structure, and impact on firm risk and analyst forecast accuracy. In order to test these 
relationships, I manually coded a sample of non-financial institutions that were 
members of the FTSE100 and Mid-250 indices during 2010, as identified by 
Thomson Reuters.  
Chapter 1 is the introduction of the whole thesis; it discusses the research 
background and motivation and briefly outlines theoretical development of risk 
disclosure research.  
Chapter 2 investigates the determinants of forward-looking risk disclosure. I find that 
corporate boards with a higher presence of independent, non-executive directors, 
larger board sizes and higher audit committee effectiveness all contribute to more 
forward-looking risk disclosures. Conversely, share holdings by investment 
institutions and inside employees are negatively related to forward-looking risk 
disclosure.  
Chapter 3 investigates the impact of forward-looking risk disclosure on firm risk. I 
report a significant negative association between the total quantity of forward-
looking risk disclosure and level of firm risk; however, one standard deviation 
increase in disclosure only leads to a slight decrease of risk. The detailed risk 
construction reflects that more ‘operational’, ‘good’, ‘quantitative’ risks that are 
forward disclosed will impose stronger effects on reducing firm risk.  
Chapter 4 investigates the impact of forward-looking risk disclosure on analyst 
forecast accuracy. I report a significant positive relationship between the quantity of 
forward-looking risk disclosures and analyst forecast accuracy; the reduction effect 
of forecast error appears strongest in the short-term horizon. In testing the 
relationship between forward-looking risk disclosure and analyst forecast accuracy, I 
control for earnings quality, the results show that there is a significant positive 
association between earnings quality and forecast accuracy. Additionally, earnings 
quality has long-term predictive power regarding earnings.  
Chapter 5 is the conclusion of this thesis.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1. Research background and motivation 
Corporate accounting malfeasance has obtained a place among the defining themes 
of the financial market over the past fifteen years, and has been widely criticised as 
having given rise to the 2007 financial crisis and related Occupy Wall Street 
movement. This section represents a chronological review of some of the worst 
incidents from the last decade and a half1.  
- 1998: Waste Management (a publicly-listed waste management company). 
The company (Waste Management) deliberately extended the depreciation 
period for their property, plant and equipment (PPE) and recorded $1.7 
billion of false earnings in their financial statements. The company received a 
penalty of $457 million to settle a shareholder class-action suit.  
- 2001: Enron (a commodities, energy and service company). The management 
wiped off massive debt from its financial statements and aggressively ramped 
                                                          
1 Source: “10 Worst corporate accounting scandals”, by Barry Ritholtz, website: 
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2013/03/worst-corp-scandals/ 
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up share prices; shareholders lost $74 billion and the company filed for 
bankruptcy.  
- 2002: WorldCom (a telecommunications company, now known as MCI, Inc.). 
The management overstated company assets by as much as $11 billion, 
resulting in $180 billion of losses for investors; the company went bankrupt.  
- 2002: Tyco (a blue-chip Swiss security systems company). The CEO and 
CFO pocketed $150 million and exaggerated reported earnings by $500 
million. These senior executives siphoned off profits through unapproved 
loans and deceitful stock sales, and illegally peculated company money as 
their private bonuses or benefits. Typo was obligated to provide $2.92 billion 
to shareholders as compensation.  
- 2003: HealthSouth (the largest publicly-traded health care company in the 
U.S.). The management (allegedly) overstated earnings by $1.4 billion in 
order to meet shareholders’ expectations.  
- 2004: Freddie Mac (a federally-sponsored mortgage-financing institution) . 
The company deliberately misstated and deflated $5 billion earnings on its 
books. The company received fines up to $125 million.  
- 2005: American International Group (a multinational insurance company). 
The management committed substantial accounting fraud amounting to $3.9 
billion, together with bid-rigging and share price inflation. In order to settle 
with a US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation, the 
company paid $1.64 billion in fines.  
- 2008: Lehman Brothers (a global financial service institution). The 
management illegally concealed over $50 billion loans by deceptive sales of 
14 
 
toxic assets to the Cayman Island banks. The fourth largest investment bank 
in US before 2008 filed for bankruptcy.  
- 2008: Bernie Madoff (Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC). The 
management swindled investors out of $64.8 billion through the largest Ponzi 
scheme in financial history. Madoff’s fraud was realised only months after 
the 2008 credit crunch.  
- 2009: Satyam (an Indian IT services and back-office accounting company). 
The management inflated revenue by $1.5 billion. After falsified accounts 
were revealed, Satyam shares (NYSE) plunged from a peak of $29.10 in 
2008 to around $1.80 in 2009.  
These accounting scandals share some common characteristics: A lack of 
essential disclosures to investors (especially risk information relating to the overall 
operation of the company); senior executives allegedly involved in fraud, conspiracy 
and filing false documents with regulators; a lack of effective board monitoring due 
to insufficient board independence; incompetent and inefficient auditing system; 
inappropriate ownership structures (particularly regarding employees’ shareholdings, 
which constitute a large proportion of their compensation packages and are closely 
connected to a firm’s short-term stock performance); massive earnings manipulation 
(managers commonly inflated firm’s finance accounts or deflated earnings) in order 
to conceal bleak profits and meet investors’ expectations, or for hostile market 
expansion, or to avoid tax; and withering financial consequences to the firm that 
commonly led to massive fines to SEC regulators, huge lose for investors, 
bankruptcy or takeover.  
A recent (and on-going) accounting story (August, 2014) of Tesco threw the 
world’s third-largest retailer into turmoil and called out the media hounds regarding 
15 
 
the issue of corporate risk disclosure. Since the artificial inflation (by £250 million) 
of Tesco’s half-year profit levels, £3 billion has been knocked off the grocer’s stock 
market value, and its shares prices have fallen 40% (so far) to an 11-year low, 
accompanied by subsequent sales and profit warnings. Tesco faces twin probes by 
City watchdogs into this accounts scandal and may face UK parliamentary scrutiny. 
Tesco’s finance chief stepped down with a £1m payoff before the accounting scandal 
came to light; Tesco has further suspended four senior executives as inquiries are 
launched into its profit overstatement. “Breaking accounting rules to exaggerate 
profits is a cardinal sin as far as investors are concerned and Tesco has been 
punished severely with shares falling more than 10% at one stage day”2. Tesco later 
explained the incident was “principally due to the accelerated recognition of 
commercial income and delayed accrual of cost”. This could mean that Tesco 
intentionally violated the matching principal in accounting and put forward its 
revenue (‘rebate’) on an early date and pushed back its costs until a later date. These 
facts regarding the management’s earnings manipulation signal a poor earnings 
quality that would impact financial analysts’ evaluation of the company’s market 
value. Tesco chairman Sir Richard Broadbent commented on the overstatement, 
saying that “things are always unnoticed until they have been noticed”; in doing so, 
he raised the concern of uninformed investors. The scale of the discrepancies which 
exposed in the leading British retailer has posed questions regarding the cause of the 
mis-statement of reported income, and whether asymmetric information between 
corporate insiders, outside shareholders and managers of this nature could trigger a 
devastating catastrophe for the company and lessen the confidence of financial 
analysts and investors. 
                                                          
2 Source: “Tesco suspends execs as inquiry launched into profit overstatement”, website: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29306444 
16 
 
The unstable financial environment of recent years, in the post era of 2007 
financial crisis, has placed risk disclosure under the close scrutiny of investors and 
regulators. A long-standing criticism of risk disclosures is that they lack transparency 
and are uninformative (Solomon et al., 2000). Even prior to the financial crisis, the 
issue of corporate risk disclosure was a significant subject at the American 
Accounting Association (AAA)/Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
conferences (from at least 1997 onwards), which identified that US firms were 
publishing inadequate risk disclosures in their annual reports. The Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) also expressed similar 
concerns regarding risk disclosure deficiencies and released three discussion reports 
(1997, 1998 and 2002) urging British firms to disclose more informative risk-relative 
information. “Best Practice in Corporate Governance”, produced by the Turnbull 
Committee, exerted further influence upon internal control and risk management 
disclosures. More recently, Abraham and Shrives (2014, p.104) examine risk 
disclosures in a sample of large UK food producers and processors. They 
characterize these disclosures as being general in nature and little more than 
‘symbolic window dressing’.  
There is now a growing attention on forward-looking disclosure in corporate 
annual reports. Recent regulatory approaches include: Companies Act (2006), and 
the ‘best practice’ issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB, 
2010). ICAEW (2011) stated the pressures from vast stakeholders who request more 
transparent disclosures in the wake of financial crisis.  
Notwithstanding risk narratives are important, detailed empirical evidence from 
the academic community remains somewhat limited. Solomon et al. (2000) conduct 
a survey of UK institutional investors and find their common agreement that 
17 
 
managers should disclose more verifiable risk information instead of providing 
generalized statements of risk management policies. Following Solomon and 
colleagues’ call for risk disclosure studies, Linsley and Shrives (2005) conducted a 
comparative study of 18 UK and Canadian banks and explored their risk narratives 
within their annual reports. They suggest that a potential utility of more voluntary 
risk disclosure is to reduce firm’s cost of capital; they also propose that forward-
looking risk disclosures could be valuable information source for investors. The 
latter point is in line with Dietrich et al.’s (2001) study that implies that forward-
looking risk disclosures could play a role in improving market efficiency. In a later 
study, Linsley and Shrives (2006) examined risk disclosures for a sample of 79 UK 
firms. They report similar results regarding the merits and disadvantages of 
voluntary risk disclosures within annual reports.  
A general consensus of the literature on risk disclosure studies holds that 
managers are reluctant to voluntarily release more than necessary forward-looking 
risk disclosures due to the high proprietary cost and legitimacy issues (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2005). Beattie et al. (2004) examine all narrative sections throughout the 
annual reports for 27 UK firms and finds merely 2.4% of whole sample units 
discussing forward-looking risk information, of which only 7% are quantified. 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) add to the body of literature by reporting that when 
explaining forward-looking risks, managers are not inclined to specify the risk 
impact with favourable or unfavourable statements. Recent studies state an increase 
in the level of narrative information released by companies over time (ASB, 2007 
and 2009; Campbell and Slack, 2008). However, notwithstanding this increase, there 
appears to be limited interest among professional users of this information because 
of concerns about the quality/usefulness of forward-looking risk disclosure 
18 
 
(Campbell and Slack, 2008). “Where disclosure is non-specific, boilerplate, or 
merely describes a risk management policy, its use is limited” (Abraham and Shrives, 
2014, pp. 92). 
Against the background of more frequent and large scale accounting scandals, 
the present research considers the risk disclosure approaches for a sample of firms 
drawn from the UK’s FTSE-100 and Mid-250 indices.  I also reiterate previous 
findings identifying the vital role of governance characteristics, such as board 
composition and independence, audit committee effectiveness, and shareholder 
ownership structure in determining the extent and content of firm’s risk disclosures. 
This research would also investigate the consequences of lack of risk disclosure in 
respect of its effect on firm risk and analyst forecast accuracy. It would also provide 
empirical evidence for a suggested connection between disclosures and earnings 
management.  
Risk disclosure is essential to a wide range of information users including 
managers, investors, financial analysts, auditors and regulators. A broader definition 
of risk embraces both positive opportunities and negative uncertainties (Lupton, 
1999; Linsley and Shrives, 2006). It includes financial risks that are associated with 
corporate financing and have an immediate effect on corporate assets and liabilities 
of a monetary nature; operational risks that directly impact the daily operation of the 
business, and those which firms are willing to pursue in order to achieve competitive 
advantages and increase value for shareholders; strategic risks that relate to 
macroeconomic or general social environment within which the firm operates (e.g., 
Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Kravet and Muslu, 2013; 
Oliveira et  al., 2011). Voluntary risk disclosures publicly detail the full operational 
status of a firm. Managers use risk disclosure as a relay for the transmission of their 
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risk management efficiency. According to signalling theory (Toms, 2002), the value 
of good practice in corporate operation cannot be realised unless it is signalled to 
stakeholders. When firms have applied strategic risk control strategies that aim at 
mitigating firm-specific threats and creating growth opportunities, managers are 
more likely to provide positive signals through voluntarily disclosing more risk 
information. Investors are the primary readers of firms’ risk disclosures. In the 
classic principal-agent relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986), investors are commonly perceived as being at an information 
disadvantage when managers selectively withhold (insider) critical risk information 
for various reasons: threats to their authorities, commercial sensitivities, and 
uncertainty over risk measurements. Therefore investors require more information to 
evaluate firm performance and make informed decisions. In addition, investors may 
be prohibited from supervising a firm’s risk-controlling systems as the cost of 
gathering and analysing additional information is untenable. Financial analysts act as 
intermediaries between investors and managers; more risk information available put 
them in a better position to promote their earnings forecasts of target firms, buy and 
sell recommendations of selected securities and other forms of professional services 
to various investors in different needs. Policy makers also need firms’ risk 
disclosures to evaluate firm performance and monitor managers’ behaviour, to 
overhaul and standardize market order, and earnestly protect shareholders’ rights and 
interests.  
Risk disclosures inform readers of a firm’s ‘opportunities’, ‘prospects’ or any 
‘hazards, threats or exposures’, which have already impacted or may potentially 
impact firm value, and notify readers of managers’ risk mitigation and opportunity 
creating strategies and internal control risk management policies. ‘Risk’ implies 
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possibilities and potentials. Risk can only be understood within a broader perspective 
of firms’ operating strategies and macroeconomic environment. In light of this, the 
notion of risk and forward-looking information are “closely intertwined” (Beretta 
and Bozzolan, 2004). According to the information time-orientation, risk disclosures 
can be categorised into forward-looking risk disclosures (FRD) and past risk 
disclosures. The present research will focus on forward-looking risk disclosure, 
because existing risk disclosure studies have indicated the usefulness and value of 
forward-looking risk disclosure (e.g. Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006; Jorison, 2002; 
Soloman et al., 2000) - yet to the best of my knowledge no research so far has 
specifically investigated forward-looking risk disclosure nor provided empirical 
evidence regarding the usefulness of forward-looking risk disclosure in respect of its 
effect on firm risk reduction and analyst forecast accuracy. Forward-looking risk 
disclosure is defined as any risk-related information that informs readers about future 
potential opportunities or threats and uncertainties arising from the interaction of 
external macro-economic and market risks and internal operational risks, and about 
any descriptive information regarding internal control risk management policies. In 
order to thoroughly investigate the different characteristics of risk disclosure, I 
disaggregate total risk narratives into a few sub-categories: on the basis of their 
temporal focus (forward-looking, backward-looking); of their business focus 
(financial, operational, strategic); of their numerical nature (quantitative, qualitative); 
of their descriptive tone (good, bad, neutral).  
I then make the following hypotheses to find the determinants (Chapter 2) and 
consequences (Chapter 3 & 4) of corporate voluntary forward-looking risk 
disclosures: in Chapter 2, I hypothesize a positive relationship between the volume 
of forward-looking risk disclosure and a board with higher presence of non-
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executive, independent directors, larger board size and effective audit committee. 
Regarding the impact of ownership structure, I hypothesize a negative relationship 
between the volume of forward-looking risk disclosure and the extent of investment-
institution-held shares and employee-held shares. Specifically, I find that forward-
looking risk disclosure is significant positively associated with board composition 
(measured by the proportion of non-executive directors on a board), board 
independence (measured by the proportion of independent directors on a board), 
board size, and audit committee effectiveness (a composite measure of audit 
committee independence, size, expertise and commitment). Conversely, share 
holdings by investment institutions and inside employees are negatively related to 
forward-looking risk disclose. In Chapter 3, I hypothesize a significant negative 
relationship between the volume of forward-looking risk disclosures and firm risk, 
measured by beta. The results support the hypothesis. In particular, one standard 
deviation increase in risk disclosure only leads to a slight decrease of risk. And more 
‘operational’, ‘good’, and ‘quantitative’ risks that are forward disclosed will impose 
stronger effects on reducing firm risk. In Chapter 4, I hypothesize that forward-
looking risk disclosure is negatively associated with analyst forecast error. The 
results support the positive relationship and indicate that the reducing effect of 
disclosure on earnings forecast error appears strongest in the short-term horizon. In 
testing the relationship between the quantity of forward-looking risk disclosures and 
analyst forecast accuracy, I also control for earnings quality factor and find a 
significant negative association between earnings quality and forecast error. The 
results support the complementary and simultaneously impact of forward-looking 
risk disclosure and earnings quality on forecast accuracy. 
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I build on previous risk disclosure study and conduct a comprehensive forward-
looking risk disclosure study for a UK sample; the results reveal that in the 
preparation of risk reporting, managers have a preference for discussing forward-
looking risk information in a neutral tone. This supports Beretta and Bozzolan’s 
(2004) findings regarding 85 Italian companies’ risk disclosures in that, where future 
risks are disclosed, executives are reluctant to indicate whether the impact is likely to 
be positive or negative. The results also reveal that forward-looking qualitative risk 
disclosures occur significant more frequent than quantitative disclosures, in line with 
the findings from general disclosure studies (e.g., Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Campbell 
and Slack, 2008). In addition, I demonstrates a significant positive association 
between forward-looking ‘good news’ (‘bad news’) risk disclosures and the 
proportion of quantitative (qualitative) risk disclosures. This result suggests that 
companies like to firm up good news disclosures with quantitative disclosures but 
prefer words (qualitative) when making ‘bad news’ risk disclosures.   
This research contributes to risk disclosure studies in the following aspects: 
firstly, it facilitates a broader understanding of the relationship(s) between disclosure 
and corporate governance ownership structure than has been recognized in prior 
research. The findings can explain the reasons behind the lack of disclosure in those 
accounting-scandal companies: non-effective corporate governance structures have 
resulted in poor monitoring by informed executives and inappropriate shareholding 
structures which have enabled senior executives to focus on short-term profits whilst 
sowing the seeds of future crises. This research should hopefully interest regulators 
and policy makers who advocate the provision of more transparent and timely risk 
disclosures in order to monitor corporate behaviour and regulate market competitive 
order to avert more accounting scandals. Secondly, I report a significant negative 
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relationship between the total number of forward-looking risk disclosures and firm 
risk. This adds to the existing literature relating to the benefits of improving the 
extent of firm risk disclosure. The detailed data construction in this research provides 
an effective way of improving investors’ confidence through voluntarily publishing 
more operational, ‘good news’ and quantitative risk information. Investors, creditors 
and auditors will hopefully find the results reported in this thesis useful as they 
outline a measurement that can be used to assess firms’ risk exposure. Accordingly, 
these readers can expand their exploration and verify the risks to target companies, 
and supervise and urge companies to improve the overall quantity of the forward-
looking risk disclosures; in this way, readers of annual reports can also be better 
served. Thirdly, considering the essential role financial analysts play between 
internal managers and external investors, this research provides evidence that 
forward-looking risk disclosure can effectively lower earnings forecast error. The 
results provide empirical evidence regarding a common factor of accounting 
scandals – massive earnings manipulation (i.e. poor earnings quality), when firms 
deliberately falsely report earnings either to conceal earnings difficulties or to seize 
market share; critical problems are commonly unnoticed until they have been 
exposed. From the view of financial analysts, the findings in this thesis are relevant 
to the extent that investors incorporate analysts’ earnings forecasts in their portfolio 
investment and respond to revisions of those forecasts; the results provide insights 
into understanding what role information risk plays in investors’ decision-making. 
Fourthly, the methodology applied in this research is experimental: I build a 
complete set of key code words based on the UNIX perl code (Kravet and Muslu, 
2013) then uses it to assist with content analysis. This approach decreases the 
subjectivity of content analysis whilst takes advantage of computer software’s 
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mechanical nature. The bond of manual and computer-assisted content analysis 
provides a testable link for future risk disclosure studies.  
 
1.2. Overview of theoretical perspectives on risk disclosure 
I adopt a multi-theoretic approach to evaluate the findings presented in this thesis. 
This is common throughout the disclosure literature (Abraham and Shrives, 2014). 
This research favours stakeholder-agency theory, a resource-based view and quality 
signalling theory, alongside resource dependence theory. 
Within the frame of stakeholder-agency theory (Hill and Jones, 1992), 
company’s stakeholders refer to all resource holders, not only directors and investors, 
but also customers, suppliers, creditors, employees, local communities and the 
general public. No matter the size of their stake in the firm, each stakeholder 
represents one part of the nexus of implicit and explicit contracts that comprises the 
firm. Each entity can be viewed as a contributor to a firm’s essential resources; in 
turn they expect the maximum risk-adjusted return. Managers serve the core of the 
nexus, and are the “only group of stakeholders who enter into a contractual 
relationship with other stakeholders, and are also the only group of stakeholders with 
direct control over the decision-making apparatus of the firm” (Hill and Jones, 1992, 
pp.134). Therefore, stakeholders request managers to be judicious and wisely 
allocate resources in a manner to protect profit benefits of various stakeholders. 
Similar to principal-agency theory, managers represent the agents of other 
stakeholders, bonded to broad institutional contracts. However, managers have the 
information advantage to obtain inside critical risk information and thus have the 
potential to twist facts when they are released to other stakeholders. This then 
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increases stakeholders’ difficulty in identifying whether managers are acting in their 
(the stakeholders’) maximum interests. The classic principal-agent relationship can 
be used to explain managers’ discretionary behaviour in voluntarily disclosing a 
firm’s risk information, and why accounting scandals are generally revealed very late 
and at a substantial loss to investors. The suggested response is for stakeholders is to 
demand more risk information than they are provided with within annual reports so 
as to monitor the contractual relationship, and/or better estimate the risk exposure of 
the firm and make informed investments as a result (Solomon et al., 2000). More 
voluntary forward-looking risks disclosures can reduce the asymmetric information 
risk and help improve a firm’s accessibility to capital markets by reducing investors’ 
expenses spent on collecting information. In addition, the market will better 
understand the company’s position and perceive the company as less risky. Financial 
analysts act as intermediaries between investors and company managers: They 
provide professional services including earnings forecasts, buy/sell advice of 
selected securities to various brokers, individual and institutional investors. Firms’ 
risk disclosure quantity is a determinant of analyst forecast accuracy since much of 
the information that analysts use in their estimations is sourced directly from firms 
(Lang and Lundholm, 1996). Increased firm-provided information means analysts 
have more valuable reports to sell. In addition, firms that voluntarily release more 
verifiable forward-looking risk information will find lower forecast standard 
deviation, more accurate forecasts and less variable forecast revisions. To the extent 
that analysts may be considered as representing or influencing investors’ beliefs, 
high-disclosing firms may have a larger cluster of potential investors and less 
dispersion in their perception about firm performance.   
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As to the contents of forward-looking risk disclosures, both the resource-based 
view (Barney, 1991) and quality signalling theory (Toms, 2002) suggest that when a 
firm effectively apply valuable, rare, inimitable and non-replicable (VRIN) resources 
to implement threats mitigation and opportunities creation strategies that are difficult 
to imitate and substitute, a firm’s risk controlling system can be improved; thus its 
competitive advantages are strengthened and its systematic risk will be deemed 
lower. This provides theoretical support for the findings reported in the thesis that 
when firms disclose more firm-specific operational, quantitative and ‘good news’ 
forward-looking risk information that competitors find hard to imitate, the value of 
strategic risk management can be transmitted to investors, and this will send a 
positive signal to the market and influence investors’ risk perception of the firm.  
Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003) provides theoretical 
support regarding examining management’s disclosure behaviour. Resource 
dependency theory characterizes a company as an open system, dependent on 
environmental change to obtain necessary resources to survive. Board characteristics 
(composition; independence; size), audit committee effectiveness, and ownership 
structure (institutional shareholding; employees’ shareholding) are indicators of a 
firm’s critical resources and are rational organizational responses to the conditions of 
firm’s external environment. The main benefits that “resource-rich” directors can 
provide to firms include information and preferential access to resources and 
legitimacy. For example, Mizruchi and Stearns (1988) find the link between a firm’s 
abundant financial resources and a highly presence of institutional investors on the 
board. In addition, a larger board with more independent outside directors can enrich 
the firm with critical competitive resources, provide constructive advices to the 
management, and contribute to a better monitoring system. Therefore, from a 
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signalling perspective, managers are inclined to voluntarily release more risk 
information as a signal to external shareholders that there is an effective risk 
management system. In most cases, managers have to simultaneously publish 
credible information to support this, as fraudulent disclosures will be penalised in the 
future. 
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Chapter 2 
The determinants of forward-looking risk disclosure 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to establish the relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics, shareholder ownership structure and voluntary forward-looking risk 
disclosure. I propose that board attributes such as board composition, independence 
and size, and audit committee effectiveness, alongside ownership structure are likely 
to impact managers’ risk disclosing behaviour (e.g. John and Senbet, 1998; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; O’Sullivan, 2000; Higgs, 2003; Leung and Horwitz, 2004; 
Raheja, 2005; Adams and Ferriera, 2007; Zaman et al., 2011).  
Disclosure literature has investigated the motivations of directors who 
voluntarily release more information than is compelled by law. These disclosed 
narratives exceed regulatory requirements and represent an option available to firm 
management for the provision of useful accounting-related and other information to 
assist the decision-making of external investors (Meek et al., 1995). Voluntary 
disclosures are subject only to managerial discretion, and managers may 
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intentionally publish favourable information to them, therefore the utility of such 
information to professional users remains undefined. While compulsory disclosure 
by regulation can be one possible solution to urge management publish objective true 
information that is consistent with the benefits of shareholders, however, there lack 
of evidence proving the benefits of compulsory disclosures (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Even if legislation approach is effective, concerns still remain about the content of 
mandated disclosure: what areas of information should be mandated? Therefore both 
internal and external monitoring mechanisms become necessary to ensure adequate 
information is published, including those regarding risks (Cheng and Courtenay, 
2006). The focus of present research is to explore how corporate governance 
characteristics (internal monitoring mechanisms) and ownership structure (external 
monitoring mechanisms) impact management decisions regarding the release of 
forward-looking risk information. 
Agency issues pose many risk disclosure challenges. When decision-making 
authority is granted to managers, they have an incentive to reduce risk reporting so 
as to cover real threats to their firm from stakeholders. For fear of being exploited by 
managers, stakeholders demand more disclosure regarding the risk management of 
their firm so as to evaluate managers’ decision-making. To deal with agency 
problems, firms are obliged to adopt appropriate internal control mechanisms 
designed to monitor and authorize management decisions, and ensure effective risk 
management on behalf of stakeholders. Among these commonly used mechanisms 
are: board composition, board independence, board size, and audit committee 
effectiveness. It is suggested that good corporate governance (per the above 
attributes) are effective in reducing risk concealment and encourage more voluntary 
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forward-looking risk disclosures, above that mandated by regulation or stock 
exchange rules.  
Within the framework of corporate governance, ownership structure is a 
principal concept, it gives guidelines to explain governance arrangements, including 
managerial power differential, board monitoring, finance and investment strategies 
and corporate disclosure approaches (Morck, 2000). It is posited that specific types 
of shareholder have various motivation, abilities and knowledge regarding risk 
disclosure discretion; however, little evidence presently exists within the literature. 
Extant research has used ownership concentration as a composite explanatory 
variable to explain the level of firm’s disclosure, instead of trying to distinguish 
between different categories of shareholders, notwithstanding there are differences 
regarding the monitoring costs, and incompatible monitoring effects of various types 
of shareholders (Falkenstein, 1996). This study will focus on two specific forms of 
shareholder ownership: shares held by investment institutions and shares held by 
employees, so as to extend existing evidence on the impact of ownership categories 
on risk disclosure. 
This research contributes to the risk disclosure studies in the following respects: 
First, it represents the first attempt in literature, to the best of my knowledge, that an 
extensive forward-looking risk disclosure analysis within all the narrative sections of 
annual reports, based on a comparatively large cross-sectional sample, has been 
conducted. I investigate the determinants of forward-looking risk narratives from the 
perspective of corporate governance issues and ownership structure. This adds to 
existing literature regarding the effect of board attributes and audit committee 
effectiveness and ownership by different shareholders on voluntary risk disclosure. 
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Second, the methodology adopted in this research is experimental; I build a complete 
set of key code words based on the UNIX perl code (Kravet and Muslu, 2013), and 
use this to assist manual content analysis. This approach decreases the subjectivity of 
content analysis and takes advantage of computer software’s mechanical nature. This 
provides testable results for future risk disclosure studies. Investors, creditors and 
auditors will hopefully find my results useful as they provide evidence regarding 
how to improve corporate governance and optimize ownership structure, and suggest 
indicators by which to assess firms’ risk exposure. Accordingly, they can expand 
their exploration, verify risk reporting policies in target companies, and urge 
companies to improve the overall quality of their forward-looking risk disclosures; in 
this way, readers of their annual reports will be better served. Moreover, this 
research will also interest regulators and policy makers who advocate the provision 
of high quality, transparent and timely risk disclosures. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 present 
theoretical arguments. Section 2.3 defines the forward-looking risks and develops the 
hypotheses. Methodology is discussed in Section 2.4. Model specification is 
discussed in section 2.5. Data collection is described in section 2.6. Section 2.7 
presents the results. In the final section, conclusions are drawn and suggestions are 
made for future studies. 
 
2.2. Theoretical approaches 
2.2.1. Agency theory and signalling theory 
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Carpenter and Feroz (1992) suggest that overall exploration of disclosure theories is 
helpful as this provides richer insights into understanding corporate disclosure 
approaches; therefore, disclosure behaviour should be regarded as complementary 
rather than competing. Previous studies have applied stakeholder-agency theory, 
resource dependency theory and signalling theory to explain the determinants of 
corporate risk disclosure practices.  
Morris (1987) states that the contents of agency theory is consistent with that of 
signalling theory, and a good combination of the two gives a better indication of 
firms’ disclosure practices. Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) states that 
corporate disclosures narrow the information gap between managers and 
shareholders thus ease the asymmetric information between the two groups. 
Managers have the incentive to publish inside information to meet the information 
requirements from outside shareholders. To much extend, disclosures are channels 
through which managers can demonstrate they are acting to boom firm value to the 
best of shareholders’ interests. This represents a good signal to the market. In light of 
this, agency theory coincides with signalling theory. Signalling theory provides an 
explanation of managers’ motivation to voluntarily release more information within 
annual reports (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Signalling theory states that mangers 
publish risk information in order to signal to outside investors that there is an 
effective risk management system inside the firm. In most cases, managers have to 
simultaneously publish credible information to support this, as fraudulent disclosures 
will be penalised in the future. 
 
2.2.2. Resource dependence theory 
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Agency theory provides fundamental support to explain managers’ discretionary 
disclosing behaviour; resource dependency theory however explains board’s actions 
from another angle. Initially outlined by Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), resource 
dependency theory has now developed into a predominant theory in studies of 
organizational behaviour. Resource dependency theory states that the behaviour of 
an organization such as board’s decisions on recruitment and dismissal and corporate 
disclosing approaches are a reflection of the resources it utilises. As Pfeffer and 
Salancik (2003, pp.1) indicate, “to understand the behaviour of an organization you 
must understand the context of that behaviour – that is, the ecology of the 
organization.” 
Board size and composition are generally regarded as two important indicators 
to assess one board’s power to obtain vital resources into their firm. Firms reply on 
external resources to operate. A larger board enriches a firm’s external resources: 1) 
information in forms of advice and counsel, 2) access to information channels, 3) 
preferential access to resources, 4) legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Dalton et 
al. (1999) find board size is positively associated with firm’s financial performance. 
However, Boyd (1990) questions the quick conclusion might seem simplistic, he 
suggests that under certain circumstance a too large board can be redundant and 
inefficient, and only those truly “resource-rick” directors should represent the 
majorities seats. That is to imply merely numbers do not count, rather the type of 
directors are the real matters. The intake of resources need be matched to the needs 
of a company. Firms in highly regulated industries are likely to find more outside 
board members with relevant financial expertise (e.g. Luoman and Goodstein, 1999; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Firms dependent on external financing have a higher 
proportion of institutional investors on the board (e.g. Stearns and Mizurchi, 1993).   
 
 
34 
 
Resource dependence theory suggests that non-executive directors procure 
external resources by their proficiency, prestige and networking (Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002), they provide “additional windows on the world” (Tricker, 1984). Mace (1971) 
and Spencer (1983) argue that the role of a non-executive director should be 
advisory not decision-making, in that their experience and expertise are fully 
acknowledged, their advices are influential but they should not intervene the 
establishment of corporate policies. In short, non-executive directors enrich the 
board’s expertise primarily through advice regarding strategic decision-making. 
By such analogy, a larger board with the presence of more independent 
directors could enrich the firm with critical competitive resources, give constructive 
advices to the management, and contribute to a better monitoring system; therefore I 
could expect a correspondingly higher level of voluntary forward-looking risk 
disclosures. 
 
2.3. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.3.1. Defining risk and forward-looking risk disclosure 
Defining risk is the first step in conducting any risk disclosure study. Previous 
studies have provided two versions of risk definition. One view defines risk(s) as 
possible threats to a firm’s wealth accumulation due to a series of internal factors 
(including ‘financial risks’ that can affect a firm’s net cash flows and have an 
immediate effect on assets and liabilities of a monetary character and ‘non-financial 
risks’ which might have a potential impact on a firm’s future cash flows) and 
external factors (related to the general environment in which a firm operates) 
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(Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Kravet and Muslu, 2013). While this view solely 
incorporates negative outcomes when coding risk information, another definition of 
risk, which is generally regarded as a broad definition, embraces both positive 
opportunities and negative uncertainties (Lupton, 1999; Linsley and Shrives, 2006). 
Specifically, a sentence will be identified as risk-related if it conveys any indication 
of ‘opportunity’ or ‘prospect’, or any ‘hazard’, ‘threat’ or ‘exposure’, which has the 
potential to affect firm wealth, or inform the reader of specific risk mitigation and 
opportunity generating strategies and internal control risk management policies 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2006). This study will adopt the broad definition of risk when 
analysing risk disclosure information, which is consistent with Lupton’s (1999) 
argument about how risk is used and recognized in colloquial language.  
The second step is to define forward-looking risk disclosure. CICA (2001) 
released “guidance on preparation and disclosure” and defines forward-looking 
disclosure as the narratives to help investors better evaluate managerial decisions and 
strategic events and actions, targeted for corporate long-term returns. Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2004, pp.269) define forward-looking disclosure as: “(i) future events, 
decisions, opportunities, and risks that can have a likely effect on future results; (ii) 
visions, strategies, and objectives expressed by management; and (iii) explanations 
of past events, decisions, facts, and results that can have a significant impact on 
future results”. A similar definition of forward-looking disclosure can be found in 
Aljifri and Hussainey (2007), who identify forward-looking disclosure as current 
plans and future predictions that allow shareholders and other stakeholders to 
evaluate a firm’s future financial performance. This includes financial forecasts (e.g.,, 
earnings forecast) in the next year, expected proceeds and anticipated cash flows, 
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and non-financial forecasts like risks and uncertainties that might impact greatly on 
the expected achievements and results in any deviation from projected targets.  
Consistent with previous literature, forward-looking risk disclosure in this study 
refers to any risk-related information that informs readers about future potential 
opportunities or threats and uncertainties arising from the interaction of external 
environmental and market risks and internal operational risks, and about any 
descriptive information concerning the internal control of risk management policies. 
 
2.3.2. Board composition 
Corporate boards are responsible for monitoring managerial performance in general 
and publishing risk information in particular. Previous empirical evidence suggests a 
set of board attributes that may influence the preparation and issue of firm risk 
information; these include: board composition, independence, size, and audit 
committee effectiveness.  
The monitoring role of a board is generally believed to be determined by its 
composition, independence and size (John and Senbet, 1998). Since corporate 
disclosure policy is drawn up by boards, and the annual reports are composed by 
boards, the governance arrangements of the board of directors can be expected to 
influence risk disclosure approaches (Gul and Leung, 2004). Board composition is 
an interesting variable to consider, particularly in relation to the function of the non-
executive directors on the board. If they are actively engaged with their monitoring 
role, then more voluntary disclosures can be expected. Moreover, their dominance of 
on the board may endow them with strengthened influence to urge the management 
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to publish more information, augment the information quality and reduce the benefits 
of withholding inside information (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002).  
Board composition refers to the percentage of outside board members over total 
board members; it therefore distinguishes non-executive directors from executive 
directors. Specifically, non-executive directors are those independent board members 
who are dedicated to reducing information asymmetry between managers and 
stakeholders (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). They are viewed as corporate outsiders. 
Executive directors are full-time employees within the firm; they are counted as 
corporate insiders. Agency theory states that a board should encompass a variety of 
members (both insiders and outsiders); each has different propensity for disclosure 
style (Cai et al., 2006). Corporate insiders (executive board directors), in working 
alongside managers, may find it difficult to simultaneously monitor managers’ 
behaviours (Fame and Jensen, 1983). Under the framework of agency theory, 
executive directors are less likely to voluntarily disclose more risk information, as 
their stewardship and strategic action can be exposed to more valid scrutinies 
(Leftwich et al., 1981). Comparatively, a board composed of more non-executive 
directors is in a stronger position to respond to shareholders’ demands for 
accountability and transparency in disclosures. In Solomon and Solomon’s (2004) 
survey of UK investors, share owners stress the significance of the presence of non-
executive directors, and rank this group the most effective corporate governance 
control mechanism.  
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There are two arguments in the literature regarding this board composition issue: 
one supports the presence of more executive directors on the board; the other favours 
the presence of more non-executive directors. 
Supporters of higher presence of more executive directors on the board raise the 
concerns for dominant non-executive directors: “stifling of strategic actions” 
(Goodstein et al., 1994), “excessive monitoring” (Baysinger and Butler, 1985), “a 
lack of business expertise” (Patton and Baker, 1987) and “a lack of real 
independence” (Demb and Neubauer, 1992).   
Those who favour the presence of more non-executive directors on the board 
apply ‘principal-agency theory’ and ‘resource dependency theory’ to support their 
argument. Principle-agency theory states that corporate board is an essential 
monitoring tool to control managers’ illegitimate actions (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Non-executive directors’ monitoring initiative are driven by complex 
motivations, derived from their directorship responsibility and boosted by their share 
ownership (Mangel and Singh, 1993). Resource dependency theory indicates that 
non-executive directors enhance board’s strategic decision-making, and could ease 
“managerial consumption of perquisites” (Brickley and James, 1987). They are not 
easily coerced by CEOs (Weisbach, 1988) and are impartial in the nomination of 
board directive members (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). In other words, non-
executive directors reduce the power differentials among board members and impel 
the whole board to fufill their duty as representatives of outside shareholders 
(O’Sullivan, 2000; Mallin et al., 2005).  
A number of international studies have investigated board composition as a 
determinant of firm’s voluntary disclosures and report different results. Ajinkya et al. 
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(2005) examine the US market and find a higher presence of outside directors on the 
board leads to more management earnings forecasts, and these forecasts tend to be 
more specific, accurate and less optimistically biased. Arcay and Vazques (2005), 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006), and Lim et al. (2007) all report a significant positive 
relationship between boards composition (percentage of independent directors 
presence) and disclosure volume in Spanish, Singaporean and Australian markets 
respectively. However, Ho and Wong (2001) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) study 
Hong Kong and Malaysia markets respectively but fail to find non-executive 
directors contribute to more informative disclosure. Eng and Mak (2003), Gul and 
Leung (2004), and Barako et al. (2006) find higher presence of non-executive 
directors on the board leads to lower disclosure volume based on empirical studies of 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Kenya markets respectively. This significant negative 
relationship can be explained by “hegemony theory” which indicates that a board’s 
passive behaviour is attributed to their dependence on information and insights that 
are provided by the company's top executives (Kosnik, 1987), or because of board 
interlocks (the number of multiple directorships some directors hold), board 
members have little time to carry out their duties effectively (Lin, et al., 2003). 
Empirical studies report conflicting results regarding the determinant of board 
composition on corporate disclosure approaches. This is largely due to the sample 
selection bias. Nevertheless it is generally consensus that non-executive directors 
play a critical role in effective administration and monitoring. And better monitoring 
lead to more transparent and informative disclosure available to general public. 
Therefore I have the first hypothesis: 
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H1a: There is a positive association between the proportion of non-executive 
directors on a board and the volume of forward-looking risk disclosure.  
H1b: There is a positive association between the dominance of non-executive 
directors (≥ 50%) on a board and the volume of forward-looking risk 
disclosure. 
 
2.3.3. Board independence 
A higher proportion of non-executive directors on the board could help improve the 
accountability and transparency of corporate risk disclosure; however, not all non-
executive directors are alike. A non-executive director may be independent or 
dependent director. Dependent non-executive directors may have material pecuniary 
relationship or transactions with the company (refer to grey areas), they are not 
completely independent of management, there being a deal or other caveat that could 
possibly affect their impartial decisions (Mallin et al., 2005). Comparatively, 
independent non-executive directors are apart from management, and are a key 
factor in assessing corporate governance quality (Higgs, 2003). The notion of board 
composition and independence are closely intertwined, as board independence is 
augmented when the presence of independent non-executive director on the board 
increases.  
Board independence is defined here as the percentage of independent directors 
on the board over total board directors. According to the Combined Code (1998), 
independent directors refer to those who have no material monetary connection to 
management except their payments and shareholdings, and no connections or history 
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that would affect their independent decision-making. However, due to the limited 
information from the published board members’ resumes in annual reports, it is hard 
to distinguish strictly independent board members (no material monetary relationship 
with management) from those who are affiliated with management by family ties or 
business connections (‘grey’ directors). In this study, I define independent board 
members as “belonging to a group not employed by the company, not representing or 
employed by a major shareholder, not having served on the board for more than ten 
years, not a reference shareholder with more than 5% of holdings, having no cross-
board membership, nor recent or immediate family ties to the company, and not in 
acceptance of any compensation other than compensation for board service”. 
Although there is no existing theory with reference to the monitoring role of ‘grey’ 
directors on the board, previous studies find high proportion of ‘grey’ directors on 
the audit committee are less likely to make independent judgment (Carcello and Neal, 
2000). The finding is in line with the argument that a board’s monitoring 
effectiveness can be enhanced when strictly independent directors occupy more seats 
on the board.  
Based on Williamson’s (1984, pp.1219) transaction-cost framework, the main 
function of a board is “to provide governance protection to the stockholders, and that 
voting representation on the board should include those constituencies with exposed 
residual claims that cannot be safeguarded by either arms-length market transactions 
or other bilateral arrangements (e.g., loan covenants). Thus, shareholders, as the risk 
beneficiaries, need representation on the board that is independent of management to 
shield their poorly defined assets from expropriation”. He further states “the 
specificity of asset transactions may create information asymmetries that can be 
mitigated by disclosure. Such disclosure provides greater transparency and enables 
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investors to better anticipate future transactions for valuation purposes. Such 
disclosure is selective, the board is instrumental in constructing additional checks 
against managerial concealment and distortion, such as audit and other committees 
composed of independent directors” (Williamson, 1984, pp.1221). 
However, empirical studies generate mixed results of the impact of board 
independence on firm’s disclosure approaches. Ho and Wang (2001) find an 
insignificant association between the quantity of voluntary disclosure and board 
independence. Eng and Mak (2003) and Gul and Leung (2004) both report a 
significant negative relationship between the volume of voluntary disclosure and 
board independence. These results contradict the principles of Williamson’s (1984) 
framework and the notion that greater board independence leads to better monitoring 
more transparent disclosures. However, Eng and Mak’s (2003) and Gul and Leung’s 
(2004) research data is ahead before the Asian financial crisis and can be affected by 
the resultant appeal for improved corporate governance and disclosure transparency. 
Moreover, Eng and Mak’s (2003) definition of independent board does not exclude 
‘grey’ directors, and their unexpected results may be largely due to the oversight in 
failing to distinguish ‘grey’ directors from other independent directors. While Gul 
and Leung’s (2004) research tries to explain the ambiguity of ‘grey’ directors on 
board monitoring, their unexpected results may be attributed to using a ‘noisy’ 
variable of director expertise (proxied by multiple directorships), which has been 
found to be significant negatively related to firm value. 
Conversely, Beasley (1996) find a positive relationship between board 
independence and disclosure quality and states that an independent board (with a 
higher proportion of independent directors on the board) is less likely to commit 
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accounting fraud. Chen and Jaggi (2000) report similar results in their study of 
firm’s mandatory financial disclosures and the board composition of independent 
non-executive directors. Leung and Horwitz (2004) find board independence has a 
significant positive effect on the extent of voluntary disclosure, on the condition of 
low director ownership (below 25%).  
However, little attempt has been made to examine the effect of board 
independence on firms’ risk disclosures regarding future orientation. Based on the 
theoretical framework of Williamson’s (1984) and the empirical evidence of board 
independence on board’s monitoring effectiveness, I have the second hypothesis: 
H2a: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of independent 
directors on a board and the volume of forward-looking risk disclosure. 
H2b: There is a positive association between the dominance of independent directors 
(≥ 50%) on a board and the volume of forward-looking risk disclosures. 
 
2.3.4. Board size 
In view of board independence, board size is a notable factor that can influence 
board activity and, potentially, approaches to disclosure. Previous researchers found 
board size could impact on the effectiveness of board activity. Board serves two 
main roles: advising and monitoring (Raheja, 2005; Adams and Ferriera, 2007). 
Advising refers to providing professional advices to management through accessing 
essential information and resources (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The benefit of a larger 
board is that such a board is more likely to possess a greater quantity of collective 
information and therefore is better-equipped to release more information. In view of 
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board structure, a larger board takes in more independent non-executive directors, 
which enhance the decision-making of the board as they will suffer from reputational 
loss once the firm is caught in accounting scandals or runs into financial constrains 
(Eisenberg et al., 1998). This argument draws support from resource dependency 
theory, in that larger board size helps to reinforce the connection between a firm and 
its outer environment and contributes to the procurement of essential resources (e.g. 
prestige and legitimacy) (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). A healthy, functional board 
enriches a firm with competitive resources, provides constructive advices to the 
management, and these benefits will lead to better firm performance and, resultantly, 
help decrease firm risk. Managers then have more incentive to highlight their 
superior performance through voluntarily publishing more risk news; especially 
news concerning future perspectives, and forward-looking risk disclosures.  
Secondly, a board serves the role to discipline managers’ behaviour and dismiss 
fruitless managers, in order to make sure managers work for the benefits of 
shareholders. Again, the advantage of a larger board is that more collective 
information is held by such a board - which is valuable in respect of its monitoring 
function. Empirical evidence show that a larger board size could augment 
management efficiency by reducing CEO autocracy together with thwarting their 
attempts to exploit shareholders (for example: adopt golden parachute contracts for 
soft landing regardless firm performance in their tenure) (Singh and Harianto, 1989). 
On the other hand, in order to fulfil their monitoring responsibilities, shareholders 
require sufficient, time-efficient, and transparent information from inside a firm. 
When the board monitoring effect improves as board size increases, it can be 
expected that an increase in voluntary risk disclosures will follow. Therefore, I have 
the third hypothesis: 
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H3: There is positive association between board size and the volume of forward-
looking risk disclosure. 
 
2.3.5. Audit committee effectiveness (ACE) 
2.3.5.1. The role of audit committee 
Board members are committed to represent the interest of shareholders, while audit 
committees serve a particular function: they are independent form the management, 
to ensure corporate disclosure is sufficient and transparent. Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) released “Guidance on Audit Committees (2012)”, and clarifies the 
role of an audit committee: it should inform the board of any big financial reporting 
issues and explain the draw-up of a company’s financial statements and all narrative 
statements. An audit committee should review published information in annual 
reports, including both the compulsory disclosure (financial statements, notes to the 
financial statements) and voluntary disclosure (chairman’s statement, operation and 
performance review, corporate governance statements relative to firms’ risk 
management systems and strategies). Within the narrative sections, audit committee 
should review the content of published information and inform the board as to 
whether the released information is generally fair, unbiased, and easy to understand, 
and whether sufficient information are available to shareholders to evaluate the 
company’s performance, strategic model and management. The audit committee 
need to ensure that voluntary disclosures in narrative sections are consistent with the 
accounts, to avoid surprises lurking in the financial statements. Compared with the 
firm’s management, who are responsible “for the identification, assessment, 
management and monitoring of risk, for developing, operating and monitoring the 
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system of internal control and for providing assurance to the board that it has done 
so…the audit committee should receive reports from management on the 
effectiveness of the risk management systems they have established and the 
conclusions of any testing carried out by internal and external auditors” (FRC, 2012, 
pp.8). An audit committee should reassess and back up the accountability of risk 
management and internal control statements. Considering the above responsibilities 
of audit committees, suggested to ensure consistency with corporate governance best 
practice, it would be negligible to fail to acknowledge the essential role played by 
audit committees in ensuring the disclosure of sufficiently reliable and time-efficient 
risk information, either in compulsory financial statements, required to comply with 
specific rules and regulations, but also in the narrative reporting sections within the 
annual report. For this reason, I include audit committee effectiveness as a particular 
factor in assessing firms’ risk disclosing issues.  
 
2.3.5.2. Audit committee independence 
The FRC (2012) Guidance on Audit Committees addresses the importance for an 
effective audit committee to be comprised by entirely independent non-executive 
directors. Independent directors are commonly believed to be impartial on corporate 
reporting, internal control strategies, and disclosure practices. Hudaib and Cooke, 
(2005) find an independent audit committee is effective in lowing the frequencies of 
accounting fraud and earnings management. DeZoort and Salterio (2001) suggest 
that when a reporting disagreement happens, an audit committee with more 
independent members is prone to appreciate and identify the risks auditors are facing 
in confronting management. Conversely, non-independent audit committee members 
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with current or previous directorship experience may be biased toward executive 
directors and therefore be more likely to identify with management decisions. 
Therefore, when an audit committee is composed of entirely independent non-
executive directors, it will be in a stronger position to request greater audit scope to 
enhance audit quality. In this way, firm’s disclosure level is expected to increase.  
In this chapter, I define an independent audit committee member as not current 
and previous employees, not relatives of executives, and not on the payroll of the 
firm (apart from directors’ fees); “excluding directors who are partners in, 
controlling shareholders, or executive officers of any for-profit business organization 
to which the firm made or from which the corporation received significant payments 
in the last five years. Compensation committee interlocking directorships are also 
excluded” (Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999).  
Empirically, Abbott et al. (2004) summarize two reasons to explain why audit 
committee members’ independence relates to their monitoring effect. Similar to the 
arguments of board independence, independent audit committee members have no 
family tie or monetary financial reputation to management, to ensure they take 
impartial actions and won’t harm the firm for personal interests; furthermore, an 
independent audit committee member suffers from grievous reputation loss if an 
audit miscarriage is found out as they violated their violated their financial reporting 
oversight role. Investors respond promptly to the accounting scandal and cause 
tremendous damages to the firm. Abbott and Parker (2000) find that the experience 
of sitting on an audit committee can greatly improve a director’s reputation as a 
financial monitor, however threats also increase for his reputational impairment if a 
reporting scandal is revealed during his tenure on the audit committee.  
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Abbott et al. (2004) indicate that audit committee independence improves its 
monitoring effectiveness therefore can improve the quantity and quality of financial 
reporting. Independence allows an internal audit to be conducted more smoothly and 
objectively inside the firm, since an internal audit’s independence is an essential 
feature in reducing reporting misstatement. In addition, an entirely independent audit 
committee expand external audit scope to avoid getting involved in accounting 
misstatement, therefore will urge the management to release more risk information. 
The above arguments imply that audit committee independence can have a 
positive impact on firm’s disclosure approach. I therefore expect an audit committee 
comprised of entirely independent non-executive directors lead to more forward-
looking risk disclosures.  
 
2.3.5.3. Audit committee size 
Bedard et al. (2004) find that audit committee size has a positive influence to reveal 
and resolve hidden problems during the process of financial reporting, because it is 
more likely to draw upon the strengths and range of insight and expertise available to 
ensure effective monitoring. This proposes that audit committee size is integral for 
companies who seek to issue meaningful corporate reports (Klein, 2002). The FRC 
(2012) requires an audit committee to “include at least three members, and at least 
one of them to have recent and relevant financial or accounting expertise”. This 
requirement is intended to promote the audit committee’s authentic power inside an 
organization.  
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Abbott et al. (2010) suggest that the internal audit function is consistent with 
the objective of the audit committee, it can be strengthened along with enhanced 
authority of audit committees. When the organization status of an audit committee 
improves, it alleviates managers’ cost control pressures of internal audit (Rittenberg 
et al., 1999). The enhancement in internal audit function, together with the 
alleviation of managers’ cost restraint pressures, help audit committees improve the 
quality of internal controls and may subsequently reduce the incidence of financial 
misstatements. Collectively, these factors could lead to increased risk disclosures and 
I expect FRC’s requirement for audit committee size (at least three members on 
board) could contribute to higher level of forward-looking risk disclosures. 
 
2.3.5.4. Audit committee expertise 
In order to enhance the effectiveness of audit committee, the Guidance on Audit 
Committees (2012) recommends that at least one member of the audit committee 
should have recent and relevant financial expertise and desirably have a professional 
qualification from one of the professional accountancy bodies. In early 1999, Blue 
Ribbon Committee regarding the effectiveness of audit committee (pp.26) 
emphasized an audit committee should obtain both the ‘financial literacy’ (defined as 
“the ability to read and understand fundamental financial statements”) and ‘expertise’ 
(defined as “previous employment or professional certification in accounting or 
finance, or comparable experience including service as a corporate officer with 
financial oversight responsibility”). Financially-conversant committee members can 
fulfil their monitoring roles more efficiently in the process of financial reporting, 
such as settling the complexities of financial reporting, identifying and resolving 
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material misstatements (Abbott et al., 2010) and decreasing the incidence of 
accounting restatements (DeFond et al., 2005). Moreover, there is evidence that 
those acquainted with reporting and auditing profession audit committee members 
who also have governance experience are better at understanding auditors’ 
judgments and supporting auditors when auditor-management disagreements 
happens than those members who lack such relevant knowledge (DeZoort and 
Salterio, 2001). Specifically, DeZoort and Salterio (2001) state that in the 
establishment of corporate reporting policies, audit committee members need be 
acquainted with regulatory requirements of auditing. Financial expertise enables 
them to understand auditor’s responsibility of explicit reporting, and to cognize the 
seriousness and appropriateness of being an auditor, therefore improving the quantity 
and quality of risk reporting, and internal controls related to risk management. 
Empirically, Abbott et al. (2004) find audit committee expertise (at least one audit 
committee member need be acquainted with financial professions) could 
significantly reduce the incidence of financial restatement. Krishman (2005) reports 
that audit committee expertise leads to less frequent internal control incidences. 
Studies of audit quality find that the power of an audit committee can be impaired or 
weakened if no one on the committee has recent financial expertise (Turley and 
Zaman, 2004; DeZoort et al., 2002). Thus, audit committee expertise can be 
expected to positively impact on audit quality, and extend audit scope and as a result 
improve voluntary forward-looking risk disclosures. Hence, I hypothesize audit 
committee expertise has a significant positive impact on the volume of forward-
looking risk disclosure.  
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2.3.5.5. Audit committee diligence 
In order to function effectively, audit committee members need to devote enough 
time and effort to carry out their responsibilities. Committee meetings assemble audit 
committee members to discuss disclosure quality issues. The frequency of committee 
meetings can indirectly reflect audit committee diligence and has been related to a 
reduced probability of accounting fraud (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001), so it is 
commonly considered as a character of committee activity (Zaman et al., 2011). The 
monitoring effectiveness of an audit committee is augmented by the frequency of 
committee meetings during the year; internal and external auditors are expected to 
meet frequently to discuss audit issues in a time-efficient fashion (FRC, 2012). 
Empirical results suggest that more frequent audit committee meetings can 
improve risk reporting in two ways. First, frequent meetings with internal auditors 
keep committee members updated of accounts and other audit issues. When a 
significant reporting issue arises, they react quickly and mobilize relevant internal 
audit resources to resolve the issue. Secondly, regular committee meetings could 
mobilize extra external audit resources in addressing emergent reporting issues 
swiftly (Abbott et al., 2003). These benefits shorten audit time in the year end thus 
relieve the pressure of auditors in this particular time of the year, which improve 
external audit quality and decrease the possibility of accounting restatement, as audit 
committee members are more likely to detect and correct misstatement before the 
public release of annual reports (Abbott et al., 2004). Based on the above argument, I 
can propose that active audit committees can positively extend audit scope and 
reinforce internal control, then improve the extent and content of risk disclosure. 
Therefore I hypothesize that audit committee diligence could positively impact on 
the volume of forward-looking risk disclosures.  
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I follow Zaman et al.’s (2011) approach and use ‘a composite measure of audit 
committee effectiveness’ which comprises audit committee ‘independence’, 
‘expertise’, ‘diligence (frequency of meetings)’ and ‘size’. The joint effect of these 
four dimensions also reflects the recommendations of the Guidance on Audit 
Committees (2012, pp. 3-4) by Financial Reporting Council: “the board should 
establish an audit committee of at least three, or in the case of smaller companies two, 
independent non-executive directors; the board should satisfy itself that at least one 
member of the audit committee has recent and relevant financial experience; 
sufficient time should be allowed to enable the audit committee to undertake as full a 
discussion as may be required”. In this chapter I assign a dummy 1 to the company if 
it fulfils all these characteristics and 0 otherwise. Dummy 1 refers to an effective 
audit committee, while dummy 0 refers to an ineffective audit committee. I have the 
following hypothesis: 
H4: There is a positive relationship between the audit committee effectiveness and 
the volume of forward-looking risk disclosure. 
 
2.3.6. Ownership structure - Outside investment-institution-held shares 
While the monitoring role of the board is well-examined, prior literature also 
propose the role of shareholders on monitoring managerial discretion. Investment 
institution is a major type of shareholder, characterised with intensive (large stake) 
of shareholdings. I use the proportion of shareholdings by investment institution as a 
proxy for strength of external investors. 
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Investment-institution-held shares refer to ‘the percentage of total shares in 
issue held as long-term strategic holdings by investment banks or institutions seeking 
a long-term return’. Bushee and Noe (2000) describe long-term investment 
institutions as “dedicated” investors, characterized as possessing large stable stakes 
with a low portfolio turnover strategy. Because of their large, stable ownership 
position, those major shareholders usually have the advantage to obtain inside 
information about their invested companies. Meanwhile, these institutional investors 
have superior profit-making abilities to interpret the implications of public signals; 
as a result, voluntary disclosure is of little utility to monitor corporate management 
and may cause high proprietary cost. Specifically, profitable trading opportunities 
could be lost if more forward-looking disclosures provide an alternative resource for 
inside information. In addition, dedicated institutional investors do not trade 
regularly; the liquidity benefits of securities trading due to more disclosures are no 
priority to them than to other investors. In light of this, dedicated institutions are 
likely to be unconcerned about disclosure approaches or may even prefer firms with 
less impending disclosure. Based on these arguments, I have the fifth hypothesis: 
H5: There is a negative association between the extent of Investment-institution-held 
shares and the volume of forward-looking risk disclosures.  
 
2.3.7. Ownership structure - Inside investment employee-held shares 
Employee-held shares are defined as those strategic share holdings of 5% or more 
held by inside employees, or by individual investors. These salaried employees get 
paid to manage corporate assets and generally work for the wealth of employers 
(Gimbel, 2003). These employees with strategic shareholdings are found to bear 
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lower job threat and immerse in the same culture and values of the firm like other 
employees. Accordingly, shareholdings by inside employees is planned for a long-
term horizon. This stable and lasting investment strategy is found to generate the 
lowest portfolio turnover compared to any other class of investors. Previous work 
has found some investment employees do not sell their stakes after multiple years’ 
waiting (10 years or more) (Ryan and Schneider, 2002). This long-term strategic 
planning enables inside investment employees, perhaps more than any other class of 
institutional investor, to seek a significant level and depth of inside information 
before realising their investment. Their understanding of proprietary information is 
augmented by comparatively frequent and intensive contact and communication with 
invested firms (Ryan and Schneider, 2002). Considering investment employees have 
their advantage to obtain both published and non-material private information, they 
have a preference for those firms which voluntarily release less information because 
of proprietary cost conerns. I therefore have the sixth hypothesis: 
H6: There is a negative association between the extent of employee-held shares and 
the volume of forward-looking risk disclosures. 
 
2.3.8. Other influential factors 
2.3.8.1. Size 
Healy and Palepu (1995) suggest that the optimal disclosure level of a firm is 
decided by comparing the benefits of disclosure (particularly capital market benefits) 
to the costs of disclosure (particularly proprietary and litigation costs). Every firm is 
unique in character, therefore costs arising from generating the information and the 
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benefits obtained when more information becomes available will be different. 
Therefore concerning the reporting style, the narratives and accounts in the annual 
report vary according to corporate specific characteristics, and firm size is a 
particular feature to consider. Extensive empirical studies indicate that firm size 
retains an important role in determining firm’s disclosing styles. They suggest 
several reasons for the influence of size on a firm’s risk disclosure level. First, more 
voluntary informative disclosure is comparatively cheaper for larger firms because 
that information might have been prepared this information ready for internal use. 
While smaller firms face difference situations, due to limited public and press 
information, annual reports are the main information resources for competitors, so 
they may be more reluctant to provide comprehensive view of their operations. 
Disseminating information can be more costly for smaller firms because the media 
are prone to centre on and publish news relating to large firms. Second, larger firms 
are more likely to be scrutinized by government and regulatory authorities, and are 
expected to report more information so as to ease undesired pressure from the market. 
Third, in view of cost of capital, larger firms have more funding requirements from 
external capital markets while smaller firms don’t. Increasing the release of 
voluntary risk information may help them gain investors’ confidence and increase 
share liquidity, which will subsequently smooth financing difficulties and reduce the 
cost of capital (e.g., Donnell and Mulcahy, 2008; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Linsley 
and Shrives, 2006). Larger firms are particularly aware of the benefit in financing 
(Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Therefore, firm size is included as a control variable 
in my study with a positive association expected in relation to the quantity of 
forward-looking risk disclosures. Previous studies have adopted different measures 
of firm size including turnover, total assets, market capitalization and employee 
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numbers. Since there is no theoretical agreement on the preference of one measure to 
the others, this study will measure firm size (SIZE) by the natural logarithm of total 
number of employees. 
 
2.3.8.2. Profitability 
Prior studies have not reached general consensus on the relationship between firms’ 
profitability and the volume of voluntary risk narratives. One View states that a 
firm’s profitability is positively associated with its disclosure level. In a financially 
healthy firm, managers have a greater motivation to release more information as this 
may increase investors’ confidence that in turn raises the value of management 
compensation. Signalling theory also supports this argument; it posits that profitable 
firms have more incentives to voluntarily release more information in the annual 
reports as a favourable signal of their superior performance (Wallace et al., 1994). 
Conversely, if a company fails to disclose enough risk information, some negative 
consequences might arise. For example, stock price volatility is commonly 
considered as a consequence of information insufficiency. With lack of information 
available to investors, it increases the difficulties to precisely assess future payoffs 
and the relative risk level with the investment. Other consequences may include 
higher cost of capital (Botosan, 1997) and higher interest rates. Eventually, the 
information asymmetry between external investors and internal management may 
increase the risk of excessive inside trading that disheartens investors. Regarding the 
negative effects, firms may find it more desirable to voluntarily publish more 
forward-looking risk information. 
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Alternatively, there are issues that can discourage management to voluntarily 
disclose risk information. Some firms are tentative to conceal risk disclosures when 
firms reach a high level of performance, in order to maintain advantageously 
competitiveness.  
Based on the above argument, I include firm profitability as a possible 
contributor to firms’ forward-looking risk disclosure practices, but in no certain 
direction. Relative profitability is measured in this study via return on assets (ROA).   
 
2.3.8.3. Liquidity 
Signalling theory suggests that firm liquidity is positively associated with corporate 
disclosure levels. Compared with their peers in competing firms, a firm with high 
liquidity ratio is likely to release more risk information as disclosures provide them a 
useful means to demonstrate their expertise in handling liquidity risks compared with 
those with lower liquidity ratios. In addition, Jensen and Meckling (1976) maintain 
that firms with high liquidity ratios bear high monitoring fees. They may want to 
reduce the monitoring costs by disclosing more information in their annual report 
narratives.  
Concerning the utility of disclosure, empirical evidence presents mixed results. 
For instance, Graham et al. (2005), and Marshall and Weetman (2007) find that firms 
with high liquid ratios are prone to provide more voluntary information. Wallace et 
al. (1994), however, document a negative association between the two variables. 
However, Wallace and Naser (1995) and Owusu-Anash (1998) both report a 
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insignificant relationship between firm’s mandatory disclosure level and the liquidity 
ratio. 
As a result, I control for firms’ liquidity as a potential variable that may impact 
a firm’s forward-looking risk disclosures. Liquidity is measured by current ratio, 
using total current assets to total current liabilities. 
 
2.3.8.4. Leverage 
According to agency theory, firms with more leverage are generally 
experiencing higher monitoring costs (Ahmed and Cmytis, 1999). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) indicate that firms’ information asymmetric problem can be 
reduced through the way of disclosing more information to their creditors, thus 
reducing the costs. In addition, providing more internal risk management information 
by managers can be viewed as a signal of their ability to fulfil the firm’s obligations 
to debt-holders. Empirical evidence regarding an association between a firm’s 
gearing level and risk disclosures is mixed. Some studies have observed positive 
effects of leverage to risk disclosure (e.g., Marshall and Weetman, 2007; Deumes 
and Knechel, 2008; Hassan, 2009), while others have found no relationship between 
them (e.g. Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Rajab and Handley-
Schachler, 2009).  
Resultantly, I control for firms’ leverage as a potential variable that may impact 
a firm’s forward-looking risk disclosures. I measure firms’ leverage level using total 
debt over total capital.  
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2.4. Methodology 
2.4.1. Measure Disclosure Quantity 
Content analysis has been widely used in accounting disclosure research to identify 
the presence of a theme in verbal reports and other written materials, additionally it 
allows disclosures to be systematically categorized and compared (Rajab and 
Handley-Schachler, 2009). This chapter adopts this methodology mainly because 
risk disclosure, particularly regarding non-financial categories, is mostly disclosed 
qualitatively and content analysis facilitates coders to measure the volume and the 
extent of that disclosure information. 
In content analysis, researchers use different counting measures, including 
words, phrases, sentences, pages and number of lines. In a previous research, 
Hussainey et al. (2003) adopt automated text recognition software to count risk-
related keywords in corporate annual reports. Gietzmann (2006) uses the raw 
disclosure data from the London Stock Exchange’s Regulatory News Service, which 
he argues provides timely information that is date and time stamped, can be 
categorised by topic, and allows for the calculation of additional disclosure measures. 
Rather than directly counting words and phrases in previous studies, our research 
measures the volume of forward-looking risk disclosure by reading, recording and 
categorising risk-related sentences, as the latter coding method is widely recognized 
as more accurate than the former one. This method requires I to read through all the 
narrative sections of annual reports and identify all sentences containing risk-related 
information. Sentences will be coded as relating to risk disclosure if they include 
indicators of risks (any reference to an “opportunity”, a “prospect” or a “hazard, 
threat or exposure”) (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). The word “risk” does not need to 
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appear for the sentence to be recognised as a risk disclosure sentence. Hussainey et 
al. (2003) indicate that during the coding process, some sentences may be 
categorised as past disclosure while they also contain information that is relevant to 
the future. For example, a sentence might indicate that the Research and 
Development (R&D) branch of a firm increased its budget by 10% in the preceding 
accounting year. This information goes beyond the disclosure category, however; it 
also conveys meaning in that increased investment in R&D is expected to increase 
that firm’s future cash flow. In the coding process, final decisions concerning time 
orientation will be based on whether the sentence delivers information that would 
impact on the future or alludes to actions that will continue in the future operations 
of the firm. This research acknowledges the semantic ambiguity in the coding 
process, and uses verb tense to categorise the time orientation of risk sentences. 
In the implementation of content analysis, some basic elements need to be 
clarified: the research question (measuring the volume of forward-looking risk 
disclosure and associating it with corporate governance characteristics and 
ownership structure); the document being coded (Corporate Annual Reports 2010); 
the coding unit (sentence); and the coding procedure (manual). Last, the coded 
information will be subjected to interpretation by the researcher (Rajab and Handley-
Schachler, 2009).  
As to the location of risk information, previous studies of American companies 
(eg., Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004) find such information to be spread throughout the 
notes on financial statements and the report on Management Discussion and 
Analysis (MD&A). In the UK sample, the Operating and Financial Review (similar 
as MD&A, but non-mandatory) is the main source of narrative risk disclosure. The 
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Combined Code on Corporate Governance, published by the London Stock 
Exchange in 1998, demands that listed companies maintain an effective internal 
control system and clearly explains risk management policies in the Corporate 
Governance section. This research will look at all voluntary narrative disclosures 
within annual reports, which includes Directors’ Reports, CEO/Managing Directors’ 
Report, Chairman’s Report, Review of Operations, Principal risks and uncertainties, 
Corporate Governance (Internal Control and risk management). Remuneration, board 
independence and/or other corporate governance issues are not considered; 
Corporate Social Responsibilities (personnel, health and safety) are considered, so as 
to identify risk information (O’Sullivan et al., 2008). 
The dependent variable - forward-looking risk disclosure - is dichotomous. It is 
assigned a value of one if the firm discloses forward-looking risk information in their 
annual report and zero otherwise.  
Kravet and Muslu (2013) developed a UNIX perl code to identify forward-
looking disclosures that indicate future risk or uncertainties. Specifically, the code 
records a sentence as forward-looking risk or risk-related if it contains at least one 
keyword that connotes risk. These keywords (where a (*) indicates that suffixes are 
allowed) are: “can, cannot, could, may, might, risk(*), uncertain(*), likely to , 
subject to, potential(*), vary(*), varies, depend(*), expos(*), fluctuat(*), possibl(*), 
susceptible, affect, influenc(*), and hedg(*)”. This study will adopt this code to 
facilitate measuring the content of forward-looking risk information by counting the 
number of sentences with at least one of these keywords. 
I firstly adopt the UNIX perl code to identify risk sentences within the annual 
reports of twenty randomly chosen companies; after reading them carefully I found 
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almost all tagged sentences to be risk-related, which reflects the effectiveness of the 
code words. In the “Principal Risks and Uncertainties” section, which has the most 
intensive risk information, nearly all the sentences feature at least one of the UNIX 
perl code key word. This list is not exhaustive; after careful examination of the 
narrative parts of the selected annual reports, more code words were added as an 
expansion of Kravet and Muslu’s (2013) UNIX perl code to capture the meaning of 
future performance-related and strategic decisions of the firm, these words are: 
opportunit*, prospect, expect, impact, outlook. 
The most frequently-appearing words - “can, could, may, might” - are 
polysemous, in that they can indicate a future prospective but also be understood as 
“be able to” and do not imply a specific time orientation. Thus, if I solely relied on 
the computer software to identify risk-related sentences there would be a risk of 
resulting in unreliable data because of the “boiler plate” word problem (Abraham 
and Cox, 2007). Therefore, in the second step of my analysis, I carried out a manual 
examination of all tagged risk-related sentences to filter out those sentences that 
contain the boiler word but merely discussed risk information. The combination of 
these two approaches is an experimental practice that will hopefully decrease the 
subjectivity of content analysis, meanwhile maintaining consistency in the coding 
process. 
 
2.5. Model specification 
𝐹𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑣𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,t     (2.1) 
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where FRD represents the total volume of forward-looking risk disclosure. CG is a 
set of corporate governance variables that include: board composition, board 
independence, board size and audit committee effectiveness. Board composition is 
measured by non-executive board members score (NES) and the dominance of non-
executive directors on the board (DNE). NES is the percentage of non-executive 
board members over the total number of board members. DNE is defined as when 
the non-executive directors constitute over 50% of total board members. Board 
independence is measured by independent board member score (IBS), and 
dominance of independent directors on the board (DIB). IBS is the percentage of 
independent board members as reported by the company (independent board 
members are those individuals not employed by the company, not employed by or 
representing a major shareholder, not having served on the board for more than ten 
years, not a reference shareholder with more than 5% of holdings, not holding any 
cross-board membership, having no recent or immediate family ties to the company, 
and not in acceptance of any compensation other than compensation for board 
service). DIB is defined as when the independent directors constitute over 50% of 
total board members. Board size (BS) is measured by the logarithm of the total 
number of board members. Audit committee effectiveness (ACE) is a dichotomous 
composite measure comprising four characteristics: audit committee independence, 
expertise, diligence and size, and is coded as 1 if a company fulfils all the four 
characteristics of an effective audit committee and is coded as 0 otherwise3. 
                                                          
3 I follow the same definition as per Zaman et al. (2011): first, all members of the audit committee 
must be independent non-executive directors; second, at least one member of the audit committee has 
recent and relevant financial expertise and desirably have a professional qualification from one of the 
professional accountancy bodies; third, audit committees should meet no fewer than three times 
during a year, held to coincide with key dates within the financial reporting and audit cycle; fourth, 
the audit committee should comprise at least three members to ensure it functions effectively.  
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The OWNERSHIP variables are calculated as the total number of shares held by 
each type of investor relative to the total number of shares outstanding per firm. 
Employee-held shares (EMHS) are the percentage of strategic share holdings of 5% 
or more held by employees, or by individual investors. Investment-institution-held 
shares (INVEHS) are the percentage of total shares in issue held as long term 
strategic holdings by investment banks or institutions seeking a long term return. The 
CONTROL variables indicate the factors found in previous studies that might impact 
a firm’s voluntary risk disclosures: firm size (SIZE), measured by the natural 
logarithm of total number of employees; a firm’s financial performance, which uses 
ROA as an indicator; leverage (LEV), calculated by total debt/total capital; and 
liquidity (LIQU), estimated using the current ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities. Finally, vj is an industry-specific component, which I control for by 
including industry dummies (IND)4. 
 
2.6. Data and summary statistics  
2.6.1. Data construction 
The original sample consists of 240 non-financial institutions listed within the FTSE 
350 Index in 2010, based on the 2010 FTSE 350 companies list, published by 
Thomson Reuters. Three companies had not yet released complete full- year annual 
reports; therefore 237 firms were coded. All annual reports are collected from the 
company websites with a year-end date nearest to 31st December 2010. Due to the 
unavailability of corporate governance information in annual reports and missing 
                                                          
4 The Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) segregate markets into 9 non-financial sectors: basic 
materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care, industrials, oil and gas, technology, 
telecommunications, utilities.   
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ownership and financial ratios from DataStream, the original sample shrinks to 206 
observations (see Table 2.1 for sample industry coverage). 
 
Table 2.1 
Sample industry coverage and variable mean values 
Industries Total0 Total1 No. of observations 
Oil & Gas 147 164 15 
Basic Materials 162 178 19 
Industrials 121 138 56 
Consumer Goods 112 126 24 
Health Care 180 200 8 
Consumer Services 94 111 55 
Telecommunications 113 121 5 
Utilities 147 165 8 
Technology 99 112 16 
Notes: Total0 is the total volume of risk disclosure exclude internal control risk management policies, 
Total1 is total volume of risk disclosure include internal control risk management policies. 
 
The risk disclosure measures in this study are limited to the information 
published in annual reports. Financial institutions are excluded from the sample since 
the nature of these firms varies considerably from non-financial firms and this 
difference can have a significant effect on the risk disclosure approaches of the two 
groups (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). The FTSE 350 Index was chosen as it comprises 
the largest firms in the UK, based on corporate market capitalisation. Most existing 
research (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Linsley and Shrives, 2006) uses the FTSE 100 
Index; this study, for the first time, explores forward-looking risk disclosure within a 
comparatively large sample. I limit the analysis to one year considering that firms’ 
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disclosure practices appear to remain reasonably constant over time. This is the 
normal empirical approach in analysing risk disclosure level and content (e.g.,, 
Botosan, 1997; Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007). 
Admittedly, the year-to-year disclosure observations for a single firm are not 
independent; I choose to obtain greater cross-sectional observations as opposed to 
observations over time. The year 2010 is chosen as 2010 is generally viewed as a 
threshold when the monetary market started to recover following a period of severe 
market recession and volatility since the 2007 financial crisis; thus listed firms are 
expected to place greater value on risk disclosure to win back investors’ confidence. 
Another reason is that this year provides very recent empirical evidence in post era 
of the 2007 financial crisis and facilitates gaining reasonable access to firms’ annual 
reports yet still guarantees post-sample year data is obtainable.  
In Model (2.1), data pertaining to board and ownership structure are obtained 
from DataStream. Audit committee composite data is sourced from the annual 
reports of sample companies in 2009 (closest to the 31st Dec. 2009)5.  
 
2.6.2. Summary statistics 
                                                          
5  Codes in DataStream I use for searching include: Non-Executive Board Members score: 
CGBSO06S - percentage of non-executive board members; Independent Board Members Score: 
CGBSO07S - percentage of independent board members as reported by the company; Board Size: 
CGBSDP060 - the total number of board members at the end of the fiscal year; Audit Committee 
Independence: CGBFDP018 the percentage of independent board members on the audit committee as 
stipulated by the company; Audit Committee Non-Executive Member : CGBFDP019 the percentage 
of non-executive board members on the audit committee as stipulated by the company; Board 
Functions/Audit Committee Expertise: CGBFO03S – does the company have an audit committee with 
at least three members and at least one "financial expert" within the meaning of Sarbanes-Oxley; 
Investment institutions held shares: NOSHIC - the percentage of total shares in issue held as long 
term strategic holdings by investment banks or institutions seeking a long term return; employees held 
shares: NOSHEM - the percentage of total shares in issue held by employees or by those with a 
substantial position in a firm that provides significant voting power at an annual general meeting. 
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The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.2; the average number of 
disclosure sentences across the sample is 120 (Total0), with a maximum of 455 and a 
minimum of 26, indicating a large variation in firms’ forward-looking risk 
disclosures. This is also reflected in a large standard deviation of 65.39. Total1 that 
includes internal control risk management policies reflects similar characteristics of 
Total0. Regarding board attributes, non-executive and independent directors 
comprise averagely less than 40% of the board. This is a different composition 
compared with Abraham and Cox (2007) and Donnelly and Mulcahy’s (2008) 
studies, which both document a presence above 50% of non-executive and 
independent board directors. This might partly be due to sample differences - 
Abraham and Cox (2007) consider FTSE 100 firms and Donnelly and Mulcahy 
(2008) study Ireland firms. A more detailed inspection of the raw data used to 
produce Table 2.2 reveals that only slightly less than 25% of sample companies have 
dominant non-executive and independent directors on the board. The average board 
size (measured by the logarithm of total board members) is 2.17. The composite 
measure of audit effectiveness reveals that a significant majority of sample firms 
(88%) have complied with the FRC (2012) guidance on improving the effectiveness 
of corporate audit committees. Across the whole sample set, 181 out of 206 
companies fulfil all four requirements of a high quality audit committee including 
independence, diligence, expertise and size 6 .  In view of ownership structure, 
corporate shareholdings by inner employees is on average 6.08% per sample firm; 
that of outside investment institutions 10.41%.  
 
                                                          
6 Results are not reported in Table 2.2, but are available on request. 
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Table 2.2 
Descriptive statistics 
 Mean(Median) S.D. Min(Max) Skewness Kurtosis 
Forward-looking risk disclosure       
Total0 120 (112) 65.39 26 (455) 1.90 8.49 
Total1 136 (125) 70.26 28 (480) 1.80 7.93 
CG characteristics      
Non-executive score 37.05 (38.9) 16.26 2.01 (85.22) 0.23 2.64 
Dominance of non-executives 0.21 (0) 0.41 0 (1) 1.40 2.95 
Independent executive score 38.57 (37.5) 17.02 1.95 (88.51) 0.30 2.50 
Dominance of independent-executive 0.24 (0) 0.43 0 (1) 1.20 2.44 
Board size 2.17 (2.20) 0.25 1.61 (2.83) 0.22 2.84 
Audit committee effectiveness 0.88 (1) 0.33 0 (1) -2.32 6.38 
Ownership structure      
Employee held shares 6.08 (0) 15.05 0 (77) 2.96 11.46 
Investment institutions held shares 10.41 (8) 9.94 0 (52) 1.30 5.15 
Control variables      
Size 9.01 (9.12) 1.68 2.64 (13.24) -0.46 3.60 
ROA 6.59 (5.88) 6.39 -6.27(22.14) 0.46 3.47 
Leverage 23.52 (22.56) 17.38 0 (60.44) 0.38 2.26 
Liquidity 1.48 (1.29) 0.88 0.43 (3.89) 1.35 4.32 
      
Observations 206 206 206 206 206 
Notes: dominance of non-executives is a dummy variable where it equals 1 if the board is constituted 
by 50% or more non-executive directors, otherwise 0. Dominance of independent-executive is a 
dummy variable, where it equals 1 if the board is constituted by 50% or more independent directors, 
otherwise 0. Audit committee effectiveness is a dummy variable where it equals 1 if the audit 
committee fulfils all four requirements of a high quality audit committee, otherwise 0. 
Table 2.3 reports correlations between the total volume of forward-looking risk 
disclosure, CG characteristics and ownership structure. Overall, the results suggest a 
positive association between FRD and CG attributes and a negative association 
between FRD and the percentage of investment institutions and employees held 
shares. Noticeably, the relationship between non-executive score and independent 
executive score displays a high correlation of 0.593, which is likely because non-
executive directors overlap with independent directors.  
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Table 2.3 
Correlation matrix between CG characteristics and ownership structure and FRD 
 Total0 NES IBS BS ACE INVEHS EMHS SIZE LEV LIQU ROA 
            
Total0 1.000           
NES 0.272 1.000          
IBS 0.332 0.593 1.000         
BS 0.351 0.080 0.144 1.000        
ACE 0.192 0.120 0.230 0.180 1.000       
INVEHS -0.210 -0.102 -0.078 -0.261 0.006 1.000      
EMHS -0.158 -0.013 -0.206 -0.112 -0.151 -0.235 1.000     
SIZE 0.290 0.162 0.223 0.336 0.168 -0.196 -0.128 1.000    
LEV 0.086 0.021 0.053 0.121 0.028 -0.110 -0.065 0.182 1.000   
LIQU -0.046 -0.045 -0.029 -0.111 -0.019 -0.012 0.190 -0.359 -0.315 1.000  
ROA -0.012 0.110 -0.029 -0.050 -0.139 -0.078 -0.008 -0.087 -0.141 -0.018 1.000 
Note: Total0 – total volume of forward-looking risk disclosure exclude internal control risk management policies; NES – non-executive score; IBS – independent board score; 
BS – board size; ACE – composite measure of audit committee effectiveness; INVEHS – investment institutions held shares; EMHS – employees held shares. Correlation 
results for Total1 indicate similar results therefore I do not present the results here.  
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2.7. Regression results  
2.7.1. The determinants of forward-looking risk disclosure 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 display the OLS regression (with White heteroscedasticity 
consistent standard errors) results for the variables used in Model (1). Some board 
attributes (e.g. non-executive score, independent board score and board size) are 
inter-correlated, and the concerns about the collinearity between firm size and board 
size also remain; if I put the CG and ownership indicators in the same model and test 
how these board attributes and ownership structure affect risk disclosures 
simultaneously, the module might suffer from multicollinearity, therefore I run a 
number of OLS tests separately including these variables one at a time to avoid the 
statistic problem. I note that in Table 2.4, the level of forward-looking risk 
disclosures is significant positively correlated with all CG characteristics. 
Specifically, the strong positive correlations between FRD and the percentage of the 
board comprised of non-executive and independent directors are revealed by the 
coefficient of 0.675 and 0.760 respectively and both significant at 1% level, 
indicating that higher presence of non-executive and independent directors on board 
is important in the communication of risk information to investors. Both the findings 
evidence scholarly work on the principal-agent problem generally connected with the 
association of executive dependent directors with greater agency problems and less 
disclosure. In order to further test the monitoring effect of board characteristics on 
risk disclosure, I include two dichotomous variables regarding dominance of non-
executives, or of independent executives, which indicates whether a board is 
comprised of over 50% of non-executive directors or independent directors. I 
observe significant and positive coefficients (19.944/41.046) of the two variables, 
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which confirm that companies with dominant non-executive and independent 
directors on the board are more likely to disclose more forward-looking risk 
information in their annual reports. This evidence support Hypothesis 1 and 2.   
Board size is significant positively correlated with FRD, with a coefficient of 57.305, 
significant at 5% level. Concern about the collinearity between board size and firm 
size remains however; this is due to larger boards generally indicating a larger firm 
size, where larger firms engage in more voluntary disclosure than their smaller 
counterparts. Therefore I exclude firm size variable (SIZE) and retest the correlation 
between board size and FRD. The result is consistent with a coefficient of 80.497, 
significant at 1% level, indicating that the collinearity effect between board size and 
firm size is minimal and main regression is effective. This supports Hypothesis 3. 
The composite measure of audit committee effectiveness also shows a positive and 
significant association (with a coefficient of 18.168, at 10% significance level) with 
the total amount of forward-looking risk disclosures, which support Hypothesis 4, 
that a more effective audit committee has a higher monitoring effect that leads to 
more voluntary risk disclosure.  
       Regarding the control variables, I report a significant positive relationship 
between firm size and the volume of FRD in all univariate tests (at 1% significance 
level). This is in line with previous literature that larger firms are inclined to disclose 
more information as it is less costly and with lower cost of capital and higher 
scrutiny from regulatory authorities. I also find a positive relationship between firm 
profitability and leverage and the extent of FRD, and a negative relationship between 
liquidity and the extent of FRD, but the effects are not significant.  
                                                          
7 The results are not reported but available on request.    
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Table 2.4 
OLS regression of the relationship between FRD (Total0) and CG 
characteristics 
FRD Predicte
d sign 
CG characteristics 
  (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3) (4) 
NES + 0.675***      
  (0.003)      
DNE +  19.944*     
   (0.055)     
IBS +   0.760***    
    (0.002)    
DIB +    41.046***   
     (0.000)   
BS +     57.305**  
      (0.014)  
ACE +      18.168** 
       (0.062) 
        
SIZE + 12.965*** 13.239*** 12.109*** 11.825*** 10.960*** 13.419*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
ROA ? 0.042 0.070 0.251 0.108 0.178 0.345 
  (0.947) (0.912) (0.680) (0.857) (0.765) (0.586) 
LEV + 0.341 0.381 0.330 0.275 0.324 0.382* 
  (0.103) (0.069) (0.108) (0.167) (0.128) (0.072) 
LIQU - -3.045 -3.493 -4.099 -3.482 -3.823 -4.027 
  (0.589) (0.547) (0.444) (0.508) (0.474) (0.482) 
        
Constant  -49.442 -30.334 -46.919 -22.338 -133.51** -43.190 
  (0.231) (0.478) (0.244) (0.575) (0.023) (0.318) 
        
F value  4.45 4.31 4.98 5.20 4.83 5.02 
Adj. R2  0.26 0.25 0.27 0.31 0.28 0.25 
Observations  206 206 206 206 206 206 
Note: Total0 – total volume of forward-looking risk disclosure exclude internal control risk 
management policies; NES – non-executive score; DNE – dominance of non-executive directors; IBS 
– independent board score; DIB – dominance of independent board members; ACE – audit committee 
effectiveness (composite measure). 
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Table 2.5 reports the effect of ownership structure on firms’ forward-looking 
risk disclosure practices. The coefficients on the ownership variables provide 
substantial support for the hypothesized relationships between the classes of different 
investors and risk reporting. Corporate ownership by inside employees is negatively 
related to forward-looking risk disclosure with the coefficient of -0.609, supporting 
previous arguments that inside investment employees prefer companies not to 
disclose too much risk information due to concerns regarding proprietary costs. 
However, I find a negative relationship between investment-institutions-held shares 
and the level of FRD, but this relationship is not statistically significant. From a 
stakeholder agency perspective, whilst large, long-term institutional shareholders 
may accomplish a monitoring function, this does not seem to include compelling 
firms to increase voluntary risk disclosure. Rather, a preference for firms with a 
lower level of forward-looking risk disclosure, as revealed in my analyses, suggests 
motives for private information acquisition.  
Turning to the control variables, the coefficient for firm size is statistically 
significant and positive in both Table 2.4 and Table 2.5, confirming previous work 
that suggests larger firms tend to publish greater risk disclosure. ROA, leverage and 
liquidity are not statistically significant. Regression results for the industry controls 
are not presented in the table due to space limitations, but I find Consumer Goods, 
Consumer Services, Technology and Telecommunications to be relatively low risk 
disclosing sectors. The statistic coefficient can also be evidenced by the Sample 
industry coverage and variable mean values as presented in Table 2.1, where I find 
that industries which disclosure less forward-looking risk information in the previous 
year have a higher beta in the following year. This relates to my discussion of the 
impact of forward-looking risk disclosures on firm risk as per Chapter 3 (pp.132). 
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Table 2.5 
OLS regression of the relationship between FRD (Total0) and ownership 
structure 
FRD Predicted sign Ownership structure 
  (1) (2) 
EMHS - -0.609***  
  (0.010)  
INVEHS -  -0.480 
   (0.246) 
    
SIZE + 13.365*** 13.338*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA ? 0.257 0.143 
  (0.685) (0.825) 
LEV + 0.366 0.334 
  (0.084) (0.127) 
LIQU - -2.627 -4.460 
  (0.643) (0.431) 
    
Constant  -24.792 -14.46 
  (0.559) (0.758) 
F value  4.49 4.67 
Adj. R2  0.25 0.24 
Observations  206 206 
Note: Total0 – total volume of forward-looking risk disclosure exclude internal control risk 
management policies; INVEHS – investment-institution-held shares; EMHS – employee-held shares. 
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2.7.2. Additional tests 
The usefulness of general statements regarding risk management policies in 
Corporate Governance sections has often been questioned in previous literature (e.g.,, 
Linsley and Shrives, 2006), as institutional investors request more specific and 
detailed risk discussions. Despite a lack of specification, a clarified explanation of 
internal control risk management systems as an important mechanism for corporate 
governance does contain useful information about how risk committees work and 
how risk management is organised within the firm. Therefore, I include internal 
control risk management policies into the total volume of forward-looking risk 
disclosures (Total1) and re-examine the relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics and ownership structure and Total1. The results are presented in Table 
2.6 and 2.7. Regressions results exhibit similar patterns with those reported in Table 
2.4 and 2.5, which provide further evidence for the hypotheses in this chapter.  
Although our risk disclosure metrics (FRD) are insignificantly different from a 
normal distribution, some of our observations have a lower bound of zero, for 
instance: the minimum disclosure of forward-looking financial risk is 0, the 
minimum disclosure of good news is 0, and the minimum disclosure of forward-
looking quantitative risk is 08. In order to assess whether this characteristic could 
potentially influence the obtained results I estimate the main regression above using 
both traditional OLS (with robust standard errors) and Tobit estimators, the latter of 
which is designed form cases where a dependent variable has a lower or upper bound 
(censored). The results are presented in Table 2.8 and Table 2.9. Both the traditional 
OLS (with robust standard errors) and Tobit estimators generate almost identical 
results.  
                                                          
8 See descriptive statistics of Table 3.6 on Page 128 and Table 4.2 on Page 183. 
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Table 2.6 
OLS regression of the relationship between FRD (Total1) and CG 
characteristics  
FRD Predicted 
sign 
CG characteristics 
  (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3) (4) 
NES + 0.707***      
  (0.004)      
DNE +  20.490*     
   (0.061)     
IBS +   0.85***    
    (0.001)    
DIB +    43.378***   
     (0.000)   
BS +     63.257**  
      (0.019)  
ACE +      18.578* 
       (0.076) 
        
SIZE + 13.494*** 13.798*** 12.59*** 12.278 11.217*** 13.986*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.002) 
ROA ? -0.032 -0.001 -0.003 0.036 0.107 0.284 
  (0.964) (0.999) (0.997) (0.957) (0.870) (0.684) 
LEV + 0.366 0.408* 0.31 0.296 0.345 0.409* 
  (0.110) (0.075) (0.162) (0.175) (0.137) (0.079) 
LIQU - -4.064 -4.543 -5.07 -4.517 -4.870 -5.091 
  (0.515) (0.480) (0.390) (0.440) (0.405) (0.423) 
        
Constant  -47.246 -27.24 46.64 -18.782 -141.11** -40.391 
  (0.309) (0.574) (0.325) (0.682) (0.028) (0.410) 
        
F value  4.27 4.11 4.89 5.06 4.61 4.88 
Adj. R2  0.25 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.26 0.23 
Observations  206 206 206 206 206 206 
Note: Total1 – total volume of forward-looking risk disclosure include internal control risk 
management policies; NES – non-executive score; DNE – dominance of non-executive directors; IBS 
– independent board score; DIB – dominance of independent board members; ACE – audit committee 
effectiveness (composite measure). 
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Table 2.7 
OLS regression of the relationship between FRD (Total1) and ownership 
structure 
FRD Predicted sign Ownership structure 
  (1) (2) 
EMHS - -0.607**  
  (0.015)  
INVEHS -  -0.583 
   (0.213) 
    
SIZE + 13.950*** 13.760*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
ROA ? 0.192 0.057 
  (0.782) (0.936) 
LEV + 0.393 0.352 
  (0.090) (0.145) 
LIQU - -3.696 -5.626 
  (0.557) (0.371) 
Constant  -21.736 -7.912 
  (0.655) (0.884) 
F value  4.22 4.48 
Adj. R2  0.24 0.23 
Observations  206 206 
Note: Total1 – total volume of forward-looking risk disclosure include internal control risk 
management policies; INVEHS – investment-institution-held shares; EMHS – employee-held shares. 
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Table 2.8 
Tobit retest of the relationship between FRD (Total0) and CG characteristics and ownership structure 
FRD Predicted sign CG characteristics Ownership structure 
  (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NES + 0.675***        
  (0.008)        
DNE   19.944       
   (0.056)       
IBS +   0.760***      
    (0.001)      
DIB     41.046***     
     (0.000)     
BS +     57.305**    
      (0.001)    
ACE +      18.168   
       (0.137)   
          
EMHS -       -0.609**  
        (0.029)  
INVEHS -        -0.480 
         (0.260) 
          
SIZE + 12.965*** 13.239*** 12.109*** 11.825*** 10.960*** 13.419*** 13.365*** 13.338*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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ROA ? 0.042 0.070 0.251 0.108 0.178 0.345 0.257 0.143 
  (0.946) (0.911) (0.681) (0.857) (0.770) (0.581) (0.678) (0.820) 
Leverage + 0.341 0.381 0.330 0.275 0.324 0.382 0.366 0.334 
  (0.177) (0.134) (0.188) (0.263) (0.196) (0.135) (0.149) (0.196) 
Liquidity - -3.045 -3.493 -4.099 -3.482 -3.823 -4.027 -2.627 -4.460 
  (0.559) (0.506) (0.427) (0.490) (0.458) (0.444) (0.618) (0.399) 
          
Constant  -24.110 -6.839 -17.202 3.957 -98.071** -16.436 -0.648 7.668 
  (0.421) (0.816) (0.555) (0.889) (0.015) (0.587) (0.982) (0.812) 
Chi2  76.35 72.92 79.49 89.18 80.11 71.49 74.07 70.55 
Pseudo R2  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Observations  206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 
Note: Total0 – total volume of forward-looking risk disclosure exclude internal control risk management policies; NES – non-executive score; IBS – independent board score; 
ACE – audit committee effectiveness (composite measure); INVEHS – investment-institution-held shares; EMHS – employee-held shares. 
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Table 2.9 
Tobit retest of the relationship between FRD (Total1) and CG characteristics and ownership structure 
FRD Predicted sign CG characteristics Ownership structure 
  (1a) (1b) (2) (2b) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NES  + 0.707**        
  (0.011)        
DNE   20.490*       
   (0.071)       
IBS +   0.828***      
    (0.001)      
DIB     43.378***     
     (0.000)     
BS +     63.257***    
      (0.001)    
ACE +      18.578   
       (0.162)   
          
EMHS -       -0.607**  
        (0.045)  
INVEHS -        -0.583 
         (0.208) 
          
SIZE + 13.494*** 13.798*** 12.513*** 12.278*** 11.217*** 13.986*** 13.950*** 13.760*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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ROA ? -0.032 0.001 0.187 0.036 0.107 0.284 0.192 0.057 
  (0.963) (0.999) (0.778) (0.956) (0.871) (0.677) (0.775) (0.933) 
LEV + 0.366 0.408 0.352 0.296 0.345 0.409 0.393 0.352 
  (0.183) (0.140) (0.196) (0.269) (0.204) (0.141) (0.155) (0.209) 
LIQU - -4.064 -4.543 -5.172 -4.517 -4.870 -5.091 -3.696 -5.626 
  (0.473) (0.426) (0.356) (0.411) (0.384) (0.374) (0.519) (0.328) 
          
Constant  -13.829 4.258 -7.039 15.667 -96.448 -5.556 10.422 21.862 
  (0.671) (0.894) (0.824) (0.613) (0.027) (0.866) (0.746) (0.533) 
Chi2  71.23 67.93 74.96 83.45 75.86 66.63 68.69 66.26 
Pseudo R2  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Observations  206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 
Note: Total1 – total volume of forward-looking risk disclosure include internal control risk management policies; NES – non-executive score; IBS – independent board score; 
ACE – audit committee effectiveness (composite measure); INVEHS – investment-institution-held shares; EMHS – employee-held shares. 
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2.8. Conclusion 
This study examines the determinants of forward-looking risk disclosure within UK 
annual reports. I find that corporate boards with a higher presence of independent, 
non-executive directors, larger board sizes and higher audit committee effectiveness 
all contribute to more forward-looking risk disclosures. Conversely, share holdings 
by investment institutions and inside employees are negatively related to forward-
looking risk disclosure.  
The originality of this cross-sectional exploration of forward-looking risk 
disclosures and the association with CG characteristics and ownership has opened up 
new avenues for future risk disclosure studies. Sample companies could be selected 
from other countries and comparative cross-country studies would be of particular 
relevance. When conducting investigations in other countries, attention needs to be 
paid to legislation requirements, accounting standards and cultural attitudes which 
might have an influence on firms’ risk reporting practices (Aljifri and Hussainey, 
2007). Research that investigates forward-looking risk information in specific 
industries might also yield considerable results. Admittedly, the nature of financial 
firms is significant different from that of non-financial firms, but another separate 
study could be conducted to examine whether the results of this study hold for 
financial institutions too. Future research could also incorporate risk information 
from a variety of sources, rather than exclusively rely on annual reports. 
 
  
 
 
83 
 
Chapter 3 
The impact of forward-looking risk disclosures on 
firm risk: Evidence from the UK 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
An increasingly unpredictable and unstable financial environment, especially in the 
wake of recent financial crises, has brought risk disclosure issues under the close 
scrutiny of investors and regulators. There is a long-standing criticism of risk 
disclosure, particularly in respect of lack of transparency and the limited availability 
of information (Solomon et al., 2000; Kajuter, 2001). This criticism has become 
fiercer recently, as stock markets have shown unparalleled high volatility and many 
firms have undergone devastating downturns.  
Corporate risk disclosures first came to widespread attention when 
AAA/FASB9 1997 conference debates revealed that the US firms’ annual reports 
were publishing inadequate risk information. ICAEW10 also stressed the risk of a 
                                                          
9 AAA is short for American Accounting Association; FASB is short for Financial Accounting 
Standards Board. 
10 ICAEW is short for the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. 
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deficiency in information, and released three discussion documents (in 1998, 1999 
and 2002) urging UK firms to disclose risk information in greater depth. The Best 
Practice in Corporate Governance produced by the Turnbull Committee wielded 
further influence over internal control and risk management disclosures. Despite 
early professional organisations’ efforts, empirical evidence as scrutinised by the 
academic community regarding to disclosures is limited. By exploring a survey of 
UK institutional investors, Solomon et al. (2000) state that managers should disclose 
more verifiable risk information instead of generalized statements on risk 
management policies. Following Solomon and colleagues' call for risk disclosure 
studies, Linsley and Shrives (2000) outline the advantages and disadvantages of 
voluntary risk disclosures through investigating a sample of 79 UK firms. Linsley 
and Shrives (2005) discuss similar issues based on the study of 18 British and 
Canadian banks. They draw attention to the potential merit of increasing voluntary 
risk disclosures on reducing firms’ cost of capital and also suggest that forward-
looking risk information is extremely valuable to investors. However, they fail to 
further explain the potential benefits of increasing forward-looking risk disclosures. 
Dietrich et al.’s (2001) experiments, although focus on all unconcealed risk 
disclosures, indicate the utility of disclosing forward-looking risk information from 
the perspective of market efficiency. Linsley and Shrives (2005) explain that 
managers are typically reluctant to disclose forward-looking risk information due to 
proprietary costs and legitimacy issues. Using a sample of 27 firms, Beattie et al. 
(2004) examine risk information throughout the entire annual report narrative 
disclosures, and find a mere 2.4% of total text Hal references to forward-looking 
risk/opportunity information, of which only 7% were quantified. Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2004) complement this finding as to the discussion of future risk: 
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managers are often reluctant to specify its impact. Despite the provision of 
improving forward-looking risk disclosures, there is no empirical approach in the 
existing literature that relates to a comprehensive forward-looking risk disclosure 
examination - and there has been no research academically tests the potential 
benefits of increasing the amount of voluntary forward-looking risk disclosures on 
firms' risk reduction. The present study will address this gap by extensively 
exploring forward-looking risk disclosures within the annual reports of 216 UK non-
financial companies listed in FTSE 350 index. The objective is to explore whether 
increasing the volume of voluntary forward-looking risk disclosures leads to lower 
firm risk. In doing so, it will provide contemporary evidence on the reliability and 
usefulness of forward-looking risk disclosures.  
The hypothesis in this study draws theoretical support from stakeholder-
agency theory (Hill and Jones, 1992), resource-based review (RBV), and quality 
signalling theory (Toms, 2002). By admitting market inefficiencies, stakeholder-
agency theory allows for resultant power differentials between stakeholders and 
managers. Therefore, managers have the advantage to exploit stakeholders’ benefits 
through manipulating risk disclosures. In this case, stakeholders response to ask for 
more risk disclosure than managers are initially provided within annual reports so as 
to monitor risk management, and better estimate the risk exposure of the firm, 
ultimately making more informed investments. The disclosure of more forward-
looking risks can reduce asymmetric information risk and help improve a firm’s 
accessibility to capital markets by reducing investors’ expenses on collecting 
information. In addition, the market can better understand the company’s risk 
position and may perceive the company as less risky. As to the contents of forward-
looking risk disclosures, the resource-based view (RBV) (Barney, 1991) and quality 
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signalling theory (Toms, 2002) suggest that, where a firm effectively applies 
valuable, rare, inimitable and/or non-replicable (VRIN) resources to implement 
threat mitigation and opportunity-creation strategies which are difficult to imitate 
and substitute, a firm’s risk controlling system can be improved; thus its competitive 
advantages are strengthened and its systematic risk will be deemed lower. This 
provides theoretical support for our hypothesis that where firms disclose more 
specific operational, quantitative and the kind of good news regarding forward-
looking risk information that competitors find hard to imitate, the value of strategic 
risk management will be transmitted to investors, and this will positively influence 
investors’ risk perception of the firm.  
This research contributes to risk disclosures studies in several aspects. First, to 
the best of my knowledge it may represent the first attempt in the literature that an 
exclusive and extensive forward-looking risk disclosure analysis has been conducted 
within the annual reports of a comparatively large and cross-sectional sample. This 
research reports a significant and negative relationship between the total number of 
forward-looking risk disclosures and firms’ systematic risk. This adds to the existing 
empirical argument relating to the benefits of improving the transparency of firm risk 
disclosures. Second, I adopt a resource-based view (RBV) and signalling theory to 
explain the content of forward-looking risk disclosures, and find that the more 
operational 'good news', and quantitative risks that are forward-disclosed, the 
stronger the effect on lowering firm risk. The result suggests that an effective way to 
improve the quality of forward-looking risk disclosure is increasing voluntarily 
published, operational, 'good news' and quantitative risk information. Thirdly, the 
methodology I apply is experimental: I build a complete set of key code words based 
on the UNIX perl code (Kravet and Muslu, 2013) then use it to assist with content 
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analysis. This approach decreases the subjectivity of content analysis and takes 
advantage of computer software’s mechanical nature. The bond of manual and 
computer-assisted content analysis provides a testable means for future risk 
disclosure studies. Investors, creditors and auditors will hopefully find the results 
reported in this thesis useful as they provide a measurement that can be used to 
assess firms’ risk exposure. Accordingly, these readers can expand their exploration 
and verify the risks in reporting policies to target companies, and supervise and urge 
companies to improve the overall quality of their forward-looking risk disclosures; in 
this way, readers of annual reports can also be better served. Moreover, this research 
will hopefully interest regulators and policy makers who advocate the provision of 
higher quality, transparent and timely risk disclosures. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 discusses 
stake-holder agency theory and the resource-based view (RBV) as well as the 
signalling theory that the present research is based on. Section 3.3 locates the 
research within the context of existing forward-looking disclosure and risk disclosure 
literature and defines categorisations of forward-looking risks. Methodology and risk 
measure are discussed in Section 3.4 and data collection is described in section 3.5. 
Hypotheses developments are presented in Section 3.6, and Section 3.7 presents the 
results. In the final section, conclusions are drawn and suggestions are made for 
future studies. 
 
3.2. Theoretical development  
3.2.1. Stakeholder-agency theory 
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Stakeholder-agency theory is originally detailed by Hill and Jones (1992) who view 
the firm as a ‘nexus’ of implicit and explicit contracts, among all stakeholders. In 
broad sense, a company’s stakeholders encompass all resource holders, not only 
including managers and extensive stockholders, but also creditors, suppliers, 
customers, employees, general public and local communities. Each entity can be 
viewed as a contributor to a company’s essential resources; in return they expect to 
receive the maximum return on their investment from the company. 
Stakeholder-agency theory can apply on many concepts, for example, the 
principal-agent relationship, as the latter can be viewed as a subset of stakeholder-
agent relationships in a more general definition. Agency theory is based on 
assumptions of market efficiency and a power balance between managers and 
stakeholders. The efficient markets assumption holds that stakeholders and managers 
are free to enter into and exit from contractual relationships such as a better 
alternative contract may be available. Comparatively, stakeholder-agency theory 
allows for the existence of market inefficiencies, which fosters the resultant power 
differentials between managers and stakeholders. Stakeholder-agency theory 
assumes that if a firm operates in a market that is not perfectly efficient, then the 
existence of difference between stakeholders and managers must be acknowledged. 
Where managers are unable to resign from a contractual relationship without bearing 
considerable loss, or if the supply of managers exceeds the demand from 
stakeholders, power shifts towards the stakeholders. Similarly, if stakeholders are 
unable to dismiss managers, or if there is a scarcity of competent managers, power 
shifts towards the managers. Understanding the fundamentals of stakeholder-agency 
theory is critical as the power differential can substantially influence the structure of 
governance mechanisms monitoring those contracts. 
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Managers are playing a unique role since they play a key role in the nexus, and 
they are the “only group of stakeholders who enter into a contractual relationship 
with other stakeholders, and are also the only group of stakeholders with direct 
control over the decision-making apparatus of the firm” (Hill and Jones, 1992, 
pp.134). Therefore managers are expected to assign resources and make judicious 
decisions in consistent with other stakeholders. However, as information asymmetry 
exists between managers and stakeholders, managers obtain inside critical risk 
information and thus have the potential opportunity to twist facts when they are 
released to other stakeholders. This then increases stakeholders’ difficulty in 
identifying whether managers are acting in their (the stakeholders’) maximum 
interests. This disclosure gap, or information asymmetry, happens when managers 
selectively withhold some information from other stakeholders for various reasons. 
These include threats to their own positions, commercial sensitivities and uncertainty 
over risk measurements. Meanwhile, stakeholders may individually be prohibited 
from supervising a firm’s risk-controlling system, as the cost of gathering and 
analysing additional information is untenable. Thus is highly probable where the 
stakeholder-agent nexus comprises abundant individuals or entities and no one 
controls a sufficient proportion of a firm’s total resources. Such a situation grants 
managers stronger discretionary control as to the use of firm resources, resulting in 
the increase of residual loss for stakeholders. This (agency) problem discussed here 
is caused by power differentials when power shifts towards managers who then 
enjoy benefits to exploit stakeholders’ benefits through manipulating disclosures. 
The suggested response is for stakeholders to demand more risk information than 
they are provided within annual reports so as to monitor the contractual relationship, 
and/or better estimate the risk exposure of the firm and make informed investments 
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as a result (Solomon et al., 2000). 
According to the broad definition of stakeholders, financial analysts act as 
intermediaries between investors and company managers and play an essential role 
in internal and external contractual nexuses. Financial analysts provide individual 
and institutional investors with all kinds of professional advice, such as, risk 
evaluation, earnings forecast, and rating recommendation. Firms’ voluntary forward-
looking risk disclosures are consistently a considerable determinant of an analyst 
following and the characteristics of their forecasts since much of the information 
resource that analysts use in their estimation is sourced directly from the firm (Lang 
and Lundholm, 1996). In an investor-relations context, if it is less expensive to 
acquire information from inside the firm than to obtain it from other sources, 
enhanced voluntary disclosures will increase the supply of analyst services. 
Practically, analysts’ role in the capital market would highly influence the effect of 
voluntary disclosures on the demand side of analyst services. After achieving and 
valuing informative resources from the firm, analysts convey their evaluation to the 
market, therefore more firm-provided information means analysts have more 
valuable reports to sell. In light of this, increased disclosures are attributed to 
increased analysts’ following, since they have higher aggregate demand on firms’ 
disclosed information. As is, firms currently have an incentive to increase analyst 
following, and will not likely engage in discretionary disclosures that would 
diminish analyst following. In accordance with this prediction, the analyst 
community is consistently in favour of more voluntary forward-looking risk 
disclosures. In addition to impacting the number of analysts following a firm, 
voluntary forward-looking risk disclosures are likely to affect analysts’ forecast 
characteristics. In more specific terms, firms that voluntarily release more verifiable 
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forward-looking risk information will typically increase analysts’ earning forecasts 
with more accuracy and less volatility. This is because analysts hold both firm-
provided and privately-obtained information, but an increase in disclosure and 
timeliness decreases the weight analysts put on other information sources in building 
up their forecasting models, which “smooth[s] the forecast revision process by 
expediting the resolution of uncertainty” (Lang and Lundholm, 1996, pp.490). 
Moreover, analyst forecast accuracy improves when the informativeness of a firm’s 
forward-looking risk disclosures increase. To the extent that analysts may be 
considered as representing or influencing investors’ beliefs, improved forecast 
accuracy help investors obtain more accurate and less dispersed assumptions about a 
firm’s future performance. Therefore firms disclosing higher volume of forward-
looking risk information may have a larger cluster of potential investors who 
continuously pour into the massive funds. In respect of financial constraints, those 
high disclosing firms are less risky fall into financing difficulties.  
Forward-looking risk disclosures provide early-warning signals for other 
stakeholders. Despite information producing costs and potential losses when 
proprietary and strategic risk information is exploited by competitors and new 
entrants, other costs can be decreased and revenues can be increased. Specifically, 
more forward-looking risk disclosures help improve a firm’s accessibility to capital 
markets so as to attract more prospective stakeholders by decreasing their spend on 
collecting information. This reduction in information-gathering costs in turn 
improves the liquidity of a company’s shares, and a possible reduction in the cost of 
capital (Ekaterina et al, 2007). Theoretically, if a manager selectively publishes 
forward-looking risk information this may fail to satisfy the information 
requirements of other stakeholders, and investors may consider the company a risky 
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investment as such management behaviour might incur costly explicit claims (i.e. 
litigation risks). In addition, other stakeholders may anticipate that internal risk 
management is inefficient, which indicates a restricted ability on the part of 
managers to obtain capital at consistent rates (Salama et al., 2011). On the contrary, a 
company disclosing more forward-looking risk information is generally viewed as 
less risky, because the company’s risk position is fully mirrored in the market. In 
light of this, it can be argued that the more forward-looking risk information a firm 
chooses to disclose, the lower the perceived risk level of the firm. 
As to the contents of forward-looking risk disclosures, Dobler (2008) states 
that managers determine risk disclosures in two ways: firstly, risk supervision and 
controlling, which are the major information sources of risk reporting, with the 
quality of risk disclosure dependent on managers’ decisions as to the endowment of 
risk information. Secondly, risk disclosure is perceived as a means to influence 
investors’ understanding about firm risk. When there is a potential threat to the 
company’s economic value that is tied to mangers’ personal wealth, mangers can 
influence readers’ investment decisions by withholding some information that may 
threaten their administrative authority and badly influence firm’s future performance. 
In particular, managers may explain the company’s risk exposure in a more 
ambiguous, complicated, unpredictable and probabilistic tone; in such cases, outside 
investors should be cautious about the situation of the firm as certain information 
might not be available to investors.  
When the firm is operating healthily and profitably, managers will send 
reassuring messages to diminish investors’ doubts over potential uncertainty if a 
previously-predicted threat does not happen. Additionally, when directors disclosing 
risk, they have a predisposition to self-justification, attributing negative outcomes to 
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external risk that are beyond their control or responsibility. 
In practice, risk disclosure generally allows for discretion, which is considered 
as subjective and partly non-verifiable. Combes-Thuélin et al.(2006) demonstrates 
that, even under mandatory accounting rules, managers can still selectively influence 
the information disclosing quality. Stakeholder-agency theory provides the 
theoretical support in explaining managers’ decisions as to the extent and style of 
forward-looking risk disclosures, and whether such disclosures show deficient, 
optimistic and/or qualitative characteristics. 
 
3.2.1. Resource-based view (RBV) and quality signalling theory 
While stakeholder agency theory provides theoretical support to increasing the 
quantity of forward-looking risk disclosures on firm’s risk reduction, the resource-
based view (Barney, 1991) and quality signalling theory (Toms, 2002) offer deeper 
insights to find out what characteristics of risk disclosures can enhance the 
competitive advantages of a company, viewed as lower risks by the present research.  
Andrews (1971) and Hofer and Schendel (1978) suggest an corporate 
organizing framework such that firms should apply strategies that make the best of 
their own strengths through responding to market and operational opportunities 
meanwhile mitigating external uncertainties and inside vulnerability in order to 
achieve sustained competitive advantages. Barney (1991) advances this framework 
and propose the ‘Resource-based view (RBV)’. He suggests four indicators of the 
resources characterised by sustained competitive advantage: ‘value’, ‘rareness’, 
‘inimitability’, and ‘non-substitutability’ (VRIN), which refers to a value-creating 
strategy, not simultaneously being employed by any current or potential competitors, 
 
 
94 
 
and when other firms are unable to duplicate the merits of this strategy. In specific: 
the four attributes of VRIN resource refer to: (a) valuable, implying that it utilizes 
opportunities and/or neutralizes uncertainties within a firm’s operating environment, 
(b) rare, in terms of a firm’s current and future competition, (c) imperfectly imitable 
and (d) non-replicable, signifying an absence of strategically equivalent substitutes 
for this resource. In a broad sense, firm resources consist of “all assets, capabilities, 
organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc.” dominated 
by a firm that allows a firm to conceive of and implement value-creating strategies 
that promote its efficiency and effectiveness (Barney, 1991). Abundant firm 
resources can be categorized into three classes: physical capital resources 
(Williamson, 1975), human capital resources (Becker, 1964), and organizational 
capital resources (Tomer, 1987). According to this definition, firm risk managers’ 
experience, judgment, intelligence and insights are firm’s valuable human capital 
resources. When they positively and forcefully act on capturing favourable future 
opportunities and mitigating threats and uncertainties through the application of 
physical capital resources, leading to a superior risk management system within a 
company, this generates firm’s VRIN resources (organizational capital resources) 
and need be transmitted to institutional investors in annual reports.  
However, the value of strategic risk management cannot be realised unless 
signalled to stakeholders. Toms (2002) provides a theoretical extension of the 
resource-based view by adding quality signalling theory. Toms (2002) suggests that 
a firm’s reputation is established upon valuable resources in difficult-to-imitate 
projects and that such an application will encourage using annual reports as quality-
signalling devices. Where asymmetric information exists, signalling is a possible 
response to market failure (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). Signalling and agency 
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theories are in line with each other and are useful for explaining voluntary 
disclosures (Morris, 1987). The logic behind signalling theory is that, due to adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems when managers undertake risky but undisclosed 
actions, or investors faultily perceive similar risks across investment targets, firms 
with competitively advantageous risk management endowment have compelling 
incentives to inform their capital market monitors when disclosures are cost effective. 
Theoretically, managers as agents of the stakeholders are subject to heterogeneous 
pressures, particularly when operating in a stagnant market post the recent financial 
crisis and they count on quality signalling to respond to those pressures. Firms on a 
larger scale, for example the FTSE 350 companies, are likely to face greater scrutiny 
from analysts and fund managers. Meanwhile, regulators might exert pressure on 
risk managerial strategies that can be transmitted via the stock market and affect a 
firm’s share value. Moreover, risk disclosure itself is a strong predictor of inimitable 
and non-replicable organizational capital resource. Therefore, where firms conceive 
of and implement threats neutralizing and opportunities seizing strategies that are 
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-replicable (VRIN) (Barney, 1991), managers have 
a strong incentive to signal the value of their strategies in annual reports, which will 
consequentially influence investors’ risk perception of the firm.  
Risk disclosures potentially offer an important channel for the transmission of 
risk management efficiency. Conversely, an effective risk controlling system 
promotes the quantity of risk disclosures, including forward-looking risk disclosures. 
The commonly used means for signalling purpose is the annual report, as it is a 
formally published document that discusses about the organisation as a whole (Gray 
et al., 2001). The signalling hypothesis holds that under certain circumstances, 
accurate signals will be acknowledged and false ones discarded. Thus the signal 
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must be difficult to imitate by competitors. Under the RBV and quality signalling 
theory framework, it is the credibility of the signal that is important. Previous 
disclosure quality studies give a high rating to quantitative and verifiable disclosures 
and specification of policies rather than a general statement of policy (Toms, 2002). 
Institutional investors value quantified information and firm-specific issues that 
inform readers of the risks in monetary terms. Corresponding to risk categorisations 
in this research, disclosing more operational, quantitative risks may increase 
disclosure quality. Good risk news, especially operational good risk news, by 
definition indicates the valuable, rare, inimitable, non-replicable (VRIN) 
opportunities of the company; thus, the more good risk news disclosed, the more 
future VRIN resources signalled. A competitor who does not implement effective 
threat mitigation and opportunity creation strategies will find it harder to imitate a 
genuine competitor if that firm uses disclosure channels to specify their 
competitiveness in risk controlling. Because the disclosure of forward-looking risks 
and mitigation strategies is difficult to imitate for those companies who put less 
weight on risk management, the information quality of such disclosures is high. 
Managers are the best party to implement and monitor risk strategies against 
quantitative targets and are therefore accountable for their actions through the 
publication of risk information. Following the earlier discussion on signalling theory, 
it seems reasonable to suppose that where firms have applied strategic risk 
management that aims at mitigating firm-specific threats and creating growth 
opportunities, managers are more likely to offer the strongest possible quality signals 
through disclosing more quantitative, operational, and good risk news: if the strategy 
is genuine, it is pointless to discuss in mere rhetoric. Other competitors may choose 
to fill risk disclosure sessions with unverifiable rhetorical statements at a relatively 
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low cost. In light of this, increasing the publication of operational, quantitative and 
good news signals a superior risk controlling system within a firm; this VRIN 
strategic resource will influence external investors’ risk perception of the firm, and 
consequently contribute to the reduction of the firm’s systematic risk.  
 
3.3. Literature review 
3.3.1. Regulatory approaches to forward-looking risk disclosures 
The recent financial crisis has left an unforgettable scar on the worldwide economic 
and financial markets, and threw a hot potato to an entire generation of analysts and 
investors, questioning what caused the severe consequence (Borio, 2008). There are 
massive doubts about whether appropriate regulations were in place and if previous 
provisions triggered lax monitoring and provoked managers’ excessive risk-taking 
(McAleer et al, 2011). The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission conducted 
intensive assessments of the risk disclosures in firms’ filings. It criticized inadequate 
risk reporting and proposed that more risk information which might potentially 
impact future operations should be released (Johnson, 2010). 
In 1994, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants initially 
suggested firms disclose forward-looking information to provide investors with 
timely and useful insights. The 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act has 
built a “safe harbour” from accountability in private lawsuits for firms issuing risk 
information in forward-looking statements. The reporting guidelines in CICA 11 
(2001) proposed a framework of risk reporting containing corporate vision, vital 
                                                          
11 The Canadian Institute of Charted Accountants 
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success features, and result-oriented action capabilities. The documents released by 
ICAEW12 (1998, 1999 and 2002) requiring firms to disclose all types of risk that 
may impose a potential effect on future performance; not only past risks but also 
forward-looking risks (Rajab and Handley-Schachler, 2009). The ICAEW also 
suggested many benefits to improving voluntary risk disclosure: the cost of capital 
would decrease as investors find it easier to estimate the riskiness of their investment 
project and thus there would be no need to add a risk premium in any financing 
charge; this also signals directors’ superior risk management and an enhancement in 
risk reporting as a whole (Linsley and Shrives, 2005). Blackburn (1999) states the 
best practice of Combined Code and the Turnbull report, which required listed firms 
to adequately clarify their risk management and to provide information on their 
internal control system. All regulatory approaches explicitly propose to enrich 
forward-looking risk disclosures. However, forward-looking risks contain the 
information of future, which are believed to be inherently unpredictable. Managers 
are therefore reluctant to release this information because they may be vulnerable to 
claims from investors who make investment decisions on that information (Linsley 
and Shrives, 2005). 
Despite vigorous debates on the regulation of forward-looking risk disclosures, 
a lack of empirical evidence on the benefits of publishing such information makes it 
hard to convince both managers and investors of the necessity and urgency for 
regulatory approaches. 
 
3.3.2. Academic approaches of forward-looking risk disclosures 
                                                          
12 The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
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3.3.2.1. Risk disclosure studies 
Fierce debates on risk disclosures arose after the 2007 accounting irregularities, with 
one view arguing that greater disclosure improves reports transparency, which 
facilitates investors to better understand the firm’s risk profile and make sound 
evaluations about corporate performance. In addition, more risk disclosures help 
improve a firm’s accessibility to capital markets so as to attract more prospective 
investors by decreasing their expenses spent on collecting information. This 
reduction in information gathering costs in turn improves the liquidity of the 
company’s shares, and the increasing demand of these shares prompts a possible 
reduction in cost of capital (Ekaterina et al, 2007). Amihud and Mendelson (1986) 
initially establish theoretical support for the negative impact of disclosure volume on 
a firm’s cost of capital. They propose that, by voluntarily publishing more private 
information, adverse selection problem would decrease in the market, and therefore, 
reducing additional transaction costs. This would narrow the bid-ask spread, and 
eventually drive down the cost of capital. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) 
complement that, the more voluntary disclosures, the less information revealed by 
large trades, thereby minimising their influence on pricing. Accordingly, investors 
are more likely to possess larger proportion in a given firm with more public 
information. This behavior promotes stocks demand and therefore increases the 
current share price, which result in relatively lower cost of capital. Similar 
conclusions can be found in Jorgensen and Kirshcenheiter’s (2003) discretionary risk 
disclosure study, they find that ex-post firms disclosing their risk could enjoy higher 
stock prices. In addition, compared with a mandatory disclosure regime, a voluntary 
disclosure regime would experience a lower expected risk premium of all firms. A 
lower cost of capital brings more funds in the market, which make firms invest in 
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long-term projects with higher expected return.  
Good corporate governance advocators propose that managers should be 
accountable to investors for their operational risk exposure, and they criticize the fact 
that information, either the firm’s risks or how risk management is organised, is not 
disclosed enough for shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Researches try to identify possible reasons for the lack of risk disclosures, they 
raise the issue of commercially sensitive information to the financial market. For 
example, Linsley and Shrives (2005, pp. 294) propose that two potential costs might 
be incurred by the release of risk information - non-proprietary costs and proprietary 
costs: “Non-proprietary costs are those costs associated with the costs of information 
retrieval, whereas proprietary costs are those costs that arise when commercially 
sensitive information is released with the outcome that the company has provided 
information of potential value to competitors”. Proprietary costs normally recognised 
as competitively disadvantageous, cause considerable concern to managers. Some 
firms tend to avoid releasing risk and risk-management information since it is 
considered commercially sensitive. There is also a rebuttal argument that improved 
disclosures are targeted to share traders which could cause higher share price 
volatility and therefore drive up systematic risks and result in a higher cost of capital 
(Berton, 1994).   
In summary, previous researches studying the benefits of risk disclosure on 
lower cost of capital through strengthening risk control (Linsley and Shrives, 2000; 
Jorison, 2002), improving stock liquidity (Solomon et al, 2000), and enhancing 
corporate profitability (Linsley and Shrives, 2006); little empirical research to date 
have conducted a specific investigation of forward-looking risk disclosures and 
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therefore it is worth to be examined in this study. In view of the discussed benefits of 
improving risk disclosure, I make the assumption that more forward-looking risk 
disclosures lead to lower firm risk. 
 
3.3.2.2. Forward-looking disclosures studies 
Previous studies on risk disclosures and forward-looking disclosures have been 
carried out separately. The role of forward-looking statements in voluntary 
disclosures is generally related to analysts’ earnings forecasts. Bryan (1997) finds 
forward-looking disclosures concerning operational practices positively and greatly 
related to one-year ahead earnings changes. He reveals that future short-term 
performance measures contain useful messages as indicators of future operations and 
capital expenditure. Similarly, Clarkson et al. (1999) show that total volume of 
forward-looking information in MD&A (Management Discussion and Analysis) 
changes in line with corporate future performance variation, which demonstrates the 
credibility of forward-looking disclosures. Research conclude that the dispersion of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts would be smaller is there are more forward-looking 
disclosures on firms’ operation and capital expenditures (Barron et al., 1999; 
Clarkson et al., 1999). Moreover, forward-looking disclosures facilitate investors 
more accurately anticipating share prices, and improve the whole stock market’s 
accuracy in forecasting future earnings movement (Schleicher and Walker, 1999; 
Hussainey et al., 2003). Kieso and Weygandt (1995) state that lacking forward-
looking information will leave investors in a disadvantage position to forecast if they 
rely on imprecise information through other media channels.  
Previous literature on forward-looking disclosures argues that the uncertainty 
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of future market makes it hard to forecast with credit, and that inaccurate predictions 
may involve the firm in lawsuits, which is concordant with Field et al.’s (2005) 
litigation cost hypothesis. Litigation risk is a primary factor that managers need to 
consider when deciding the content and level of voluntary forward-looking 
disclosures. Skinner (1994) proposes that firms with high litigation risks would 
benefit from voluntarily releasing management forecasts, as firms may be confronted 
with lawsuits when investors claim the managers withhold information that is due to 
be leased. The concern over potential lawsuits may demoralize managers’ 
motivations to disclose forward-looking information. This is especially true when 
managers consider that the legal institutions are unable to distinguish among forecast 
errors due to market uncertainty or deliberate managerial manipulation (Aljifri and 
Hussainey, 2007). To protect firms against litigation claims is also the main concern 
that drives firms to publish bad risk news. Even a small firm can bear massive 
litigation costs: as reported by Cornerstone, after the 1995 PSLRA (Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act) the legal defence costs for a single firm typically 
varied between one and three million dollars, and ranged up to $40 million, which 
would represent a huge blow to smaller firms. However, Field et al. (2005) indicate 
that after controlling for the endogeneity between disclosure and litigation, there is a 
non-positive relationship between issuing forecasts and litigation risks. Moreover, 
opponents argue that forward-looking information may contain valuable messages to 
their rivals and might do harm to the competitive level of the firm. Healy and Palepu 
(2001) propose the similar argument through the proprietary cost hypothesis. 
 Overall, the main stream of forward-looking disclosure studies proposes that 
forward-looking disclosures contain valuable incremental information to 
shareholders and a variety of stakeholders and professional analysts. However, to the 
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best of my knowledge little empirical evidence has been found regarding forward-
looking risk disclosures or an association between the forward-looking risk 
disclosures and firm’s systematic risk. The present study will provide original 
evidence for the potential usefulness and credibility of forward-looking risk 
disclosure. 
 
3.3.2.3. Defining risk and forward-looking risk disclosure 
Defining ‘risk’ is the first step before conducting any risk disclosure study. 
Previous studies have provided two versions of risk definitions. One view defines 
risk as the possible threat to a firm’s wealth accumulation due to a series of internal 
factors (including financial risks that immediately affect assets and liabilities and 
non-financial risks which might influence firm’s future cash flows) and external 
factors (related to the general environment where the firm operates) (Cabedo and 
Tirado, 2004; Kravet and Muslu, 2013). While this view solely incorporates negative 
outcomes when coding risk information, another definition of risk, which is 
generally referred as a broad definition of risk, embraces both positive opportunities 
and negative uncertainties (e.g.,Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Lupton, 1998). 
Specifically, one sentence will be classified as risk related if the reader is notified of 
any ‘opportunity’ or ‘prospect’ or any ‘hazard, threat or exposure’ information, 
which has already impacted or may have a potential impact on firm wealth, or the 
communication of managers’ risk mitigation and opportunity seizing strategies and 
internal control risk management policies (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). This study 
will adopt the broad definition of risk when analyzing risk disclosure information, 
consistent with Lupton’s (1998) argument about how ‘risk’ is broadly used and 
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recognized in colloquial language.  
The second step is to define forward-looking risk disclosure. According to 
CICA (2001), forward-looking information complements financial and non-financial 
information to help investors better evaluate managerial decisions on corporate long-
term value generation. Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) explain forward-looking 
information as: “(i) future events, decisions, opportunities, and risks that may have a 
likely effect on future results; (ii) visions, strategies, and objectives expressed by 
management; and (iii) explanations of past events, decisions, facts, and results that 
may have a significant impact on future results”. Similar definitions of forward-
looking disclosure can also be found in Aljifri and Hussainey’s (2007) paper which 
allow shareholders and other stakeholders to evaluate a firm’s performance in future 
through its current reports and future plans. This involves financial forecasts (e.g., 
earnings forecast) for the following year, expected proceeds and anticipated cash 
flows, and non-financial forecasts for instance risk and uncertainties that might 
greatly impact expected achievements and result in deviation from projected targets.  
Forward-looking risk disclosure in this study refers to any risk-related 
information that informs readers about future potential opportunities or threats and 
uncertainties arising from the interaction of external environmental and market risks 
and internal operational risks, or else any descriptive information concerning the 
internal control of risk management policies. 
 
3.3.2.4. Forward-looking risk disclosure categorisation 
Previous studies on risk disclosure have set different ways to categorise risk 
information and they share many cross-components. Jorion (1997) proposes that firm 
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risks consist of potential risks from business, strategy and finance. Specifically, 
business risks relate to the product market where a firm operates, including 
innovations activities, business marketing and production design. Strategic risks 
relate to the economic and political environment changes. Financial risks include 
liquidity risks, price or market risks, credit risks, operational risks and legal risks. 
Jorion (1997) only considers potential negative factors when identifying risk-related 
information. This risk classification finds support from the ICAEW (1997). Institute 
analysts sort the risks into external risks and internal risks. The former refer to 
general operating environment, equivalent to Jorion’s (1997) “strategic risks”, and 
the later are subcategorized as financial and non-financial risks. Thus, financial risks 
directly affect firms’ monetary characters whereas non-financial risks have impacts 
on business operation and will potentially influence cash flows and profits in the 
long run. This is similar to Jorion’s (1997) “business risks”. Another strand of 
studies (e.g.,Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Oliveira et al., 2011) that adopt a broad 
definition of risk has presented a likeness in risk categorisation. When comparing 
risk disclosure between British banks and Canadian banks in their annual reports, 
Linsley et al. (2006) sort risks into six categories, namely, credit risk, market risk, 
interest rate risk, operational risk, capital structure and adequacy risk, risk 
management frameworks and policies. Oliveira et al. (2011) complement this 
research by adding liquidity risk and renaming policies as “Generic”. However, these 
risk categorisations emphasize financial risks and are more applicable to financial 
institutions’ risk disclosure studies. 
The present study will classify risk-related information as representing a 
financial risk, operational risk, or strategic risk. Financial risks relate to the financial 
information published by the company that will have direct impacts on monetary 
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characters. This study expands the financial risk definition by adding more financial 
factors that are beyond board control - for example, commodity, taxation, inflation, 
and market risk. Operational risks involve those internal risks that are within the 
control managers and firm-specific opportunities that companies willing to pursue so 
as to increase shareholders’ value and achieve competitive advantages (Jorion, 1997). 
Internal non-financial risks, or indirect financial risks, would influence the daily 
operation of the business. Strategic risks refer to general environmental factors 
within which a company operates. Those factors are beyond the organisational 
control. Internal control risk management strategies are commonly disclosed in 
‘corporate governance’ section in annual report, and discuss companies’ risk 
management policies. All risk-related sentences will be distinguished according to 
their time-orientation (forward-looking disclosures, and past disclosures). Then, the 
risk information within the identified time-frame will be further classified according 
to risk disclosure categories (Financial risk, Operational risk, or Strategic risk), the 
nature of disclosure (quantitative or qualitative) and the type of news (good, bad, or 
neutral). Risk disclosure categories and typical examples of each type can be found 
in Appendix 3.1 and 3.2 respectively.  
 
3.4. Hypothesis development 
3.4.1. The difference among good/bad/neutral forward-looking risk disclosures 
Prior research on the disclosure volumes of good and bad risk news have not reached 
definitive conclusions. One view suggests that directors intuitively tend to release 
‘good news’ in order to obscure poor performance through a more complicated 
writing style of annual reports, to obfuscate the real disadvantageous risk message to 
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readers.  Because future risk disclosure creates uncertainty amongst executives, they 
are hesitant to indicate whether the effect is prone to be positive or negative. Beretta 
and Bozzolan (2004) find evidence that the “attributional inclination” happens when 
managers are describing bad risk news. It is suggested the executives’ intention is to 
distract investors’ attention from the most serious problems, yet imply hidden 
credibility threats in the long run.  
Conversely, Linsley and Shrives (2006, pp.392) state that, regardless of 
directors’ self-protective preference on publishing good risk news, it does not 
necessarily lead to their withholding bad news if this might result in “excessive 
reputational costs and jeopardise relationships with external parties, or if legal costs 
could result from negative earnings surprises”. By analysing the risk information 
disclosure in a number of Canadian company financial statements, Cabedo and 
Tirado (2004) find the dominance of negative risk information. Similar findings are 
reported by Linsley and Shrives (2000) who base their research on a British sample. 
Therefore the first hypothesis for the current study is: 
H1a: The number of good forward-looking risk disclosures is significantly different 
from bad forward-looking risk disclosures; 
H1b: The number of bad forward-looking risk disclosures is significantly different 
from neutral forward-looking risk disclosures; 
H1c: The number of good forward-looking risk disclosures is significantly different 
from neutral forward-looking risk disclosures. 
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3.4.2. The difference between quantitative/qualitative forward-looking risk 
disclosures 
Quantitative risk disclosure is commonly viewed of higher quality as it promotes the 
credibility of risk information and makes it “ex-post verifiable” (Schrand and Elliot, 
1998). Despite regulatory efforts to encourage or oblige informative risk disclosures, 
investors and academics still claim that firms are reluctant to provide quantified risk 
information. One factor that gives rise to this deficient disclosure is the ever-
changing and unpredictable nature of risk (Kravet and Muslu, 2013). Future risks are 
intrinsically harder to measure and quantify thus managers are anxious they will be 
judged upon, and held to account against, the published quantitative risk information 
if found erroneous. In addition, quantitative risk information may contain sensitive 
messages to competitors, thus incurring a high proprietary cost and leaving the 
company in a disadvantageous situation. Therefore the second hypothesis is: 
H2: The number of quantitative forward-looking risk disclosures is significant less 
than the number of qualitative forward-looking risk disclosures. 
 
3.4.3. The impact of forward-looking risk disclosures on firms’ risk 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) suggest more risk disclosures could impact on the public 
risk perception of the firm. It can be argued that greater disclosure enhances 
transparency, which will allow investors to better understand a firm’s risk profile and 
make sound evaluations about corporate performance. The improvement of investors’ 
decisions lowers their uncertainty about firms’ future cash flows. Lambert et al. 
(2007) state that in firms which publish future risk in more precise nature, the 
covariance between one and another firm’s cash flows exhibits declining tendency. 
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Supporters of greater risk disclosure suggest that, in good corporate governance 
practice, managers are accountable to shareholders and other stakeholders for their 
judgment decisions based on published risk information. If more risk information is 
disclosed, the asymmetric information between managers and shareholders will 
decrease, and internal shareholders’ and external potential investors’ and the general 
public’s ability to discipline managers will be greatly enhanced. In fear of losing 
their positions, managers are more motivated to adopt effective risk management, 
carry out efficient specific risk mitigation strategies, and capture potential growth 
opportunities, thus decreasing firms’ systematic risk. In this way, more forward-
looking risk disclosures contribute to lower firm risk. Moreover, more risk 
disclosures can be seen as a signal of directors’ superior risk management (Linsley 
and Shrives, 2005). 
Another view holds that more disclosed risk information helps improve a 
firm’s accessibility to capital markets so as to attract more prospective investors by 
decreasing their expenses spent on collecting information. This reduction in 
information gathering costs in sequence improves the liquidity of a company’s 
shares, and a possible decrease in cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; 
Ekaterina et al., 2007). “Information asymmetry widens the adverse-selection 
component of the bid-ask spread demanded by the market makers and thus increase 
the cost of trading in a security. In equilibrium, security prices settle at levels that 
yield investors equal rates of risk-adjusted return, net of the transaction cost, on each 
security” (Kothari, Li and Short, 2009, pp. 1645).  
Thirdly, the mis-evaluation of the parameter values of the expected rate of 
return on target securities constitute another component of cost of capital, which is 
widely regarded as non-diversifiable risk. More disclosed content allows analysts 
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and investors to reduce the estimating error of parameters, therefore decrease the 
cost of capital (Barry and Brown, 1984).). When the cost of capital decreases, 
financial returns increase, and firms will have more cash flow to undertake 
promising projects in a virtuous circle. All these factors will lead to a firm with 
healthy financial prospects, fewer financing constrains, and a greater ability to seize 
value-adding investment opportunities when they become available. From the 
perspective of investors, they can avoid injecting money into firms that are 
experiencing financing constrains and might bet on riskier projects in the hope of 
achieving a higher return in the short term, and this inevitably drives up the risk level 
of a firm. Resultantly, the third hypothesis is: 
H3a: There is a significant negative relationship between the quantity of forward-
looking risk disclosures and firm risk. 
In their UK study, Linsley and Shrives (2006) report significant differences in 
the frequencies of reported of different risk categories. I then follow their approach 
and disaggregate the number of forward-looking risk disclosures into different 
subcategories: according to their business focus (financial, operational, strategic); 
according to their nature (quantitative, qualitative); according to their tone (positive, 
negative, neutral), and then test the associations between these characterises of risk 
disclosure and firm risk.  
Financial risk disclosure is important in helping analysts to better anticipate 
future earnings numbers. However, recent evidence from Australia suggests that 
these results could be context specific. Reason could be found from Coram et al.’s 
(2011) interview of eight financial analysts (Sydney and Perth stockbrokers) that the 
perceived value of enhanced financial disclosure is context-specific where analysts 
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pay more attention to negative financial information while are more sceptic 
concerning positive financial information. Operational risk refers exclusively to 
firm-specific internal risks that are within the control of the board, while strategic 
risks describe the external operating and natural environment that are beyond the 
control of companies’ directors. For the sake of better understanding firm’s inner 
operational situation, analysts weight higher of non-financial information disclosures 
than financial disclosures, and of the two subcategories of operational and strategic 
risk disclosures, it can be expected of higher utility of firm-specific operational risk 
disclosures to analysts evaluate firms’ risk exposure. Therefore, I hypothesise: 
H3b: There is a negative relationship between financial risk disclosure and firm risk; 
there is a negative relationship between operational risk disclosure and firm risk; 
there is a negative relationship between strategic risk disclosure and firm risk. 
Theory dealing with the salience of negative information presents that positive 
information receive less attention than negative information (Coram et al., 2011). On 
the contrary, signalling theory indicates managers tend to pass positive signals to 
outside investors in order to demonstrate the effective risk management system 
within the firm. And most likely, managers have to publish credible positive 
information as fraudulent disclosures will be penalised in the future. To investigate 
this contextual dimension, I disaggregate Total into good news, bad news and neutral 
news. Prior literature present evidence that bad news (unfavourable information) 
correlates with higher cash flow risk, whereas good news (favourable information) 
correlates with lower risk of estimating future cash flows in both short-term period 
(French et al., 1987) and long-term period (Chan, 1988; Ball and Kothari, 1989). Ng 
et al. (2009) find good news would lower the adverse-selection component of the 
bid-ask spread, however bad news would increase return volatility of future earnings. 
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Meanwhile, investors rely on disclosure content to evaluate the expected firm value 
and the uncertainty associated with that value. Therefore, the information content is 
likely to affect adverse selection cost through investors’ evaluation of uncertainty. 
And in sequence the effects are expected to be reflected in firms’ cost of capital and 
accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast. Kothari, Li and Short (2009) and Campbell 
et al. (2014) and find good news (favourable disclosures) lowers firm’s risk (proxied 
by cost of capital, stock return volatility and analyst forecast dispersion), whereas 
bad news (unfavourable disclosures) increases firm’s risk. In particular, they argue 
that bad news has two directional effects on cost of capital: firstly it provides news 
information to market makers that the firm is riskier than they originally assessed, 
which increases the cost of capital; secondly, it increases the precision with which 
market participants estimate the cost of capital, which lowers the cost of capital. 
These two effects mutually offset one another, however the primary effect on cost of 
capital is an increase. Survey studies by Graham et al. (2005) find that corporate 
executives expect a risk premium with less predictable earnings (higher earnings 
volatility and uncompleted earnings target), which explains that investors expect 
higher rate of return on invested equities for bearing additional risk when more bad 
news disclosures become available. To give greater level of insight I quantify good 
news, bad news and neutral news, and this content disaggregation permits me to 
have the following hypothesis: 
H3c: There is a negative relationship between good news and firm risk, while bad 
news and neutral news would not show a significant lowering effect on firm risk.  
Regarding the numerical nature of the disclosure content, Kadous et al. (2005) 
suggest that the quantification of a project proposal improves its persuasiveness 
among investors as the credibility of disclosure content can be greatly improved. 
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Likewise, the difficulties to quantify future risks make the quantitative disclosures 
more valuable to investors. For the fear of being exposed to future legal claims when 
irretrievable errors in judgment occur that is based on published yet erroneous 
estimation of future risk; executives are therefore inclined to avoid discussing 
unpredictable future risks in a quantitative tone. In addition, assessing the quality of 
forward-looking risk disclosures is not infallible, mainly due to lack of reliable and 
credible data (Frame, 2003) and the limitation of risk measurement techniques 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2006). All the factors could result in substantial variation of 
the eventual risk outcome and the subsequent judgement. Therefore, I have the 
following hypotheses:  
H3d: There is a significant negative relationship between quantitative risk disclosure 
and firm risk; there is an insignificant negative relationship between qualitative risk 
disclosure and firm risk.  
 
3.5. Methodology 
3.5.1. Measure the quantity of forward-looking risk disclosure 
Content analysis has been widely used in accounting disclosure research; it can be 
used to identify either the presence or absence of a theme in written reports and other 
verbal materials; additionally it allows disclosures to be systematically categorised 
and compared (Rajab and Handley-Schachler, 2009). This research uses this 
methodology mainly because risk disclosures, particularly non-financial categories, 
are mostly disclosed qualitatively and content analysis enables coders to measure the 
extent and volume of that disclosure information. 
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In content analysis, scholars use different counting measures including words, 
phrases, sentences, pages and number of lines (Rajab and Handley-Schachler, 2009). 
In a previous study, Hussainey et al. (2003) adopt automated text recognition 
software to count keywords that identify risk-related information in corporate annual 
reports. Gietzmann (2006) uses raw disclosure data from the London Stock 
Exchanges Regulatory News Service, and argues that this source provides timely 
information that is date and time stamped, and can be categorised by topic, allowing 
for the calculation of additional disclosure measures. The present study measures the 
volume of forward-looking risk disclosures by counting risk and risk management 
sentences rather than words or phrases as this approach is widely recognized as a 
more accurate coding method. This method requires the present author to read 
through each annual report and identify all sentences containing risk-related 
information. Sentences will be coded as risk disclosures if they deliver messages 
pertaining to risks (any “opportunity” or “prospect” or any “hazard”, “threat” or 
“exposure”) (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). The word ‘risk’ does not need to appear in 
an examined sentence for it to be recognised as a risk disclosure sentence. Hussainey 
et al. (2003) indicate that during the coding process, some sentences may be 
categorised as past disclosure while they also contain information that is relevant to 
the future. For example, regarding a message that the Research and Development 
(R&D) costs within a firm increased by 10% in the preceding accounting year: this 
information belongs in the past disclosure category; however, it also conveys the 
meaning that investment in R&D is expected to increase the firm’s future cash flows. 
In the coding process, final decisions concerning time orientation will pertain to 
whether the sentence delivers information that would impact on further actions that 
will carry on in the future operation of the firm. This research acknowledges the 
 
 
115 
 
potential for semantic ambiguity in coding process, and uses verb tense to categorise 
the time orientation of risk sentences. 
In the implementation of content analysis, some basic stages need to be 
clarified: the research question (measuring the quantity of forward-looking risk 
disclosures and association with firm risk level); the codable document (corporate 
annual reports of 2010); the coding unit (sentence); disclosure categories (e.g., 
financial risk, operational risk, strategic risk) (see appendices 1 and 2 for risk 
disclosure categories and examples); the coding mode (manual); and last of all, the 
coded information as subjected to interpretation (Rajab and Handley-Schachler, 
2009).  
As to the location of the risk information, previous studies of American 
companies find risk information spread throughout Management Discussion and 
Analysis (MD&A) and notes on financial statements (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). 
In the UK, sample companies’ Operating and Financial Reviews, the equivalent of 
the MD&A (which is non-mandatory), is the main source of narrative risk disclosure 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2002). The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, 
published by the London Stock Exchange in 1998, demands listed companies keep 
an effective internal control system and also clearly explains risk management 
policies in the ‘Corporate Governance’ section. The present research will look at all 
voluntary narrative disclosures within annual reports which include Directors’ 
Reports, CEO/Managing Directors’ Reports, Chairman Reports, Reviews of 
Operations, Principal risks and uncertainties, Corporate Governance (Internal 
Control and risk management). Remuneration, board independence, and other such 
corporate governance issues are not considered; Corporate Social Responsibilities 
(personnel, health and safety) are considered, to identify risk information 
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(O’Sullivan et al., 2008). 
The dependent variable - forward-looking risk disclosure - is dichotomous. It is 
assigned a value of one if a firm discloses forward-looking risk information in their 
annual report and zero otherwise (O’Sullivan et al., 2008). All identified risk 
disclosure sentences will be coded following the disclosure coding grid (see Table 
3.1):  
 
Table 3.1 
Disclosure coding grid 
Disclosures sentence characteristics 
Financial 
risk 
Operational 
risk 
Strategic 
risk 
Internal 
control risk 
management 
policies 
Qualitative/good/forward-looking     
Qualitative /bad /forward     
Qualitative /neutral/forward-looking     
     
Quantitative/good/forward-looking     
Quantitative /bad/forward-looking     
Quantitative /neutral/forward-looking     
Notes: Quantitative disclosures consist of sentences that quantifies the risk impact “either directly in 
monetary terms or if the reader is able to quantify the past or potential future monetary impact of a 
risk albeit indirectly” (Linsley and Shrives, 2005, pp.296). If a sentence cannot be easily categorised 
under one category, it will be double examined and grouped into the class that the sentence mostly 
emphasized. 
 
Kravet and Muslu (2013) develop a UNIX perl code to identify forward-
looking disclosures that indicate future risks or uncertainties. Specifically, the code 
tags a sentence as forward-looking risk-related if it contains at least one keyword 
that connotes risk. These keywords (where a (*) implies that suffixes are allowed) 
are: “can, cannot, could, may, might, risk(*), uncertain(*), likely to, subject to, 
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potential(*), vary(*), varies, depend(*), expos(*), fluctuat(*), possibl(*), susceptible, 
affect, influenc(*), and hedg(*) .” This study will adopt this code to complement 
measurement of the content of forward-looking risk information by counting the 
number of sentences with at least one of these keywords. 
I firstly adopt the UNIX perl code to identify risk sentences within the annual 
reports of 20 randomly-chosen companies. After reading them carefully I found 
almost all tagged sentences were risk-related, which shows the effectiveness of the 
code words. In the “Principal Risks and Uncertainties” section, which contains the 
most intensive risk information, nearly all sentences were tagged with at least one of 
the UNIX perl code key words. This list is not exhaustive; after careful examination 
of the narrative parts of the 20 annual reports, more code words were added as an 
expansion of Kravet and Muslu’s (2013) UNIX perl code to capture the meaning of 
future, performance and strategic decisions of the firm. These words were: 
opportunit*, prospect, expect, impact, outlook. 
The most frequently appearing words - “can, could, may, might” - are 
polysemous; they can infer future prospective and can also be understood as “be able 
to” and do not imply a specific time orientation. However, if I solely relied on the 
computer software to identify risk-related sentences, there is a risk of unreliable data 
because of the ‘boiler plate’ word problem (Abraham and Cox, 2007). Thus in the 
second step I carried out a manual examination of all tagged risk-related sentences to 
filter sentences that contained a ‘boiler word’ but merely discussed risk information. 
The combination of the two approaches is an experimental practice that will decrease 
the subjectivity of manual content analysis, and takes advantage of computer 
software’s mechanical nature.  
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3.5.2. Model specification 
In line with previous research, a group of underlying corporate characteristics 
(accounting variables) that might influence a firm’s risk level need to be identified 
before regression. The level of firm risk is measured by BETA from London 
Business School’s Risk Management Service. Prior research (e.g., Alexander and 
Thistle, 1999; Lord and Beranek, 1999) suggest a negative relationship between firm 
size and systematic risk. They adopt different measures of firm size including 
turnover, total assets, market capitalization and employee numbers. As there is no 
theoretical reason to prefer one method to the others, this study will estimate firm 
size (SIZE) by the natural log of total assets13. Previous research find a significant 
negative association between dividend payout ratio and firm risk, therefore I control 
for the dividend payout (POUT), measured by dividing dividends per share by the 
adjusted net earnings per share for the previous accounting period (Salama et al., 
2011). Liquidity (LIQU) is widely viewed as a useful factor in forecasting a firm’s 
risk (Ferris et al., 1990). Liquidity variable is estimated by current ratio (Abdelghany, 
2005), calculated by the percentage of total current assets to total current liabilities. 
Another well acknowledged determinant of firm risk is leverage. It is often proposed 
that the more debt a firm holds in its capital structure, more likely the firm will 
default, and subsequently its total equity will be valued much lower (e.g., Baxter, 
1967; Bierman, 1968; Ben-Zion and Balch, 1973). Hence I control for the leverage 
(LEV), which is calculated by total debt/total capital. Moreover, there is empirical 
evidence for an association between firm risk level and corporate asset growth 
(Salama et al., 2011). Therefore asset growth (GROW) is also controlled as a 
determinant of firm risk. This study uses the percentage of TAt /TAt-1 to measure 
                                                          
13 Using the natural log of total number of employees to measure firm size yields similar results. 
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asset growth, where TA is the book value of total assets. Another variable that has 
often been considered as a determinant of risk is profitability, which will be 
measured by return on capital employed (ROCE). Finally, I control for the industry 
impact using dummy variables (IND). 
The present research modifies the model used in Salama et al. (2011) to assess 
the risk level of sample companies. It tests whether forward-looking risk disclosures 
contribute to firms’ risk reduction.  
𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + εi,t                      (3.1) 
where: 
i = 1…216 
t = 2010 
BETA = firm risk from London Business School’s Risk Management Service 
FRD = The quantity of forward-looking risk disclosures 
SIZE = Natural log of total assets 
POUT = Dividend payout 
LIQU = Current ratio 
LEV = Natural log of equity gearing 
GROW = Natural log of asset growth 
ROCE = Return on capital employed 
IND = Industry dummies 
 
3.6. Data collection 
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The original sample consists of 240 non-financial institutions listed within the FTSE 
350 Index in 2010, based on the published FTSE 350 companies list of 2010 by 
Thomson Reuters. The sample is further reduced due to the unavailability of 
accounting data and beta, thus leaving 216 observations. All annual reports are 
collected from the corporate websites with a year-end date nearest to 1st January 
2011. The risk disclosure measures in this study are limited to the information 
published in annual reports. Arguably, annual reports might not yield a powerful 
proxy for overall risk disclosures in an accounting year when firms might choose to 
release complementary and timely risk information through company websites or 
other media channels and when a substantial source of information is disseminated 
by financial analysts. This is acknowledged as one potential shortcoming of this 
research. Financial institutions are excluded from the sample since the nature of 
these firms varies considerably from that of non-financial firms and this difference 
can be expected to have a significant effect on the risk disclosure approaches of the 
two groups (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). The FTSE 350 Index is chosen as it 
comprises the largest listed firms in UK based on corporate market capitalisation. 
Prior literature indicates firm size is positively associated with corporate voluntary 
disclosure in both quantity and quality (O’Sullivan et al., 2008), where larger firms 
are found to release more risk information than smaller firms (Linsley and Shrives, 
2005). With regard to voluntary forward-looking disclosures, Choon et al. (2000) 
find larger firms are more likely to release earnings forecasts than smaller firms. 
Thus, the FTSE 350 Index is chosen to filter the sample with comparable firm size. 
Most previous research (e.g., Abraham and Cox, 2007; Linsley and Shrives, 2006) 
choose their sample from the FTSE 100 Index; this study explores the forward-
looking risk disclosure of a comparatively large sample for the first time. I limit my 
 
 
121 
 
analysis to one year, given firms’ disclosure practices appear to remain reasonably 
constant over time. This is the normal empirical approach to analysing risk 
disclosure level and content (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006; Abraham and 
Cox, 2007; Botosan, 1997). Admittedly, the year-to-year disclosure observations for 
a single firm are not independent; I choose to obtain greater cross-sectional 
observations as opposed to observations over time. The year 2010 is chosen 
considering 2010 is generally viewed as a threshold when the final market started to 
pick up following a period of severe market recession and volatility following the 
2007 financial crisis. Thus, listed firms are expected to place greater value on risk 
disclosure to win back investors’ confidence. Another reason for this selection is that 
this represents the most recent empirical evidence in the wake of the 2007 financial 
crisis that has not yet been examined by any previous published papers and is to 
ensure reasonable access to firms’ annual reports yet still guarantee other post-
sample year data would be obtainable.  
 
3.7. Empirical results 
3.7.1. Summary statistics 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 report the correlation metrics between dependent variable risk 
(BETA) and main explanatory variable total quantity of forward-looking risk 
disclosure (FRD). Noticeably, there is a negative and significant correlation between 
FRD and BETA with a coefficient of -0.117, the magnitude of this correlation 
increase to -0.128 if considering internal control risk management policies (see Table 
3.3). This evidence supports the hypothesis 3 that the greater extent to which risk 
sentences are forward-looking, the lower a firm’s systematic risk. The correlation is 
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stronger if internal control risk management policies are specified in the corporate 
governance section. This reflects that a specified statement of risk management 
policies contains information that is valuable to investors. 
Moreover, there is a positive correlation between Total0 and firm size, with a 
coefficient of 0.538, noticeably higher than other possible influential variables of the 
number of risk disclosures. This supports previous literature that big firms tend to 
disclose more risk information (e.g., Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006). For all remaining variables, variance inflation factors were within 
levels of tolerance for multicollinearity.  
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Table 3.2 
Correlation matrix1 
Variables BETA2011 Total0 POUT GROW SIZE LIQU GEAR ROCE 
BETA2011 1.000        
Total0 -0.117* 1.000       
POUT -0.192* 0.004 1.000      
GROW 0.036 0.059 -0.229* 1.000     
SIZE -0.108 0.538* 0.043 -0.064 1.000    
LIQU 0.041 -0.098* -0.297* 0.319* -0.197* 1.000   
GEAR -0.170* 0.142 0.103 -0.314* 0.278* -0.436* 1.000  
ROCE -0.125* -0.104 0.054 0.229* -0.244* 0.042 -0.133* 1.000 
Note: Total0 is total number of risk disclosures exclude internal control risk management policies; * indicates significance at 10% level. 
 
Table 3.3 
Correlation matrix2 
Variables BETA2011 Total1 POUT GROW SIZE LIQU GEAR ROCE 
BETA2011 1.000        
Total1 -0.128* 1.000       
POUT -0.192* 0.010 1.000      
GROW 0.036 0.057 -0.229* 1.000     
SIZE -0.108 0.532* 0.043 -0.064 1.000    
LIQU 0.041 -0.101 -0.297* 0.319* -0.197* 1.000   
GEAR -0.170* 0.158* 0.103 -0.314* 0.278* -0.436* 1.000  
ROCE -0.125* -0.097 0.054 0.229* -0.244* 0.042 -0.133* 1.000 
Note: Total1 is total number of risk disclosures include internal control risk management policies; * indicates significance at 10% level. 
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Table 3.4 depicts the average value for beta and forward-looking risk 
disclosures in different industries. Their values vary substantially across different 
sectors. Interestingly, whilst Healthcare and Utilities sectors with low betas disclose 
the most forward-looking risk information, the Technology sector, with a high beta, 
published the lowest volume of forward-looking risk information. This implies a 
possible negative relationship between the quantity of forward-looking risk 
disclosures and firm risk level relative to specific industries.  
 
Table 3.4 
Sample industry coverage and variable mean values 
Industries BETA2011 Total0 Total1 No. of observations 
Basic Materials 1.19 146 163 24 
Consumer Goods 0.92 100 113 25 
Consumer Services 1.04 100 116 55 
Health Care 0.82 180 200 8 
Industrials 1.10 121 137 57 
Oil & Gas 1.10 144 156 16 
Technology 1.12 99 112 17 
Telecommunications 0.99 111 119 5 
Utilities 0.67 152 168 9 
Notes: Variables are winsorised at the 5% level. Total0 is total number of risk disclosures exclude 
internal control risk management policies, Total1 is total number of risk disclosures include internal 
control risk management policies, BETA2011 represents corporate systematic risk. 
 
A total number of 29,021 forward-looking risk disclosure sentences were 
identified within companies’ annual reports in my sample. The detailed risk 
categorizations and sentence characteristics that these disclosures fall within are 
presented in Table 3.5.  
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Table 3.5   
Risk disclosures for sample companies 
 
Financial 
risks 
Operational 
risks 
Strategic 
risks 
Sub-total 
Internal 
control risk 
management 
policies 
Total 
Proportion 
(%) 
Text disclosures sentence characteristics        
Good news/Quantitative 34 461 232 727 0 727 3% 
Bad news/Quantitative 41 63 82 186 0 186 1% 
Neutral news/Quantitative 227 365 299 891 6 897 3% 
Good news/Qualitative 119 2,414 1,553 4,086 0 4,086 14% 
Bad news/Qualitative 1,029 3,355 3,663 8,047 0 8,047 28% 
Neutral news/Qualitative 2,320 5,351 4,100 11,771 3,307 15,078 52% 
Good news 153 2,875 1,785 4,813 0 4,813 17% 
Bad news 1,070 3,418 3,745 8,233 0 8,233 28% 
Neutral news 2,547 5,716 4,399 12,662 3,313 15,975 55% 
Quantitative 302 889 613 1,804 6 1,810 6% 
Qualitative 3,468 11,120 9,316 23,904 3,307 27,211 94% 
        
Total 3,770 12,009 9,929 25,708 3,313 29,021 100% 
Proportion (%) 13% 41% 34% 89% 11% 100%  
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The two codes that reveal the largest numbers of disclosures are 
operational/neutral/qualitative (5,351) and strategic/neutral/qualitative (4,100). The 
operational/neutral/qualitative risk disclosures describe risks arising from the people, 
systems and processes through which a company operates and the corresponding risk 
mitigation strategies in a neutral and qualitative context. A typical example of this 
type of disclosure would be: “Group-wide operational procedures and standards are 
in place and enforced in all business units. There is also a robust supervision 
structure which allows management to monitor the progress and delivery of the 
group’s contracts and customer relationships” (G4S annual report, 2010, p.50). Risk 
disclosure studies that predate the 2007 financial crisis criticize the inadequacy and 
lack of clarity that defined firms’ internal operational risk disclosures (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006); however, the dominance of operational risk disclosures in this 
research (12,009; 41%) signals an improvement in risk disclosures following the 
crisis. 
Strategic/neutral/qualitative risk disclosures refer to general operating 
environmental factors that are beyond a board’s control. These encompass sentences 
such as: “Such changes in dynamics could include new technologies, government 
legislation or customer consolidation and could, particularly if rapid or unpredictable, 
impact the group’s revenues and Profitability” (G4S annual report, 2010, pp.50).  
Another pertinent finding is that the total number of financial risk disclosures 
(3,770) is much lower than that of operational (12,009) and strategic risk disclosures 
(9,929). One possible reason for this is that the majority of the sample companies put 
financial risk information in the “Notes to the Financial Statement”, which falls 
outside the narrative voluntary risk disclosures that are the extent of this research, 
thus only limited forward-looking financial risk information is found in the coding 
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process compared with operational and strategic risk disclosures. This is a main 
difference between previous risk disclosure studies. In a widely-referenced paper by 
Linsley and Shrives (2006), the total number of financial risk disclosures showed no 
substantial variation compared with other main risk categorisations: operational risk, 
integrity risk, strategic risk. It can be stated that some financial risk factors - such as 
inflation, currency fluctuations and taxation - are beyond the control of any company, 
and they are common risks that face every company. Thus, executives have more 
incentive to publish firm-specific risks to potential investors rather than describing 
the general financial environment which investors can source information on from 
other media. This endorses Gietzmann’s (2006) argument that “the information that 
sophisticated institutional investors value most is non-routine company-specific non-
financial information that cannot be readily collected (and validated by) from other 
sources”. Another reason may be that risk disclosure formats and styles are 
continuously changing; meanwhile accounting authorities and policy makers are 
working on transparency and informativeness of risk disclosure, especially following 
the 2007 financial crisis. These factors will all have an impact on the risk disclosure 
practices nowadays. 
Overall, the average number of forward-looking risk disclosure per annual 
report is 134 sentences. Table 3.6 presents descriptive statistics for the sampled 
companies.  
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Table 3.6 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean (Median) S.D. Min (Max) Skewness Kurtosis 
Forward-looking risk disclosure 
variables      
Total number of risk disclosures0 119 (110) 65.10 26 (455) 1.883 8.444 
Total number of risk disclosures1 134 (122) 70.01 28 (480) 1.789 7.901 
      
Number of financial risk disclosures 17 (14) 13.63 0 (75) 1.437 5.252 
Number of operational risk 
disclosures 
56 (50) 33.51 7 (233) 1.899 8.903 
Number of strategic risk disclosures 46 (38) 31.48 3 (199) 2.061 9.101 
      
Number of good news disclosures 22 (19) 16.46 0 (102) 1.923 8.552 
Number of bad news disclosures 38 (30) 33.21 3 (234) 2.898 13.372 
Number of neutral news disclosures 58 (55) 31.11 6 (226) 1.282 6.549 
      
Number of quantitative risk 
disclosures 
8 (6) 7.73 0 (45) 1.783 7.095 
Number of qualitative risk 
disclosures 
111(99) 60.45 26 (417) 1.948 8.827 
      
Other variables 
     
BETA2011 1.04 (1.05) 0.27 0.56 (1.52) 0.007 2.027 
SIZE 14.47 (14.32) 1.41 12.36 (17.3) 0.485 2.413 
POUT 34.57 (38.14) 21.16 0 (68.56) -0.286 2.020 
LIQU 1.56 (1.32) 1.01 0.46 (4.52) 1.553 4.975 
GEAR 33.53 (31.25) 23.97 0 (82.22) 0.404 2.294 
GROW 0.09 (0.06) 0.13 -0.09 (0.42) 1.076 3.696 
ROCE 13.36 (11.59) 9.24 0.31 (35.00) 0.758 2.894 
Notes: Total0 is total number of risk disclosures exclude internal control risk management policies, Total1 is total number 
of risk disclosures include internal control risk management policies, BETA2011 represents corporate systematic risk; 
SIZE is measured by taking the natural logarithm of total assets; POUT is dividend payout; LIQU is measured by current 
ratio, using total current assets divided by total current liabilities; GEAR, log of equity gearing, calculated by total debt 
over total capital; GROW, stands for asset growth, is calculated by log of TAt/TAt-1, where TA is the book value of total 
assets; ROCE, return on capital employed.  
Test for mean equality between number of good/neutral news disclosures, number of good/bad news disclosures, number 
of bad/neutral news disclosures, number of quantitative/qualitative news disclosures are all significant at 1% level.  
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The variation in the total number of disclosures is large, with a minimum of 28 
sentences, a maximum of 480, and a standard deviation of 70.01. Noticeably, risk-
related sentences appear intensely in the “Principal Risks and Uncertainties”, 
“Internal Control and Risk Management” and “Forward-looking Statement” sections 
within annual reports (some reports have different but comparable titles), whilst 
others are dispersed across the narrative sections: the “Chairman’s Statement”, 
“Directors’ Report”, and  “Financial, Business and Operational review”. 
 
3.7.2. Hypotheses testing 
In testing Hypothesis 1, the total number of neutral news (12,662) is significant more 
than the number of good news (4,813) and bad news (8,233), taking 55%, 18% and 
27% of my sample, respectively (see Table 3.5). This provides evidence for my 
Hypothesis 1. From Table 3.6, the average number of neutral news in each firm is 58 
sentences, which is greater than the average number of good news disclosures (22 
sentences) and bad news disclosures (38 sentences). The median value for the 
number of neutral/good/bad news disclosures provide similar evidence, showing 55 
sentences, 30 sentences, and 19 sentences respectively. I also report p-values 
associated with T-tests aimed as accessing whether the average number of neutral 
news is equal to the average number of good/bad news. The results suggest that the 
null hypothesis is rejected; indicating the number of neutral news disclosure is 
greater than the number of good or bad news disclosures. This provides further 
evidence supporting Hypothesis 1. One possible explanation is that of different risk 
interpretation. A single coder might have different understanding of a ‘risk sentence’ 
in the context of the annual report. For example, if a sentence indicates a cost 
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increase, this can signal inefficient resources management; however, if placed in its 
fuller context, the cost increase may be due to the research and development fees 
incurred by a new product, or from hiring an excellent administrator; thus a short-
term cost increase might lead to future profits, and the sentence is more accurately 
coded as neutral news. Another explanation suggests that some managers intuitively 
tend to write annual reports more “neutrally” in order to conceal their poor 
performance. This result is in line with the findings in Beretta and Bozzolan (2004). 
In view of the content of good and bad risk news (see Table 3.5), it is 
noticeable that good news is mostly discussed in operational risk disclosures (2,875), 
while bad news is frequently included in strategic risk disclosures (3,745). 
Specifically, within the total 8,233 bad news risk sentences, 45% (3,745/8,233) 
describe depressed external operating environment. This finding supports previous 
work suggesting that managers are inclined to attribute negative risk information to 
external factors (strategic risks) that are beyond their control, while claiming a level 
of superior risk management.  
In testing Hypothesis 2, the total number of quantitative risk disclosures is 
1,804 (6% of total risk disclosures exclude internal control risk management 
policies), while the number of qualitative risk disclosures is 23,904 (94% of total risk 
disclosures exclude risk management structure and policies) (see Table 3.5). In 
addition, the average number of qualitative risk disclosures (111 sentences, with the 
median value of 99 sentences) is greater than the number of quantitative risk 
disclosures (8 sentences, with the median value of 6 sentences). The p-value 
associated with T-tests displays the significant difference between these two groups 
(see Table 3.6), which support our Hypothesis 2 that qualitative risk disclosures 
dominate total risk disclosures, which is in line with existing literature that indicates 
 
 
131 
 
managers tend to describe especially bad news in an obscured manner, rather than to 
quantify it with according to an immediate monetary impact, attempting to obfuscate 
the unfavourable information. Linsley and Shrives (2005) criticise this complicated 
writing style in that it greatly increase readers’ difficulties in collecting and 
understanding risk information. However, it points a direction for future accounting 
regulation that, in order to improve the credibility of risk disclosure, quantitative risk 
information should be greatly increased. 
To test Hypothesis 3, whether more forward-looking risk disclosures lead to 
lower risk, OLS (with White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors) is adopted. 
Table 3.7 reports the regression output from the risk model.  
 
Table 3.7 
OLS Regression of the relationship between BETA2011 and total number of 
forward-looking risk disclosures 
BETA2011 Total0 Total1 
FRD -0.00060** -0.00061** 
 (0.049) (0.031) 
POUT -0.00228*** -0.00227*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
GROW -0.25130* -0.24787* 
 (0.090) (0.094) 
SIZE 0.00644 0.00777 
 (0.668) (0.606) 
LIQU -0.03551* -0.03546* 
 (0.075) (0.076) 
GEAR -0.00166* -0.00162* 
 (0.053) (0.059) 
ROCE -0.00496*** -0.00495*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
R2 adjusted 0.2689 0.2715 
No. of observations 216  
Notes: Outliners in all regression variables are winsorised at the 5% level. FRD is forward-looking 
risk disclosures, Total0 is total number of risk disclosures exclude internal control risk management 
policies, Total1 is total number of risk disclosures include internal control risk management policies, 
numbers in parentheses are p-values computed using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. ***, 
** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Industry dummies are included in 
all specifications but not reported in this results table. 
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There is a significant negative relationship between the total number of 
forward-looking risk disclosures (excluding internal control risk management 
policies) and firm risk (measured by beta). If taking internal control risk 
management policies into consideration, this result is still consistent. However, the 
risk lowering effect is quite small in observing its coefficient. Specifically, if holding 
other factors equal, one standard deviation increase in forward-looking risk 
disclosures would only lead to a 0.00061 decrease in a firm’s beta. This indicates 
that forward-looking risk disclosure has a significant but low effect on reducing 
firms’ risk. 
Given its large number of forward-looking disclosures, the sample is likely to 
be characterized by considerable heterogeneity. I next investigated whether the 
sensitivities of forward-looking disclosures varied for different risk categorisations: 
financial risks, operational risks, and strategic risks. Table 3.8 shows different results 
across these categories.  
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Table 3.8 
OLS Regression of the relationship between BETA2011 and forward-looking risk disclosures 
BETA2011 
Financial 
risks 
Operational 
risks 
Strategic 
risk 
Good 
news 
Bad 
news 
Neutral 
news 
Quantitative 
risks 
Qualitative 
risks 
FRD 0.00089 -0.00126** -0.00109* -0.00434*** 0.00067 -0.00012 -0.00819*** -0.00053 
 (0.519) (0.027) (0.072) (0.000) (0.244) (0.857) (0.001) (0.110) 
POUT -0.00227*** -0.00226*** -0.00224*** -0.00211*** -0.00228*** -0.00232*** -0.00236*** -0.00228*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
GROW -0.25477* -0.22599 -0.26669* -0.15314 -0.27539* -0.25900* -0.18766 -0.25712* 
 (0.094) (0.128) (0.072) (0.288) (0.070) (0.091) (0.207) (0.085) 
SIZE -0.01159 0.00422 0.00423 0.00102 -0.00110 -0.00743 0.00992 0.00342 
 (0.379) (0.765) (0.773) (0.936) (0.940) (0.608) (0.484) (0.817) 
LIQU -0.03208* -0.03392* -0.03556* -0.03851* -0.03304* -0.03342* -0.02714 -0.03561* 
 (0.094) (0.089) (0.074) (0.051) (0.092) (0.082) (0.187) (0.072) 
GEAR -0.00179** -0.00165* -0.00173** -0.00157* -0.00168* -0.00175* -0.00132 -0.00170* 
 (0.039) (0.053) (0.046) (0.060) (0.051) (0.042) (0.128) (0.048) 
ROCE -0.00504*** -0.00492*** -0.00504*** -0.00492*** -0.00487*** -0.00503*** -0.00502*** -0.00497*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
R2 adjusted 0.2583 0.2730 0.2667 0.3122 0.2611 0.2568 0.2939 0.2650 
No. of observations  216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 
Notes: Outliners in all regression variables are winsorised at the 5% level. FRD is forward-looking risk disclosures. Numbers in parentheses are p-values computed using 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Industry dummies are included in all specifications but 
not reported in this results table. 
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The coefficients of risk disclosure are significant for both operational and 
strategic categories, at 5% and 10% level respectively. The sensitivity is larger in the 
former (-0.00126) than in the later (-0.00109), which indicates the disclosure of more 
forward-looking operational risks, helping drive down firm risk in a more effective 
way. This can be explained by the nature of the two risks categorisations. 
Operational risk refers exclusively to firm-specific internal risks that are within the 
control of the board, while strategic risks describe the external operating and natural 
environment that are beyond the control of companies’ directors. This regression 
result is in line with previous findings that institutional investors place more value on 
an individual firm’s risks rather than the general market risks which every firm faces. 
Noticeably, there is no significant association between forward-looking financial risk 
disclosures and firms’ beta; this is largely due to the lack of financial risk disclosures 
in voluntarily narrative statements within annual reports, as the majority of sample 
companies discussed financial risks in their “Notes to the Financial Statement”, 
which (as noted above) is fell beyond the remit of this study.   
In order to consider another perspective, I divide total forward-looking risk 
disclosures into good, bad and neutral news. One noteworthy result indicates that 
beta is only significant (at 1% level) in relation to good news risk disclosures. 
Moreover, the elasticity of forward-looking risk disclosure (-0.00434) is more 
sensitive than the total level (-0.00061), which indicates that more good news 
disclosed will have a greater effect on firms' risk reduction. There is no significant 
relationship between beta and forward-looking bad news or neutral news. The result 
can be explained in that good news indicates future opportunities for the company 
and a prosperous potential. This good news signals profit-adding opportunities in the 
future; investors are more willing to inject funds in firms with promising 
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opportunities. In light of this, the firm’s risk will fall accordingly.   
In respect of forward-looking quantitative and qualitative risk disclosures, I 
observe a significant negative relationship between quantitative risk disclosures and 
the beta (at 1% significant level, with an elasticity of -0.00819), but not for 
qualitative risk disclosures. This indicates that risk disclosures’ effect on firm risk 
can be greatly improved if the size of the risk can be quantified to enable readers to 
estimate the potential monetary impact of risks more precisely. Kadous et al. (2005) 
propose a similar argument, suggesting that the quantification of a project proposal 
can improve its persuasiveness among investors since the project credibility is 
correspondingly enhanced. Likewise, the difficulties in quantifying future risks make 
them more valuable to investors. However, the fear of being exposed to potential 
legal claims when irretrievable errors in judgment occur is based on the published 
yet erroneous estimation of future risks; directors are therefore more inclined to 
avoid discussing unpredictable future risks in a quantitative manner. Moreover, 
assessing forward-looking risk disclosures is not infallible, mainly due to a lack of 
reliable and credible data (Frame, 2003) and the limitation of risk measurement 
techniques (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). All these factors might lead to substantial 
variation of the eventual risk outcome and the original judgment. 
 
3.8. Conclusions 
This chapter examines forward-looking risk disclosures within UK annual reports 
and tests the relationship between the volume of forward-looking risk disclosures 
and firm risk level. For measures of forward-looking risk disclosure, I use content 
analysis to count the sentences containing at least one UNIX perl code key word.  
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The results support the hypothesis that the numbers of good, bad and neutral 
forward-looking risk disclosures are significant different from one another. 
Specifically, neutral news dominates total forward-looking risk disclosures. This 
supports Beretta and Bozzolan’s (2004) findings for 85 Italian companies’ risk 
disclosures in that, where future risks are disclosed, directors are reluctant to indicate 
whether the impact is likely to be positive or negative. 
Investigation of quantitative and qualitative forward-looking risk disclosures 
has revealed that qualitative disclosures occur significant more often than 
quantitative disclosures, reflecting the findings from general disclosure studies (e.g., 
Kravet and Muslu, 2013). These results lend support to stake-holder agency theory in 
that risk disclosures can be used as an instrument for risk handling if there is room 
for discretion.  
It is also worth noting that forward-looking risk disclosures intensively appear 
in “Principal risks and uncertainties” and “forward-looking statements”, whilst 
others are dispersed throughout the reports. However, the significant increase of 
forward-looking operational risk disclosures compare with the dominance of general 
statements of risk policy (Linsley and Shrives, 2006) can be seen as a sign of 
improvement in risk disclosures in the wake of the 2007 financial crisis. However, 
managers’ preference to attribute bad news to external factors and a lack of 
quantitative risk information needs to be improved in future accounting regulatory 
reports. 
A significant negative association is found between the volume of forward-
looking risk disclosures and the level of firm risk, measured by beta; however, one 
standard deviation increase in forward-looking risk disclosures would only lead to a 
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slight decrease of the beta value. This supports the stake-holder agency theory in that 
if managers selectively publish limited forward-looking risk information, and 
therefore fail to satisfy the information requirements of other stakeholders, investors 
may consider the company a risky investment because this might later incur costly 
explicit claims (i.e. a risk of litigation). Additionally, other stakeholders may assume 
an inefficient level of internal risk management and a restricted ability of managers 
to obtain capital at consistent rates (Salama et al., 2011). From the perspective of 
different risk categorisations - financial risks, operational risks, and strategic risks – 
the present results indicate that disclosing more forward-looking operational risks 
helps drive down firm risk levels in a more effective way. This result is in line with 
previous literature that has suggested institutional investors place more value on 
individual firms’ risks rather than on general market risks which every firm would 
face. In addition, more good news and the nature of the quantitative news that is 
disclosed will have greater effects on firms' risk reduction. These results therefore 
provide some support for the resource-based view (RBV) and quality signalling 
approach, which suggests that one way to improve the quality of firms’ risk 
disclosure is by increasing the release of operational, good news and quantitative risk 
information: Such disclosures are less easily replicable by weaker competitors and 
transmit valuable, rare, inimitable and non-replicable risk management strategies 
information to potential investors.  
The aim of this research has been to extend the empirical understanding of the 
usefulness of forward-looking risk disclosures in risk reduction. In adopting a 
content analysis approach, this research has some limitations. Subjectivity can be 
reduced with the aid of UNIX perl code scanning, but cannot be wholly eliminated, 
and the selection of risk categorisations is subject to debate. Nonetheless, this 
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method has proven to be effective in having facilitated important contributions to 
existing literature.  
The originality of the cross-sectional exploration of forward-looking risk 
disclosures and its association with beta has opened up a vast scope for future risk 
disclosure studies. Sample companies could be selected from other countries, with 
comparative cross-country studies of particular value. When conducting other 
investigation in other countries, however, attention must be paid to legislation 
requirements, and accounting standards and cultural attitudes (as well as translation 
issues) that might have potential influence on firms’ risk reporting practices (Aljifri 
and Hussainey, 2007). Research that investigates forward-looking risk information 
within specific industries might also bear considerable results. Admittedly, the nature 
of financial firms is significant different from that of non-financial firms; further 
work could be undertaken to examine whether the results of this study are replicated 
for financial institutions. Future research could also incorporate risk information 
from a variety of sources, and not exclusively rely on annual reports. 
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APPENDIX 3.1 
Risk disclosure categories (Linsley and Shrives, 2006, pp. 401-402) 
Financial risks 
 Interest rate 
 Exchange rate 
 Commodity 
 Liquidity 
 Credit 
 Inflation  
 Taxation 
 Market risk: changes in asset prices negotiated in the markets 
 Derivative financial instrument 
 Financial risks mitigation strategies 
Operational risk 
 
 Customer satisfaction 
 Product development 
 Product, project, service failure 
 Efficiency and performance (Liability, Accounts receivable, 
cost structure, debt covenants, excessive debt, flexibility)  
 Sourcing (purchasing materials) 
 Stock obsolescence and shrinkage 
 Environmental (risks stem from the impact of corporate 
operations on natural environment) 
 Employment practices, health and safety 
 Brand name erosion, reputation 
 Research and development 
 Intellectual property rights 
 Management of growth (subsidiaries)  
 Acquisitions, alliance, and joint-ventures 
 Information systems and controls  
 Management and employee fraud 
 Operational risks mitigation strategies 
Strategic risk 
 
 Environmental scan (macro environmental sources: general 
economic conditions)  
 Industry source (potential entrants, substitutes, suppliers, 
strategic partners, customers (e.g., changes in demand, changes 
in clients requirements and customers preferences)  
 Business portfolio 
 Competitors 
 Pricing: freight rates and raw material, lower prices from 
competitors costs 
 Valuation 
 Planning 
 Life cycle 
 Performance measurement 
 Regulator, legislation 
 Sovereign, social and political 
 Technological change 
 Climate and catastrophic 
 Strategic risks mitigation strategies 
Internal control risk 
management strategies 
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APPENDIX 3.2 
Typical examples of risk disclosures 
Company Risk disclosure examples Risk category Sentence characteristics 
G4S “The security industry comprises a number of very competitive 
markets. In particular, manned security markets can be fragmented 
with relatively low economic barriers to entry and the group 
competes with a wide variety of operators of varying sizes. Actions 
taken by the group’s competitors may place pressure upon 
its pricing, margins and profitability” (G4S, 2010, pp.50). 
Strategic risk Qualitative/bad news/forward-looking 
Halfords Group “The success of the Group’s business depends 
upon its senior management closely supervising all 
aspects of its business, in particular the operation of 
its stores, autocentres and the design, procurement 
and allocation of its merchandise” (Halfords Group, 2010, pp.56). 
Operational risk Qualitative/neutral news/forward-looking 
Hunting “The oil price has recovered from its lows of 2009 and sustained an 
increase of 15% during 2010 and is now trending towards US 
$100/barrel, which has provided a stable and encouraging 
investment environment” (Hunting, 2010, pp.7) 
Financial risk Quantitative/good news/forward-looking 
Halfords Group “The Committee assists the Board in achieving its 
obligations under the Combined Code in areas of risk management 
and internal control, focusing particularly on compliance with legal 
requirements, accounting standards and the Listing Rules, and 
ensures that an effective system of internal financial and non-
financial controls is maintained” (Halfords Group, 2010, pp.69) 
Internal control 
risk management 
policies 
Qualitative/neutral news/forward-looking 
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APPENDIX 3.3 
Descriptive statistics of variables 2012 
 
Mean (Median) S.D. Min (Max) Skewness Kurtosis 
Forward-looking risk disclosure variables      
Total number of risk disclosures0 119 (110) 65.76 26 (455) 1.873 8.352 
Total number of risk disclosures1 134 (122) 70.65 28 (480) 1.784 7.844 
 
     
Number of financial risk disclosures 18(14) 13.76 0 (75) 1.404 5.115 
Number of operational risk disclosures 56 (50) 33.70 7 (233) 1.916 8.950 
Number of strategic risk disclosures 46 (38) 31.79 3 (199) 2.077 9.063 
 
     
Number of good news disclosures 22 (18) 16.64 0 (102) 1.931 8.489 
Number of bad news disclosures 38 (30) 33.63 3 (234) 2.856 13.018 
Number of neutral news disclosures 58 (54) 31.27 6 (226) 1.286 6.585 
 
     
Number of quantitative risk disclosures 8 (6) 7.39 0 (40) 1.567 5.910 
Number of qualitative risk disclosures 111(100) 61.2 26 (417) 1.927 8.648 
 
     
Other variables      
BETA2012 1.05 (1.05) 0.31 0.49 (1.56) -0.061 1.996 
SIZE 14.46 (14.30) 1.42 12.36 (17.38) 0.493 2.407 
POUT 34.97 (38.22) 21.08 0 (68.56) -0.295 2.039 
LIQU 1.55 (1.31) 1.01 0.46 (4.52) 1.585 5.088 
GEAR 33.12 (30.98) 23.9 0 (82.22) 0.421 2.317 
GROW 0.09 (0.06) 0.13 -0.09 (0.42) 1.049 3.658 
ROCE 13.47 (11.87) 9.33 0.31 (35) 0.740 2.826 
Observations 209 209 209 209 209 
Note: due to missing variables data, the sample observations reduced to 209 for the year 2012. Forward-
looking risk disclosure numbers and other variables except BETA2012 are the data in 2010, BETA2012 is the 
beta in 2012.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
142 
 
APPENDIX 3.4 
OLS Regression of the relationship between BETA2012 and forward-looking risk disclosures2010 
BETA2012 
Total0 Total1 Financial 
risks 
Operational 
risks 
Strategic 
risk 
Good 
news 
Bad 
news 
Neutral 
news 
Quantitative 
risks 
Qualititive 
risks 
FRD -0.00032 -0.00037 0. 00071 -0. 00077 -0. 00051 -0. 00384*** -0. 00039 0. 00059 -0. 00824*** -0. 00022 
 (0.367) (0.260) (0.631) (0.249) (0.459) (0.001) (0.547) (0.429) (0.014) (0.555) 
POUT -0.00287*** -0.00286*** -0. 00284*** -0. 00285*** -0. 00286*** -0. 00270*** -0. 00287*** -0. 00287*** -0. 00282*** -0. 00288*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GROW -0.30752* -0.30479* -0. 30895 * -0. 29331* -0. 31435* -0. 21814 -0. 32055* -0. 31999* -0. 23025 -0. 31135* 
 (0.064) (0.065) (0.067) (0.076) (0.059) (0.172) (0.058) (0.062) (0.154) (0.063) 
SIZE 0.00392 0.00596 -0. 00630 0. 00378 0. 00204 0. 00433 0. 00044 -0. 01086 0. 01454 0. 00107 
 (0.811) (0.718) (0.662) (0.805) (0.898) (0.752) (0.978) (0.486) (0.353) (0.947) 
LIQU -0.02295 -0.02300 -0. 02146 -0. 02216 -0. 02302 -0. 02626 -0. 02183* -0. 02066* -0. 01339 -0. 02292* 
 (0.345) (0.345) (0.370) (0.367) (0.342) (0.292) (0.367) (0.378) (0.597) (0.342) 
GEAR -0.00171* -0.00167* -0. 00182* -0. 00170* -0. 00176* -0. 00159* -0. 00172* -0. 00179* -0. 00126 -0. 00174* 
 (0.063) (0.069) (0.052) (0.064) (0.059) (0.079) (0.062) (0.053) (0.182) (0.059) 
ROCE -0.00651*** -0.00650*** -0. 00653*** -0. 00649*** -0. 00653*** -0. 00648*** -0. 00644*** -0. 00641*** -0. 00673*** -0. 00651*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
           
R2 adjusted 0.3260 0.3277 0.3242 0.3281 0.3251 0.3580 0.3245 0.3254 0.3495 0.3245 
Observations   209 209 209 209 209 209 209 209 209 209 
Notes: Outliners in all regression variables are winsorised at the 5% level. FRD is forward-looking risk disclosures. Numbers in parentheses are p-values computed using 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Industry dummies are included in all specifications but 
not reported in this results table. This table depicts the regression result of forward-looking risk disclosures2010 and beta2012 to test whether the forward-looking risk disclosures 
in 2010 have further impact on firm risk in further period. The total number of forward-looking risk disclosures doesn’t show significant relationship, however, the good news 
and quantitative still reflect significant results. It implies forward-looking risk disclosures might have impact on risk reduction in two years ahead, although the effect is lower 
compared to the immediate future of year 2011.  
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APPENDIX 3.5 
Descriptive statistics of past risk disclosures2010 
 
Mean (Median) S.D. Min (Max) Skewness Kurtosis 
Past risk disclosure variables      
Total number of risk disclosures0 43 (35) 33.09 0 (212) 2.365 10.78 
Total number of risk disclosures1 44 (36) 33.33 1(212) 2.285 10.351 
 
     
Number of financial risk disclosures 6(4) 6.89 0 (45) 2.196 9.259 
Number of operational risk disclosures 22 (18) 20.12 0 (180) 3.380 21.949 
Number of strategic risk disclosures 14 (10) 13.91 0 (116) 3.077 17.905 
 
     
Number of good news disclosures 15 (12) 13.06 0 (91) 2.525 12.165 
Number of bad news disclosures 15 (11) 15.96 0 (101) 2.68 11.914 
Number of neutral news disclosures 13 (10) 10.34 0 (66) 2.053 9.270 
 
     
Number of quantitative risk disclosures 20 (17) 19.64 0 (157) 3.465 19.691 
Number of qualitative risk disclosures 22(18) 17.37 0 (104) 1.830 7.309 
 
     
Observations 216 216 216 216 216 
Note: the risk disclosures identified in the annual reports of 2010 are originally categorized according to time 
orientation into forward-looking risk disclosures and past risk disclosures. 
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APPENDIX 3.6 
OLS Regression of the relationship between BETA2011 and past risk disclosures2010 
BETA2011 Total0 Total1 
Financial 
risks 
Operational 
risks 
Strategic 
risk 
Good 
news 
Bad 
news 
Neutral 
news 
Quantitative 
risks 
Qualititive 
risks 
PRD 0. 00052 0. 00046 0. 00182 0. 00043 0. 00114 0. 00292* 0. 00064 -0. 00147 0. 00128 0. 00009 
 (0.413) (0.467) (0.473) (0.671) (0.335) (0.087) (0.614) (0.407) (0.156) (0.939) 
POUT -0. 00231*** -0. 00231*** -0.00228*** -0. 00231*** -0. 00234*** -0. 00226*** -0. 00234*** -0. 00235*** -0. 00231*** -0. 00232*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
GROW -0. 26397* -0. 26309* -0. 25548* -0. 27012* -0. 24582 -0. 27185* -0. 25014 -0. 23285 -0. 25808* -0. 26133* 
 (0.082) (0.083) (0.093) (0.081) (0.109) (0.068) (0.104) (0.154) (0.089) (0.088) 
SIZE -0. 01463 -0. 01399 -0. 01176 -0. 01106 0. 01381 -0. 02026 -0. 01226 -0. 00610 -0. 01675 -0. 0093 
 (0.309) (0.331) (0.375) (0.410) (0.323) (0.140) (0.397) (0.645) (0.236) (0.498) 
LIQU -0. 03161* -0. 03197* -0.03236* -0. 03235* -0. 03223* -0. 02999 -0. 03276* -0. 03492* -0. 03151 -0. 03292* 
 (0.1) (0.095) (0.088) (0.093) (0.095) (0.117) (0.089) (0.072) (0.101) (0.089) 
GEAR -0. 00174** -0. 00175** -0.00172** -0. 00176** -0. 00172** -0. 00169** -0. 00175** -0. 00175** -0. 00172** -0. 00175** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.046) (0.041) (0.044) (0.049) (0.042) (0.043) (0.045) (0.042) 
ROCE -0. 00497*** -0. 00499*** -0.00506*** -0.00499*** -0. 00496*** -0. 00538*** -0. 00497*** -0. 00521*** -0. 00511*** -0. 0050*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) 
           
R2 adjusted 0.259 0.2585 0.2583 0.2573 0.2591 0.27 0.2575 0.2587 0.2621 0.2567 
Observations   216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 
Notes: Outliners in all regression variables are winsorised at the 5% level. PRD is past risk disclosures. Numbers in parentheses are p-values computed using 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Industry dummies are included in all specifications but 
not reported in this results table. This table presents the regression results of past risk disclosures2010 and beta2011. This is to compare to the results of forward-looking risk 
disclosures. The total number of past disclosures do not show any significant relationship with beta, this provide support for the original hypothesis of this research that 
forward-looking risk disclosures are more valuable to investors in perceiving further firm risk level. 
  
 
 
145 
 
Chapter 4 
Forward-looking risk disclosure, earnings quality 
and analyst forecast accuracy 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction  
While the agency theory regarding the relationship between corporate insiders and 
outside stakeholders is well intensively investigated, one important aspect of 
managing the differing interests of agents and principals is the necessity to discipline 
managers’ discretional behaviours through various monitoring mechanisms (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Financial analysis quality can be 
considered as one way to monitor whether the management of a firm breaches 
contractual links (Leftwich et al., 1981; Ball and Foster, 1982). Financial analysts 
represent the group to whom corporate reporting is (or should be) addressed. They 
are the primary users of financial statement information (Schipper, 1991). In 
gathering, processing, and distributing information to the market, they act as 
intermediaries between capital suppliers and firm management and therefore perform 
an important role in capital markets by reducing information asymmetries and 
agency problems between preparers and users of financial statements (Healy and 
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Palepu, 2001). Prior evidence suggests that analysts’ share recommendations, price 
targets, earnings forecasts and written documents have value relevance to share price 
formation (Barker and Imam, 2008). One of the primary inputs in analysts’ earnings 
forecast and valuation models is information risk, which generally refers to the odds 
of analysts’ incorrectly specify share prices following poor quality disclosures. 
Theoretical studies propose that information risk is non-diversifiable (Easley and 
O’Hara, 2004), and is commonly proxied by disclosure level and earnings quality 
(Francis, et al., 2005; Hussainey and Mouselli, 2010).  
Previous literature shows an intense interest in the impact of accounting 
information on stock returns (e.g., Mouselli et al., 2012; Francis et al., 2008). Built 
on the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) framework, studies have 
tried to show that greater disclosure quantity lowers firms' cost of capital by reducing 
systematic risk. However, there is little research into the incremental ability of 
disclosures to anticipate future earnings. The few such works that address this are: 
Wang and Hussainey (2013), who present evidence that voluntarily publishing 
forward-looking information could improve capital market’s ability to predict future 
earnings and these disclosures convey value relevant information for market 
participants; Dhaliwal et al. (2012), who focus on corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) disclosures, report that releasing stand-alone CSR reports leads to higher 
earnings forecast accuracy and suggest CSR disclosures complement firm’s financial 
disclosures; and Dorestani and Rezaee (2011), who document that the change in key 
performance indicator (KPI) disclosures is related to lower analyst forecast error. 
This strand of disclosure research centres on voluntary non-financial information, 
which, they argue, would impact firm value and thus indirectly lead to higher 
forecast accuracy. However, to the best of my knowledge, no attempts in literature 
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have examined risk disclosures, especially forward-looking risk disclosures (FRD), 
which contain both valuable financial and non-financial information context and its 
potential value to lower forecast error within British context. I extend these studies 
by focusing specifically on forward-looking risk disclosures that have not been 
investigated in existing literature and predict a significant positive relationship 
between the extent of FRD disclosures and analyst forecast accuracy. I use a coded 
index to count FRD in the narrative sections of annual reports and provide evidence 
that FRD effectively lowers forecast error, with this effect appearing strongest over a 
short-term forecast horizon. My detailed risk construction also confirms the 
association identified for aggregate risk disclosures.  
Financial transparency (or opaqueness) is widely assessed by earning quality, 
which is commonly included as an explanatory variable in the modelling of earnings 
predictability. By definition, earnings quality refers to “the precision of the earnings 
signal emanating from the firm’s financial reporting system. Such imprecision 
affects the capital market’s demand for, as well as a firm’s motive to supply, 
disclosures that are useful to current shareholders and prospective investors in 
assessing firm value” (Francis et al., 2008, pp.54). Prior literature examining analysts’ 
perceptions of earnings has focused on individual earnings attributes - for example, 
earnings persistence, variability, volatility, or transitory items (e.g., Francis et al., 
2004; Dichev and Tang, 2009); or within a market-based accounting context, looked 
at accruals quality on cost of capital. However, few attempts have used alternative 
earnings quality metrics to quantify earnings quality and test its potential usefulness 
on lowering forecast error. The current research extends the earnings quality 
literature and hypothesizes a significant negative association between forecast 
accuracy and earnings quality; since all my EQ metrics are inverse measure of 
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earnings quality, I predict positive sign of EQ in all my regressions. I use five EQ 
metrics: ‘accruals quality’, ‘absolute value of abnormal accruals’, ‘earnings 
variability’, ‘common factor score’ for three underlying accruals estimates, and 
‘discretionary revenues’. The results support my hypothesis and are robust when I 
change alternative EQ metrics and control for various potentially confounding 
factors. Further, I report EQ has a long-term predictive power of earnings and the 
earnings predictability declines when the forecast horizons increase.  
I also extend the earnings forecast literature by supporting the complementary 
and simultaneous impact of FRD and EQ on forecast accuracy. My findings are 
relevant, to the extent that investors incorporate analysts’ earnings forecasts in their 
portfolio investment and respond to revisions of those forecasts, my results provide 
insights into understanding what role information risk plays in investors’ decision-
making.  
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Section 4.2 discusses 
related research and hypothesis development. Section 4.3 discusses model 
specifications. Section 4.4 explains sample selection and data collection. Section 4.5 
presents the main results. Section 4.6 is the conclusion.  
 
4.2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
4.2.1. Theoretical development 
Stakeholder-agency theory, originally proposed by Hill and Jones (1992), is used to 
explain the nature of the implicit and explicit contractual relationships that exist 
between a company’s stakeholders. In a wide context, a company’s stakeholders 
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encompass all resource holders; not only managers and large stockholders, but also 
customers, suppliers, creditors, employees, local communities and the general public. 
According to a broad definition of stakeholders, financial analysts act as 
intermediaries between investors and company managers and play an essential role 
in internal and external contractual links. Financial analysts provide professional 
services of earnings anticipations, buy/sell recommendations and other investment 
advice to various financial entities. Firms’ disclosure quantity is a determinant of 
analyst following, since much of the information that analysts use in their evaluation 
is sourced directly from firms (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). In an investor relations 
perspective, if it is less expensive to acquire information from inside the firm than to 
obtain it from other sources, greater information quantity will improve analysts' 
services. The effect of voluntary disclosures on clients’ request for analysts’ services 
highly relies on the character that analysts perform in the financial market. The main 
information stream flows from inside the company to financial analysts, who 
evaluate the information and communicate it to the financial market; therefore 
increased firm-provided information means analysts have more valuable reports to 
sell. In light of this, greater information quantity is attributed to a more accurate 
earnings forecast, thereafter increasing the aggregate demand for analyst services. 
Thus, firms have an incentive to increase analysts’ followings by voluntarily 
releasing more information, as the market evaluation of the stock prices will be 
closer to their intrinsic value, and investors will be more positive towards further 
increases by high-disclosing firms. In accordance with this, the analyst community is 
consistently in favour of more voluntary disclosures, relative to financial 
transparency and non-financial disclosures.  
In addition, the extent of disclosure is also likely to affect analysts’ forecast 
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characteristics. In more specific terms, firms that voluntarily release more verifiable 
forward-looking risk information and earnings related financial information will 
typically find a greater consensus among analysts’ earnings forecasts (i.e., lower 
forecast standard deviation), more accurate forecasts and less variable forecast 
revisions. This is because analysts hold both firm-provided and privately-obtained 
information, but the increase in disclosures and timeliness decreases the weight 
analysts put on other information sources in building up their forecasting models, 
which “smooths the forecast revision process by expediting the resolution of 
uncertainty” (Lang and Lundholm, 1996, pp.490).  
To the extent that analysts may be considered as representing or influencing 
investors’ beliefs, high-disclosing firms may have a larger cluster of potential 
investors and less dispersion in investors’ beliefs about performance. In addition, 
investors’ expectations about future earnings fluctuate more smoothly over the year.   
 
4.2.2. Direct impact of increased forward-looking narratives on earnings 
anticipation 
Previous studies of  the usefulness of forward-looking narratives to analysts’ forecast 
accuracy, if put in chronological order, include: Bryan (1997), who initiatively 
examines the disclosure content in ‘Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A)’ 
sections within annual reports that are compelled by the U.S. Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC), and reports a significant positive association between forward-
looking operational disclosures and one-period ahead changes in earnings per share, 
but he fails to observe a long-term association. Following Bryan (1997), Schleicher 
and Walker (1999) use a self-construct future-oriented index and manually code the 
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information on firm’s trends and uncertainties that are likely to prevail in future. 
They support the usefulness of voluntary forward-looking disclosures in anticipating 
future earnings changes. Further, they show this effect is strongest in tests that study 
one-period-ahead and two-period-ahead stock price forecasts14. Their findings imply 
that up to one third of future earnings movements are anticipated and valued by the 
financial market according to the voluntarily released forward-looking narrative 
predictions. Later, Hussainey et al. (2003) embraced a standard text investigation-
programming bundle to evaluate forward-looking disclosures in narrative section 
among all his annual report studied. Using Collins et al.’s (1994) returns-future 
earnings regression model and they find high disclosing firms generate higher future 
earnings response coefficients. Their finding implies that corporate current returns 
are strongly associated with future earnings movements.  
Several studies have suggested that the effect of forward-looking disclosures 
on next period’s earnings prediction is conditioned on particular contextual factors. 
Schleicher et al. (2007, pp.153-154) present evidence that this relationship is 
conditioned on a firm’s profitability, and the association is more significant for low-
profit (loss-making) companies. They provide two reasons to explain why forward-
looking disclosures are important source of information in poor years. Firstly, “loss 
cannot prevail indefinitely in surviving firms; the existence of a loss in such firms 
unambiguously indicates that current income is not a good guide to the longer-term 
earnings power of the firm, compared with profits that are sustainable in the long-
run”; secondly, a reported loss indicates that the market cannot price the firm 
according to reported earnings (e.g. P/E models) as such a valuation approach would 
infer a negative share price. Therefore, in order to make accurate earnings forecasts, 
                                                          
14  Schleicher and Walker (1999) find the effect of forward-looking disclosures on earnings 
predictability is minimal for three-period-ahead, four-period-ahead and five-period-ahead.  
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analysts require additional information that clarifies the possible reasons for reported 
losses and how long the losses are possibly sustain to assess the firm’s long-term 
profit-generating capacity. Hussainey and Walker (2009) extend the literature by 
taking into account firm growth characteristics. They report that the level of forward-
looking disclosures is significantly associated with improved earnings predictability 
for high-growth firms. Based on the argument of the accounting failure to capture the 
value-relevance of intangible investments on a timely basis mean that high growth 
and intangible asset intensity will diminish the predictive power of current earnings 
with regard to future earnings numbers. Investors, targeting high-growth companies 
realize that current earnings provide a poor indicator to estimate firm’s future 
earnings, and will tend to obtain more timely information from other sources, i.e., 
forward-looking disclosures relevant to earnings. A recent study by Wang and 
Hussainey (2013) investigates corporate governance characteristics on forward-
looking disclosures and whether they are informative about future earnings. They 
adopt the computerized content analysis method developed by Hussainey et al. (2003) 
to quantify voluntary forward-looking disclosures, and also use the modified returns-
future earnings model (Collins et al., 1994) to calculate earnings response 
coefficients. They find good corporate governance mechanisms could improve 
forward-looking disclosures, which augment stock market’s anticipation of a firm’s 
future earnings.  
In addition to extensive evidence regarding the value relevance of forward-
looking disclosures to earnings forecasts accuracy, some researchers have 
investigated other sorts of voluntary narratives and report similar conclusions. 
Dhaliwal et al. (2012) inspect the association between the disclosure level of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and earning forecast accuracy using firm-
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level data collected from 31 countries. They find that the release of CSR could 
greatly reduce analyst forecast error. This association appears stronger for firms with 
more opaque financial disclosures, supporting the complimentary relationship 
between CSR disclosures and financial disclosures. Dorestani and Rezaee (2011) 
focus on the impact of degree change in KPI15 disclosures and earnings forest error. 
By deflating the absolute value of forecast errors by stock price, they provide 
evidence that greater changes in non-financial KPI disclosures reduce analyst 
forecast error.  
 
4.2.3. Impact of increased level of FRD on firm value 
Forward-looking risk disclosure is a valuable component in analysts’ earnings 
prediction in view of its potential impact on a firm’s value. Previous literature find 
firms with high quality FRD enjoy benefits in the capital market. The information 
asymmetry between corporate insiders and outsiders gives rise to the classic agency 
problem. Theoretical researches support a negative relationship between the level of 
disclosure and cost of capital. One strand of research indicates that a higher level of 
disclosure accelerates stock market liquidity and in sequence decreases firms’ cost of 
capital either through reduced transitions costs or by increased demand for the target 
firm’s stocks. The reasons behind this argument are: voluntary disclosures make the 
acquisition of costly inside information unnecessary; disclosures reduce the level of 
information revealed by a large transaction, and decrease the adverse price effect of 
large trades; when inside information is more extensively distributed, it is 
impounded into more precise share price (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Amihud 
                                                          
15 The purpose of KPI is to enhance the transparency and value relevance of public 
financial information. 
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and Mendelson, 1986). All these benefits motivate investors to acquire more share 
holdings and drive up the market demand and share price, result in a lower cost of 
capital. Another strand of research states that greater disclosures reduce investors’ 
estimation risk due to their uncertainty about the parameters of a security’s return or 
pay-off distribution. Since investors’ estimates depend on accessible information, 
their confidence level builds on the quantity of the information. Greater uncertainty 
exists regarding the true parameters in low disclosing circumstance (Botosan, 2006). 
There is considerable empirical evidence regarding how disclosures manifest in the 
cost of capital. The main stream of literature report a significantly negative 
relationship between information level and a firm’s cost of capital (e.g. Francis et al., 
2008; Hughes et al., 2007; Easley and O’Hara, 2004; and O’Hara, 2003). The reason 
behind is uninformed investors recognize their information disadvantage and reduce 
their shareholdings in such firms accordingly, which inevitably knocks down the 
stock price. If the estimation risk is non-diversifiable, uninformed investors would 
require additional compensation for bearing higher risk, which increase the cost of 
capital. 
Some studies find firm values may vary when disclosures impact on firm risk. 
In a widely referenced paper, Lambert et al. (2007) support the relationship between 
information quality and firm’s systematic risk. Ng (2011) reports a firm’s liquidity 
risk reduces as its disclosure credibility increases. The intuition behind this link is 
that all firms face systematic risk; firms of higher market risk presumably have 
poorer performance during market downturn, but perform relatively better in stable 
and prosperous market. Liquidity risk, as one form, of systematic risk, is a sensitivity 
factor; the relevant macroeconomic factor is market liquidity. When market liquidity 
deteriorates, all sorts of shares will experience different degrees of investors outflow. 
 
 
155 
 
This outflow may be worse for firms with lower information quality, considering the 
squeezes on investors’ demand for those shares with higher uncertainty and adverse 
selection. Market makers may also be less willingly to buy those firms' shares as a 
result of the concerns of adverse selection, which sequentially could further restrain 
investors’ demand for those shares. Overall, the scope of disclosure greatly impact 
firm’s risk. 
Some studies discuss the potential economic benefits of disclosures in view of 
firm performance. Greater disclosures smooth the agency problems. The greater in 
depth communication between management and market investors reduces mis-
valuation and managerial myopia due to asymmetric information and short-run 
market pressures. According to the statement of the treasurer of Progressive Direct 
Insurance Co., by voluntarily increasing the frequency of financial disclosure, their 
company’s stock volatility reduced by as much as 50% from 2001 to 2004 (Graham, 
2004). Another view states that disclosure leads to better monitoring, which in turn 
leads to better firm performance. They argue that disclosure is an effective 
monitoring tool for managerial decisions (Hope and Thomas, 2008). Higher extent of 
disclosures allow external stakeholders, including institutional investors and 
financial analysts, to form their own judgment on management decisions and impose 
pressure on managers to make relevant decisions (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005).  
Overall, both theoretical and empirical literature reveals that analysts can 
obtain useful information from voluntary disclosures to anticipate a firm’s future 
earnings. Forward-looking risk disclosures, as a key example of corporate voluntary 
narratives, comprise both earnings-sensitive financial information and operational 
and strategic risk information that have the potential to impact on firm’s value. I then 
expect to find a significant negative association between FRD and earnings forecast 
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error (FCERROR). Based on previous empirical evidence (i.e. Bryan, 1997; 
Schleicher and Walker; 1999), I expect the effect of FRD on earnings predictability 
to be relevant in short-term, i.e., for a one-year or two-year forecast horizon. 
Therefore I have the first hypothesis:  
H1: There is a negative association between forward-looking risk disclosure 
quantity and analyst forecast error.  
 
4.2.4. The association between earnings quality and forward-looking risk 
disclosure 
Another widely used proxy for information risk is earnings quality (EQ). Some 
scholars investigate the association between disclosure quantity and earnings quality 
and examine whether there are complimentary or substitutive relationship between 
the two variables when explaining stock returns, cost of capital, and earnings 
forecasts (e.g., Francis et al., 2008; Mouselli et al., 2012; Dhaliwal et al., 2012). 
Francis et al.'s (2008) research endorses a complementary relationship between 
disclosures and earnings quality, indicating that companies of higher earnings quality 
exhibit more extensive disclosure content. However, they also find that if 
unconditional on earnings quality, the reducing effect of disclosure narratives on a 
firm’s cost of capital is significantly reduced or disappears completely if earnings 
quality is included as an explanatory variable. Similar conclusions can be found in 
Dhaliwal et al. (2012), who indicate the complementary feature of non-financial 
disclosures to financial disclosures to improve earnings predictability. They use the 
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average scaled accruals to control earnings quality16 and argue that both financial 
and non-financial disclosures contain information relative to firm value; for firms of 
lower earnings quality, analysts can obtain more useful insights from non-financial 
disclosures to anticipate corporate future earnings.  
Both studies suggest the inclusion of earnings quality as a main control 
variable in explaining the relationship between disclosures and analyst forecast 
accuracy. However, analytical research suggests conflicting predictions on the 
association between the extent of disclosure narratives and earnings quality. 
Theoretical studies (e.g. Dye, 1985; Richarson, 2000) suggest a negative relationship 
between earnings quality and firm’s information level, this was supported by 
extensive empirical evidence (i.e., Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Welker, 1995; 
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). It is suggested that the information asymmetry problem 
between corporate inside management and external investors increases investors’ 
demand for greater disclosures and motivates managers to voluntarily release more 
information, as the value of incremental disclosures is higher in this condition 
(Grossman and Hart, 1980; Milgrom, 1981). The implication is that firms with a low 
(high) earnings quality will release more (less) disclosures because information 
asymmetry is higher (lower) in those firms; this implies a substitutive relation. 
Conversely, another view argues that firms are less intended to issue proprietary 
information when the earnings quality shows a declining tendency (Dye, 1985; Jung 
and Kwon, 1988) Firms with low (high) earnings quality release less (more) 
information, since the credibility of such disclosures is questionable among 
professional users; this implies a complementary relation. I assume there is an 
interactive relation between FRD and EQ, with an unclear predicted sign. It is 
                                                          
16 Earnings quality is interchangeable to “financial opaqueness” in Dhaliwal et al. (2012). 
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important to investigate how earnings quality interacts with voluntary forward-
looking risk disclosures in the forecasting process, but this is not the main focus of 
the present research. 
 
4.2.5. The relationship between earnings quality and analysts forecast Accuracy 
Aboody et al. (2005) provide several reasons to explain why earnings quality can be 
viewed as a suitable proxy for information risk: information risk is a priced risk 
factor (Francis et al., 2005); relative to the cash flow component of earnings, the 
earnings accruals are much easier to be manipulated by managers, implying little 
proprietary information may be pre-empted by earnings announcement; earnings 
quality is an omnipresent construct that applies to different listed firms; unlike using 
trade data to indirectly measure corporate information risk, earnings quality directly 
reflects corporate information setting using the reported financial data in annual 
reports.  
Earnings quality and disclosure quantity are the two commonly used proxies of 
information risk and share many common characteristics. Earnings are viewed as one 
of the main inputs in analysts’ forecasting process and valuation models. Earnings of 
higher quality are more predictable and suitable to forecast. Francis et al. (2008) 
apply three predictive factors —  higher persistence, less transient, and lower 
volatility — to indicate earnings quality. Following their method, I then discuss the 
link between these three attributes and earnings quality respectively.  
In view of earnings persistence, Dechow and Dichev (2002) state that one 
beneficial role of accruals is to adjust mis-matched cash flows to better mirror a 
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firm’s performance. However, accruals are commonly calculated on assumptions and 
estimates, so if inputs are incorrect, accruals must be adjusted in future financial 
statements. For instance, “if the net proceeds from a receivable are less than the 
original estimate, then the subsequent entry records both the cash collected and the 
correction of the estimation error” (Dechow and Dichev, 2002, pp.36), which means 
the benefit of accruals would reduce due to estimation errors and their subsequent 
corrections. Large magnitudes of estimation errors in accruals signify lower earnings 
quality and earnings predictability, which indicates a positive impact of earnings 
persistence on earnings quality.  
Ali and Zarowin (1992) argue that, in the presence of transitory components of 
earnings, using previous earnings to estimate current earnings may not be 
appropriate. In addition, using earnings changes in previous period to indicate 
unexpected earnings may understate earnings’ effects because it is based on the 
assumption of permanent shocks to earnings. Further, the estimation errors in 
earnings are negatively correlated with earnings persistence, which causes the 
subsequent examination of the relation between earnings response coefficients and 
persistence to be overstated. Their findings suggest the transitory nature of earnings, 
hence their limited predictive power. 
Earnings volatility arises from two issues: economic shocks and accounting 
problems in reporting earnings. Both issues drive down earnings predictability. 
Graham et al.’s (2005) survey reveals a broadly belief that earnings volatility has a 
negative impact on earnings predictability. Of the 401 financial executive 
respondents, 97% express a prominent preference for earnings smoothness (or strong 
aversion to volatile earnings). In exploring the reasons for this feedback, 80% of 
executive respondents express their opinion that earnings are less predictable under 
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higher volatility. Stemming from the survey evidence, Dichev and Tang (2009) 
consider the specific mechanisms that link earnings volatility to the predictability to 
be related to accounting and economic issues. In view of economic shocks, earnings 
volatility reflects the impact of genuine and unavoidable economic instability. 
Instinctively, firms that endure hefty economic shocks tend to cause lower 
predictable and higher volatile earnings. In addition, accounting problems in 
reporting earnings, such as, poor matching of expenses to revenues, increase the 
noise in long-term forecast horizon, and subsequently drive up earnings volatility. 
In addition to the intuitive predictive power of earnings, scholars also provide 
evidence about how earnings quality affects firm value through various channels. In 
Dechow et al.’s (2010) review of the consequences of earnings quality, they list: (1) 
litigation risk, (2) audit resignations, (3) market valuations, (4) real activities, (5) 
analyst forecast accuracy. The question how earnings directly affect analyst forecast 
accuracy has been well discussed, in the following session, I will focus on the other 
consequences. Palmrose et al. (2004) demonstrate that the change of previous 
reported earnings in restatements increases the probability that shareholders will win 
in litigation, which, in other words, lifts up firms’ litigation risk. In addition, studies 
set in high-risk contexts (e.g., IPOs); where abnormal accruals are likely to signify 
misstatements beyond the boundaries of GAAP, also find a negative impact of 
earnings quality on a firm’s litigation risk (Ducharme et al., 2004; Gong et al., 2008). 
From an audit opinions perspective, earnings quality has significant implications for 
the auditor-client relationship. Huang and Scholz (2012) find that a restatement 
greatly increases the likelihood of auditor resignation. Moreover, companies with 
severe restatements are prone to hire smaller auditors after a resignation. Auditors 
treat restatements as an indication of increased client risk. In view of market 
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valuations, when firms fail to meet earnings targets, they are likely to lose high 
market valuations immediately (Myers et al., 2007). When extreme earnings 
management and fraud are detected, firms will suffer substantial losses in the capital 
markets, not least reputational penalties for misstatement (Karpoff et al., 2008). In 
respect of real decisions, Biddle and Hilary (2006) and Biddle et al. (2009) both state 
that external investors are less misguided by asymmetric information with the help of 
high quality accounting and hence result in high level of investment efficiency. 
Others review that earnings quality, endogenously determined by accounting 
decisions, also affects managers’ internal investment decisions (Jackson et al., 2009) 
and misstatements distort investment decisions (McNichols and Stubben, 2008).  
I embrace five separate earning quality measurements with an aim to confine 
the essential components of earning that have been repetitively examined in previous 
literature, for instance ‘cash flows’, ‘earnings variability and persistence’ to ensure 
the results are not influenced by choosing alternative earnings quality metrics. Based 
on existing work, I expect to find a negative association between earnings quality 
and analyst forecast error. Therefore, I state the second hypothesis as:  
H2: Earnings quality is negatively associated with analyst forecasts error. 
 
4.2.6. Additional discussion on the long-term predictive power of earnings 
quality 
Using analyst forecast accuracy to estimate earnings quality is imperfect. It entirely 
depends on the presumption that analysts are impartial with expertise in earnings 
prediction. Empirical studies challenge the validity of this assumption. There is 
evidence that when rational analysts detect earnings manipulation, they include the 
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inferences of discretionary accruals into earnings anticipation, and will discount 
earnings per share accordingly (Coles et al., 2006; Burgstabler and Eames, 2003). On 
the contrary, Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) and Bradshaw et al. (2001) argue that 
although analysts understand the implications of accruals in earnings forecast, 
manifested by their investment advices, their forecasts are not complete impartial. 
The present research assumes the impartiality and expertise of financial 
analysts in view of earnings prediction, therefore the deviation of analysts’ forecasts 
echoes the features of earnings relevant to earnings quality only. A stream of returns-
based research measure earnings quality by market returns, these research suffer 
from the limitation that they depend on the presumption of market efficiency; 
whereas the inferences of earnings quality in my tests are subject only to the 
assumption of analyst efficiency. Using analyst forecast accuracy to estimate 
earnings quality has the benefits that it only incorporates earning attributes whereas 
market prices embroil more information than just earning and may mislead 
researchers regarding the usefulness of earnings quality. 
Analysts’ efficiency is a controversial issue. Managerial manipulation of 
earnings can inflate reported sales prematurely or understate liabilities. As analysts 
fixate on recorded bottom-line proceeds, they can be temporarily deceived. There is 
evidence that analysts cannot unwind the implication of reported earnings in a timely 
fashion (Dichev and Tang, 2009). It can be explained by that earnings attributes 
imply indications about a firm’s financial performance, however analysts have a 
slow reaction to this information. For example, accruals contain information 
regarding changes in inventories, accounts receivables and payables, and factors 
commonly included in analysts’ evaluation of a firm’s business conditions. A firm 
that experiences sales difficulties or issues regarding production will find a heavy 
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accumulation of inventories. Likewise, sales failures and tighter credit will result in 
an increase of payables. Where companies of high accruals are not necessarily facing 
financial distress, the components of accruals predict a slow sales growth, albeit 
analysts’ fixated income appears healthy. Plenty of empirical evidence supports the 
notion of a delayed or under reaction of the market to the accounting information in 
financial statements (i.e. Bernard and Thomas, 1989; Abarbanell and Bushee, 1998). 
In particular, accruals increase in response to a market decline or a slowdown in a 
firm’s business conditions; however, the market does not ravel this signal instantly. 
Accordingly, accruals subsequently result in negative stock returns. This under 
reaction of the market has also been developed in behavioural finance that suggest 
individuals extrapolate past trends from short histories too far into the future 
(Shleifer, 2000) and reacts slowly when new signs come into being. Analysts are 
some of the most important market participants: their response to contained 
information in earnings can be expected to reflect similar features of the market.  
I assume that if analysts are fully aware of this phenomenon, then their 
earnings forecasts for the adjacent current period in response to the short histories of 
earnings entries may be a delayed reaction. However, when forecast horizon 
increases, the market fully reflects the published components of earnings and 
analysts are more confident in earnings anticipation. So, I expect the predictive 
power of earnings quality will experience a slight increase in the short-term and 
remain constant in long-term forecast horizons (i.e. up to three-year-ahead forecast 
horizons).  
 
4.3. Measurement of main variables 
 
 
164 
 
The main variables in the present research are analyst forecast accuracy, forward-
looking risk disclosures, and earnings quality. I discuss in the following section how 
each of the variables is measured. 
 
4.3.1. Analyst forecast accuracy 
Consistent with prior studies (Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Dorestani and Rezaee, 2011), I 
use analyst forecast error (FCERROR) as an inverse measure of analyst forecast 
accuracy. I measure forecast error by the absolute value of the difference between 
the actual earnings per share (EPS) and mean forecast earnings per share (MFC), 
deflated by the absolute value of actual earnings17 (EPS):  
𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅 (𝑌) = |𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡
𝑌 − 𝑀𝐹𝐶𝑗,𝑡
𝑌 | / 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡
𝑌                           (4.1) 
where subscript j represents firm j, and t for year t. Indicator Y takes three values, 0, 
1, or 2, to indicate the mean forecast and actual earnings are for one-year-ahead, 
two-year-ahead and three-year-ahead. In my sample, FCERROR (0), FCERROR (1) 
and FCERROR (2) denote forecast error in firm-year 2011, 2012 and 2013 
respectively. I follow Dhaliwal et al.’s (2012) approach to distinguish among 
forecasts made for different years as there is evidence that analysts’ forecast 
accuracy diminishes when the forecast horizon increases (De Bondt and Thaler, 
1990). The forecast horizon is limited to three years, considering that analysts do not 
usually conduct forecasts beyond this, and forecasts for longer time horizons become 
less reliable and the sample size reduces dramatically for longer period forecasts.  
MFC is the average value of all earnings forecasts for a company derived by 
                                                          
17 I obtain similar results when I use the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year as the deflator.  
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the majority of contributing analysts18. It is a composite forecast of earnings per 
share that distils all available current EPS estimate data for the specified fiscal time 
period into a single expectation19. The average EPS estimate, commonly known as 
the ‘consensus forecast’, is calculated by adding the current EPS estimate data for 
the specified fiscal time period from all contributing firms and dividing this figure by 
the number of EPS estimates that enter into the calculation20. EPS is the actual 
earnings per share; both MFC and EPS data are obtained from the I/B/E/S database 
to ensure consistency. Detailed explanations of the computation of variables and 
codes used to search in I/B/E/S and DataStream are presented in Appendix 4.1.  
I use deflated earnings forecast errors in order to correct for error variance. It is 
argued that deflated FCERROR corrects for heteroscedasticity and non-normality 
and the explanatory powers of regressions clearly improve (e.g., Dorestani and 
Rezaee, 2011; Hodgkinson, 2001; Horrigan, 1983).  
 
4.3.2. Level of forward-looking risk disclosures 
I stick to the forward-looking risk disclosures (FRD) data manually collected from 
the narrative sections in annual reports I have used in Chapter 2 (pp.61) and 3 
(pp.115). To avoid repetition, I briefly introduce how the quantity of FRD is 
measured.  
Before conducting any risk disclosure studies, the first step is to define risk. I 
embrace a broad definition of risk, which incorporates both positive opportunities 
                                                          
18 Following Dorestani and Rezaee’s (2011) approach, I replace the mean analyst forecast EPS by 
median analyst forecast EPS to calculate FCERROR§; the results are robust (see Table 4.6).  
19 This definition is originally from DataStream.  
20 This definition is originally from DataStream. 
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and negative uncertainties (e.g., Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 
2006). In particular, a sentence is coded as risk-related if it specifies any 
‘opportunity’ or ‘prospect’, or any ‘hazard, threat or exposure’ information, which 
has the potential to influence a firm’s value, a statement of a firm’s risk mitigation 
and opportunity seizing strategies, or internal control risk management policies 
(Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). The second step is to define forward-looking risk 
disclosure. Forward-looking risk disclosures (FRD) include any risk-related 
information that informs readers about future potential opportunities or threats and 
uncertainties arising from the interaction of external macro-economic and market 
risks and internal operational risks, and about any descriptive information regarding 
internal control risk management policies.  
I adopt and develop Kravet and Muslu’s (2013) UNIX perl code to identify 
forward-looking risk disclosures in all narrative sections in annual reports. I choose 
sentence as a basic counting unit rather than word, phrase, page or number of lines 
(Rajab and Handley-Schachler, 2009). A sentence is tagged as FRD if it contains at 
least one keyword that connotes risk. The keywords that I use to search FRD 
sentences with computer automated text recognition software include (a (*) indicates 
that suffixes are allowed): can, cannot, could, may, might, risk(*), uncertain(*), 
likely to, subject to, potential(*), vary(*), varies, depend(*), expos(*), fluctuat(*), 
possibl(*), susceptible, affect, influenc(*), and hedg(*), opportunit*, prospect, expect, 
impact, and outlook. In view of the boiler plate words problem (Linsley and Shrives, 
2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007), I then manually examine all tagged risk-related 
sentences to filter the ones that contain the boiler word but do not contain risk 
information. The combination of software search and manual content analysis 
greatly decrease the subjectivity problem in manual content analysis; it improves the 
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effectiveness of computer-based content analysis. Finally, I count the total number of 
sentences that include at least one listed keyword and are genuinely risk-related to 
decide the level of a firm’s forward-looking risk disclosures.  
In order to test the effect of different categories of FRD on analysts’ forecast 
accuracy, I follow previous literature (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Oliveira et al., 
2011) in categorizing the identified FRD sentences into several groups. By business 
focus, I categorise total FRD into financial risk, operational risk, and strategic risk. 
Financial risks associate with firms’ financing issues, which have an immediate 
effect on corporate assets and liabilities of a monetary nature. It contains financial 
factors: commodity risk, taxation, inflation, market risk, interest rate, exchange rate, 
liquidity, credit, financial derivatives, and the description of firms’ financial risk 
mitigation strategies. Operational risks are those which firms are willing to pursue 
with the aim to achieve competitive advantages and enhance shareholders’ wealth. 
These risks directly impact the daily operation of the business and are assumed to be 
under the control of company managers. Operational risks include: “customer 
satisfaction, product development, product, project, service failure, operational 
performance and efficiency, materials sourcing, stock obsolescence and shrinkage, 
information systems and controls, research and development, environmental impact, 
employment practices, health and safety, management and employee fraud, brand 
name erosion, reputation, intellectual property rights, firm growth, acquisitions, 
alliance and joint-ventures” (Linsley and Shrives, 2006, pp. 401), and the description 
of operational risk mitigation strategies. Strategic risks are macroeconomic or 
general social environmental factors that might impact firms’ operations. These are 
generally beyond organizational control. Strategic risks include: “environmental 
conditions, industry source, business portfolio, competitors, pricing, valuation, 
 
 
168 
 
planning, life cycle, performance measurement, regulator, legislation, sovereign, 
social and political, technological change, climate and catastrophic” (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006, pp. 401-402), and the descriptions of strategic risk mitigation 
strategies.  
 
4.3.3. Earning quality metrics 
4.3.3.1. Risk disclosure studies 
Before proceeding to earnings quality measures, it is first necessary to explain 
earnings management. Earnings management is defined as applying accounting 
techniques to produce a financial report that draws an excessively positive picture of 
a firm’s operation and financial status (Dechow et al., 2012). Earnings management 
takes advantage of accounting rules and are legitimately flexible when companies 
recognize revenues and expenses. It is often hard to distinguish acceptable 
approaches from misrepresentations. Earnings management encompasses this grey 
area; however, it frequently relates to earnings fraud.  
Firms use earnings management to even out earnings fluctuation or to meet 
investors’ earnings expectations. Large earnings fluctuations can be normal in a 
firm’s operation, but tremendous movement may trigger investors’ vigilance, 
especially for stable and growing firms. Some managers use accounting gimmicks to 
meet analysts’ expectations, especially if their firm’s share prices fall after earnings 
announcements (Dechow et al., 2012). 
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4.3.3.2. Definition of Accruals 
‘Accruals’ is defined as “accounts on a balance sheet that represent non-cash-based 
assets and liabilities applied in accrual-based accounting. These accounts include 
accounts receivable, accounts payable, goodwill, deferred tax liability and future 
interest expenses” (Bhimani et al., 2008, pp.59). Accrual-based accounting “assesses 
the performance and position of a firm by recognizing economic events regardless of 
when cash transactions occur. It embraces the matching principal by matching 
revenues to expenses at the time the transaction occurs, rather than when payment is 
made or received. This approach allows current cash inflows/outflows to be 
combined with future expected cash inflows/outflows in order to draw a more 
precise picture of a company’s current financial condition” (Bhimani et al., 2008, 
pp.59). However, relative complexity and uncertainty about the timing and volume 
of future earnings and expenditures make this a controversial issue in accounting 
research. A distinct and significant research area has been focused on distinguishing 
the two types of accruals from non-discretionary to discretionary accruals by 
modelling the accrual process 21 . Non-discretionary accruals ought to recognise 
amendments that indicate a firm’s fundamental performance, comparatively 
discretionary accruals ought to detect earnings distortion caused by mis-specification 
of the accounting principles or management earnings manipulation, as a result of the 
lack of effective measurement framework. The documented metrics endeavour to 
locate problems directly from inside the measurement framework thus are 
particularly pertinent to academics. The underlying argument relies on the 
assumption that if the non-discretionary element out of total accruals is modelled 
correctly, the rest discretionary element should reflect the earnings distortion.  
                                                          
21 ‘Discretionary accruals’ is interchangeable with ‘abnormal accruals’; ‘non-discretionary accruals’ is 
interchangeable with ‘normal accruals’.  
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I adopt four accrual models: the standard deviation of cash residuals (EQ1), the 
average estimate of absolute abnormal accruals (EQ2), the standard deviation of 
earnings per share (EQ3). In addition, following Francis et al. (2008) and 
Bhattacharya et al. (2011), I use the common factor score obtained from the above 
three underlying proxies as a combined measure of earnings quality (EQ4). Prior 
literature suggest various measures of earnings quality, but have reached no 
agreement on a perfect metric for detecting earnings management. I adopt these 
proxies because they have been widely used in previous research and have been 
found to have roughly the same impact on lowering the cost of capital (Francis et al., 
2005).  
It need be pointed out that when accessing these models, the estimates of 
discretionary accruals computed from models tend to have a positive relationship 
with the total level of accruals. This indicates firms with extreme total accruals are 
also liable to exhibit greater discretionary accruals. This perception is critical when 
clarifying results. It brings concerns about whether discretionary accruals detect 
earnings management or whether they are instead caused by poorly specified accrual 
models (Dechow et al., 2010). Keeping this in mind, the aim is to test the 
consistency and generalizability of the results. I embrace five EQ models to ensure 
that the conclusions will not be affected by the choice of metrics to estimate EQ. 
 
4.3.3.3. Earnings Quality Metrics 
The first proxy of earnings quality adopted in the current research is the standard 
deviation of cash residuals (EQ1). Dechow and Dichev (2002) construct the model to 
capture the scale of estimation errors in accruals, based on the relationship between 
 
 
171 
 
accruals and cash flows. The basic notion is the accounting mismatch causes a gap 
between the amount of accrued earnings and the amount of realized earnings. This 
commonly refers to estimation errors. Dechow and Dichev (2002) separate accruals 
by regressing working capital accruals on cash flows in present, adjacent past and 
future time period, changes in revenues and property, plant and equipment (PPE). 
The unexplained component of the variance of working capital accruals is an inverse 
proxy of earnings quality, i.e. a higher unexplained component indicates lower 
earnings quality. 
Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model focuses on short-term working capital 
accruals and their association with cash flows, but is not an attempt to map long-term 
accruals into cash flow realizations. “The R2s from their specification are higher 
compared with those of the modified Jones’ (1991) model: 47% at firm level, 34% at 
industry level, and 29% at pooled level” (Dechow et al., 2010, pp.359). Using this 
metric to proxy earnings quality, they find firms with higher standard deviations of 
cash residuals tend to exhibit to following characteristics: less persistent earnings, 
longer operating cycles, greater accruals, and more volatile cash flows, accruals and 
earnings, and these firms represent smaller firm size and higher probability to report 
a loss-making year. Taken together, all the reflected firm characteristics indicate 
lower earnings predictability. 
The precision of accruals estimates can be determined by a few factors: 
economic and structural factors might result in variations in the precision of accruals 
estimates (although managers may or may not intervene in the reporting procedure); 
managerial expertise and discretion can also impact the estimation precision, if 
holding other influential factors constant. Therefore a mismatch between accruals 
and cash flow in adjacent periods can indicate that firms have disclosed honestly but 
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have been exposed to unexpected macro-economic circumstances; it could indicate a 
firm has incompetent managers during prediction process; or that a firm's managers 
are deliberately manipulate earnings reporting. However, Dechow and Dichev’s 
(2002) model does not distinguish these factors during the estimation process. I 
recognise the modified Dechow and Dichev’s model has drawbacks, but there is no 
agreed-upon solution to the problem of estimating errors, and this model is still one 
of the most extensively used accrual metrics. I estimate equation (4.2) for the sample 
over 11 years, 2000-2010. This data set allows me to include both a lead and a lag 
cash flow term in equation (4.2). 
 𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝛽2
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝛽3
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡+1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝛽4
𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝛽5
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡
+  𝜀𝑗,𝑡                                                                                                                     (4.2)  
where:  
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = firm j’s total current accruals in year t = 𝛥𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 − 𝛥𝐶𝐿𝑗,𝑡 − 𝛥𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛥𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑗,𝑡 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡 = value of firm j’s total assets in year t 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡 = firm j’s cash flow from operation in year t = 𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑗,𝑡 
𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑗,𝑡 = firm j’s net income before extraordinary items in year t 
𝑇𝐴𝑗,𝑡  = firm j’s total accruals in year t = 𝛥𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 − 𝛥𝐶𝐿𝑗,𝑡 − 𝛥𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛥𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑁𝑗,𝑡   
𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡 = firm j’s change in revenues between year t and year t−1 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡 = firm j’s gross value of property, plant and equipment in year t  
𝛥𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = firm j’s change in current assets between year t and year t−1; 
𝛥𝐶𝐿𝑗,𝑡 = firm j’s change in current liabilities between year t and year t−1; 
𝛥𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑗,𝑡 = firm j’s change in cash and cash equivalent between year t and year 
t−1; 
𝛥𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑗,𝑡 = firm j’s change in short-term debt between year t and year t−1; 
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𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑁𝑗,𝑡 = firm j’s expense of depreciation and amortization in year t 
     
I run the cross-sectional model (4.2) using ordinary least squares (OLS) with 
White heteroscedasticity standard errors to generate a series of firm- and year- 
specific residuals  𝜀𝑗,𝑡 , which form the basis in the accruals quality metric, 𝐸𝑄𝑗
1 
=µ(  𝜀 ̂𝑗,𝑡). Larger value of EQ
1 refers to higher standard deviation of firm j’s cash 
residuals, which indicates lower accruals quality.  
The second metric of earnings quality adopted in the current research is the 
average of the absolute value of discretionary accruals (EQ2), computed from the 
modified Jones’ (1991) model. It is a predominant model in earnings management 
research. Johns decomposes total accruals into current and noncurrent accruals, then 
uses changes in cash-accompanying revenues (ΔRev) to proxy for current accruals 
and property, plant and equipment (PPE) to proxy for noncurrent accruals22. To 
estimate discretionary accruals for a given firm-year observation, I regress the 
following cross-sectional model (Mouselli et al. 2012).  
𝑇𝐴𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1
= 𝛽0
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽1
𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑗,𝑡        (4.3) 
Following prior literature, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to 
                                                          
22 The model development can be decomposed into several steps (Yoon et al., 2012): 
Stage 1: Decomposition of total accruals ( 𝑇𝐴𝑗,𝑡 ) into current accruals (  𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 ) and noncurrent 
accruals ( 𝑇𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡): 
𝑇𝐴𝑗,𝑡 =  𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 
Stage 2: Transformation into a statistical model: 
𝑇𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
Stage 3:  Standardization by 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 to control for heteroscedasticity: 
𝑇𝐴𝑗,𝑡/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 = 𝛽0/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  
Stage 4: Replacement of  𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑇𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡  with proxy variables: 
𝑇𝐴𝑗,𝑡/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 = 𝛽0/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
where: 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 = lagged value of firm j’s total assets  
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compute firm- and year-specific parameter estimates of  𝛽0 , 𝛽1  and  𝛽2 . Next I 
estimate for each firm the non-discretionary accruals as a proportion of lagged total 
assets using the following equation: 
𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = ?̂?0
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1
+ ?̂?1
(𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡 − 𝛥𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡)
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1
+ ?̂?2
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1
                  (4.4) 
where: 
 𝛥𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 = firm j’s change in accounts receivables between year t and year t−1 
Non-discretionary accruals (𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡) indicate the portion of total accruals that is 
contingent on firm j’s sales growth other than managerial discretion.  Change in 
accounts receivables ( 𝛥𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡  ) is deducted from revenue change ( 𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡  ) to 
consider the probability of corporate credit sales manipulation, which could trigger 
more liberal credit terms to stimulate sales numbers prior to earnings announcement 
(Dechow et al., 1995). I then calculate firm j’s discretionary accruals (𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡) by 
subtracting 𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡  from total accruals:  
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑗,𝑡 =
𝑇𝐴𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1
− 𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡                                                                                  (4.5) 
I then take the absolute value of discretionary accruals |𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑗,𝑡 |. Following 
Francis et al. (2008), I take the average of |𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑗,𝑡| for each firm over the estimation 
period 2000-2010 to get a firm-year estimate EQ2. A higher numerical value of EQ2 
indicates lower earnings quality. Considering the evidence that the average |DAC| of 
multiple years generates similar results with a single year estimate of |DAC| (Francis 
et al. 2008; Mouselli et al. 2012), I also run a single year (t = 2010) regression to get 
|𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑗,𝑡|_2010, and confirmed the arguments of previous authors.  
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The modified Jones’ (1991) model has appealing characteristics in that it 
assumes current accruals are proportional to changes in revenues determined by sales 
growth, and that noncurrent accruals change along with the gross value of property, 
plant and equipment (PPE), it thus captures the most important noncurrent accruals 
component, i.e., depreciation and amortization expenses. Considering sales growth 
and investment in PPE are genuine stimulators of firm value, the modified Jones 
(1991) model settles the relationship between these essential firm’s entities and the 
components of accruals.  
However, the shortcoming of Jones model is prominent. A few empirical 
studies criticise the low explanatory power of the Jones model. Dechow et al. (2010, 
pp.358) find only 10% of the variation in accruals is captured by Jones model. They 
indicate  “discretionary accruals are less powerful than total accruals at detecting 
earnings management, and using the residuals from the Jones model as an indicator 
of poor accruals quality also suffers from the mis-classification of accruals as non-
discretionary when they are not”. In an earlier study, Dechow et al. (1995) report a 
positive relationship between cash residuals and total accruals (80% highly 
correlated) and earnings performance, and a negative relationship between residuals 
and cash flow performance. These findings suggest the mis-classification of normal 
accruals as discretionary components when they truly reflect a firm’s fundamental 
performance. Xie (2001) gets similar conclusions that the cash residuals obtained 
using modified Jones model exhibit lower predictive power for earnings comparied 
with non-discretionary accruals component.  
The third measure of earnings quality (EQ3) is earnings variability (i.e., 
Dechow and Dechev, 2002; Francis et al., 2008; Bhattacharya et al., 2011), measured 
by the standard deviation of the firm’s earnings per share between 2000 and 2010. 
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Earnings here refer to earnings before extraordinary items, divided by total assets 
(Francis et al., 2008). Dechow and Dechev (2002) argue earnings variability is the 
strongest instrument to proxy earnings quality, where a higher scale of earnings 
volatility indicating lower earnings quality. In their study, earnings are decomposed 
as two elements of cash flows and accruals. The volatility of both earnings 
components is assumed to be negatively correlated with earnings quality, hence 
higher volatility in reported earnings implies lower earnings quality. This assumption 
is evidenced by the high Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between the 
standard deviation of earnings (0.82) and the standard deviation of accruals (0.75), 
showing that earnings variability can be used as a reliable metric to measure accruals 
quality.  
In addition to the literature using earnings variability to proxy earnings quality, 
I have explained in the literature section that earnings variability is an important 
input in earnings predictability models. Graham et al.’s (2005) survey study reveals a 
prevalent managerial belief that earnings volatility lowers forecast accuracy. Dichev 
and Tang (2009, pp.179) endorse the inferences of earnings volatility to assess 
earnings predictability, they argue that “earnings volatility offers reliable 
discrimination on relative earnings persistence and predictability up to five-year 
horizons, and dominates in strength existing results like the accrual effect and the 
extreme-earnings mean-revert effect”. They also argue that using earnings variability 
to proxy forecast accuracy excels using cash flows volatility and other accruals 
benchmarks.  
The fourth earnings quality metric I used is the common factor score (EQ4) 
derived from the factor analysis of the three preceding EQ metrics: EQ1 the standard 
deviation of cash flow residuals, EQ2 average of abnormal accruals, EQ3 earnings 
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variability (Francis et al., 2008; Bhattacharya et al., 2011). This common factor 
maintains the ordering of underlying variables, with larger values of EQ4 indicating 
lower earnings quality.  
The fifth earnings quality measure (EQ5) is the standard deviation of 
discretionary revenues. Stubben (2010) proposes a revenue model to detect earnings 
manipulation. Discretionary revenue is defined as the difference between the actual 
change and the predicted change in receivables, with a greater difference indicating 
more severe revenue manipulation. It is criticized that accrual models are generally 
biased as including noisy estimates of earnings manipulation, which raise questions 
as to the reliability of conclusions based on those models (Bernard and Skinner, 
1996). Stubben (2010) argues that modelling a single earnings element has the 
benefit to allow for integrating essential characteristics that are distinctive to the 
element, and hence can effectively reduce estimation errors. Moreover, how earning 
management proceeds can be better understood by concentrating exclusively on 
earnings components. He suggests revenue is worthwhile to be investigated, as it is a 
major earnings component and subject to management manipulation. He uses 
premature revenues and their impact on the relation between revenues and accounts 
receivables to proxy the component of manipulated revenues. The prematurely 
recognized revenues refer to the sales recognized before cash is received when 
managers aggressively or incorrectly apply GAAP. 
Specifically, Stubben (2010) states that current accruals are usually resolved 
within a year. Hence, sales made towards the end of the year are more liable to stay 
on books at fiscal year-end. This revenue model 23  (4.6) allows the variance of 
                                                          
23 The model development can be decomposed into several steps (Stubben, 2010): 
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accounts receivables in the last quarter of accounting period: 
𝛥𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣1_3𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣4𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡                      (4.6) 
where: 
𝛥𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 = firm j’s change in accounts receivables between year t and t−1; 
𝑅𝑒𝑣1_3𝑗,𝑡 = firm j’s revenues in the first three quarters in year t; 
𝑅𝑒𝑣4𝑗,𝑡 = firm j’s revenues in the fourth quarter in year t. 
Stubben (2010) applies this model to a sample of firms that are subject to 
SEC24 enforcement actions for a mix of revenue- and expense-related misstatements 
and argues that the revenue model is less biased, better specified, and more powerful 
than the widely adopted accrual models. However, this model has not been tested in 
any further earnings management research; the present research will provide 
empirical evidence of the usefulness of discretionary revenues as a measure of 
earnings quality. 
 
4.4. Model specification 
I modify the models used by Dhaliwal et al. (2012) and Hope (2003), and construct 
the following baseline model: 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Step 1: decompose revenues (Rev) into discretionary revenues (𝜕𝐷𝑀) and non-discretionary revenues 
𝑅𝑁𝑀: 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 
𝑁𝑀 + 𝜕𝑗,𝑡
𝐷𝑀 
Step 2: a proportion of non-discretionary revenues remain uncollected at the year-end, denoted as c, 
discretionary revenues are assumed uncollectable. Therefore, accounts receivables (AR) equals the 
portion of uncollected non-discretionary revenues (c* 𝑅𝑁𝑀) and discretionary revenues (𝜕𝐷𝑀): 
𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑐 ∗ 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 
𝑁𝑀 + 𝜕𝑗,𝑡
𝐷𝑀 
Step 3: rearrange terms and express change in receivables in terms of reported revenues. 
𝛥𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑐 ∗ 𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡  + (1 − 𝑐) ∗ 𝜕𝑗,𝑡
𝐷𝑀 
Step 4: the estimate of firm’s discretionary revenues is the residual from the following equation: 
𝛥𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
24 US Securities and Exchange Commission 
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𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅 = 𝑓 (𝐹𝑅𝐷, 𝐸𝑄, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠)                    (4.7) 
Model (4.7) is regressed separately for each of the three forecast horizons. The 
dependent variable, forecast error, takes the form of FCERROR (0), FCERROR (1), 
FCERROR (2), which refer to the forecast error of one-year-ahead, two-year-ahead 
and three-year-ahead. In the present study, FCERROR (0), FCERROR (1), 
FCERROR (2) denote the forecast error of the fiscal years 2011, 2012 and 2013 
respectively. The primary focus in this research, FRD, is a count variable, which 
measures the level of a firm’s voluntary forward-looking risk disclosures in all 
narrative sections of annual reports. H1 hypothesizes a significant negative 
association between FRD and FCERROR; therefore I predict a negative sign on FRD. 
Another main variable, EQ, is estimated using four accruals quality metrics and one 
discretionary revenue metric. H2 hypothesizes a significant negative association 
between EQ and FCERROR, since all the EQ metrics are inverse measures of 
earnings quality, I predict a positive sign on EQ. 
Following Dhaliwal et al. (2012), Dorestani and Rezaee (2011) and Hope 
(2003), I include several control variables that might confound the relationship 
between forecast error, risk disclosures and earnings quality. I include analyst 
following because more analysts following a firm cause intense competitions among 
analysts, who then have stronger motivation to improve forecast accuracy. Analyst 
following is measured by the number of brokers (NBROKER) issuing stock 
recommendations in Hemmington-Scott database. I also control for firm size (SIZE), 
measured by the natural log of total assets25. Firm size is viewed as an appropriate 
proxy for firm’s general information setting; large firms generally report more stable 
earnings that are easier to predict (Dhaliwal et al., 2012). In addition, large firms are 
                                                          
25 Using the natural log of total number of employees to measure firm size yields similar results.  
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generally more diversified in business activities and therefore have a lower 
systematic risk in earnings prediction. Firm profitability is also controlled for as it 
has a direct effect on firm value and is a key factor in analysts’ forecast models. 
There is also empirical evidence that loss-making firms have more volatile earnings 
that are less predictable (Schleicher et al., 2007). Profitability is measured by return 
on capital employed (ROCE). Dividend pay-out (POUT) is measured by the ratio of 
dividends to the adjusted net earnings per share in the previous accounting period. 
Liquidity (LIQU) is estimated by a firm’s current ratio, computed by the percentage 
of total current assets to total current liabilities. Leverage (GEAR) is estimated by 
total debt/ total capital. Asset growth (GROW) is estimated by TAt / TAt-1, where TA 
is the book value of the firm’s total assets. Finally, I control for the industry impact 
using dummy variables (IND) (Industry classification criteria is the same as in 
Chapter 2 and 3). Larger estimation errors are generally observed in the firms in 
volatile industries, albeit their managers have expertise and good intentions. Data 
pertaining to the control variables are collected for the fiscal year 2010 from 
DataStream. 
 
4.5. Sample and data collection 
I continue to use the same sample set I used in Chapter 2 (pp.67) and Chapter 3 
(pp.121) to ensure the results are comparable. The initial sample comprises 240 firms 
which covers all UK non-financial institutions listed within the FTSE 350 index in 
2010 (according to the 2010 FTSE 350 index company list published by Thomson 
Reuters). Three firms are deleted since their annual reports are not available, leaving 
237 observations. In order to obtain earnings quality score I only keep the industry 
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sectors for which at least 10 observations were available in year 201026 (Mouselli et 
al., 2012). Three industry sectors are removed accordingly, and are: “health care” 
sector (8 firms), “Telecommunications” sector (5 firms), and “Utilities” sector (9 
firms) (see Table 4.1 for sample industry coverage). The sample in this research has 
greater variation in firm characteristics than many prior UK studies such as Abraham 
and Cox (2007) and Linsley and Shrives (2006), which focus solely on FTSE100 
firms. 
 
Table 4.1 
Industry coverage 
Industry Sector Obs. FCERROR (0) FCERROR (1) FCERROR (2) 
Basic Materials 19 0.047 0.091 0.131 
Consumer Goods 22 0.053 0.058 0.039 
Consumer Services 48 0.038 0.045 0.034 
Industrials 52 0.038 0.038 0.043 
Oil & Gas 14 0.136 0.148 0.181 
Technology 15 0.062 0.045 0.060 
Notes:  industry classification is obtained from Thomson Reuters 2010. FCERROR (0), FCERROR 
(1), FCERROR (2) = earnings forecast error in year 2011, 2012, 2013 respectively, calculated by the 
absolute value of the difference between the mean forecast earnings per share and actual earnings per 
share, scaled by the absolute value of actual earnings. 
 
All annual reports were collected from the companies’ websites for the fiscal 
year 2009/10. I obtain the financial data required for earnings quality models from 
DataStream, and analyst forecast data from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate 
System I/B/E/S. I exclude firms with missing accounting and financial data, therefore 
the final sample contains 170 observations. The sample comprises the largest listed 
UK firms based on market capitalisation. 
                                                          
26 The results are robust if the three industries with less than 10 observations are not deleted. 
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I collect the data for three earnings forecast horizons: one-year-ahead (2011), 
two-year-ahead (2012) and three-year-ahead (2013). I set up to two years forecast 
horizons as short-term and up to three years forecast horizons as long-term.  
FRD counts are collected for the year 2010. I focus on explaining cross-
sectional variations in forward-looking risk disclosures and whether they impact on 
forecast error. I do not examine time-series difference in disclosures. This is 
common approach of disclosure studies (i.e. Botosan, 1997; Linsley and Shrives, 
2005, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007) and also ensures the sample is free of 
variations that are caused by changing regulations or political environments. 
Additionally, given the time-intensive nature of the data collection in this study 
(manual), a time-series dimension is not a practical option.  
To adopt earnings quality metrics, it is required that a firm has at least twelve 
years of financial data during years 2000-2011. The test period starts from the year 
2000 because this is the first year for which many accounting ratios are available 
from DataStream.  
I winsorize all firm-specific variables (except FRD) at 5% level to ensure my 
results are not affected by extreme values. To maintain the substantial variation in 
forward-looking risk disclosures levels and reveal the true disclosures approach of 
each individual observation, I tend not to winsorize the FRD data. 
 
4.6. Empirical results 
4.6.1. Summary statistics 
Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics of forecast error, risk disclosure, earning 
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quality, and other control variables. In terms of forecast error, the average value of 
FCERROR increases from 0.051, 0.058 to 0.062, with the increase of forecast 
horizons as represented by FCERROR (0), FCERROR (1) and FCERROR (2) 
respectively. This is in line with existing literature (Dhaliwal et al., 2012) that 
indicates when forecast horizon increases, analysts’ predictability decrease as does 
the reliability of predicted earnings. My computed forecast error data are close to the 
mean forecast error estimates reported by Dhaliwal et al. (2012) of 0.037, 0.068 and 
0.097 in three forecast horizons respectively in a UK sample from the period 1994-
2007. The standard deviation of FCERROR also rise with the increase of forecast 
horizons, showing as 0.058 for FCERROR (0), 0.069 for FCERROR (1), and 0.094 
for FCERROR (2). This indicates that analysts have more diverse opinions on their 
forecast due to their lower accuracy of earnings anticipation in the long term. More 
evidence can be observed from their minimum and maximum values which range 
from 0.002 to 0.234 for FCERROR (0) but comparatively wider from 0.001 to 0.352 
for FCERROR (2). FCERROR§ calculated using median value of analyst estimates 
exhibit similar pattern. 
 
Table 4.2 
Descriptive statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Forecast error        
FCERROR (0) 165 0.051 0.058 0.002 0.234 1.989 6.340 
FCERROR (1) 161 0.058 0.069 0.004 0.259 1.824 5.352 
FCERROR (2) 158 0.062 0.094 0.001 0.352 2.179 6.657 
FCERROR§ (0) 165 0.046 0.053 0.003 0.227 2.222 7.611 
FCERROR§ (1) 161 0.060 0.083 0.002 0.328 2.217 7.093 
FCERROR§ (2) 158 0.055 0.087 0.001 0.343 2.420 7.870 
Risk disclosure        
FRD_total 170 129 60.942 28 420 1.589 7.295 
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FRD_fr 170 18 13.951 0 75 1.522 5.511 
FRD_or 170 53 29.176 7 208 1.609 8.362 
FRD_sr 170 43 28.372 3 191 1.930 8.670 
FRD_b 170 34 26.159 4 170 2.716 12.575 
FRD_g 170 94 43.488 17 250 1.052 4.815 
FRD_qn 170 8 7.402 0 40 1.538 5.647 
FRD_ql 170 120 56.649 28 401 1.674 8.047 
Earnings quality        
EQ1 170 0.040 0.030 0.010 0.123 1.385 4.196 
EQ2 170 0.066 0.034 0.027 0.162 1.340 4.152 
EQ3 170 0.056 0.048 0.012 0.198 1.641 5.106 
EQ4 170 -0.042 0.940 -1.168 3.078 1.381 4.561 
EQ5 141 0.014 0.022 0.0002 0.087 1.729 4.794 
Other control variables        
NBROKER 168 1.993 0.494 0 2.708 -1.731 6.943 
RISK 170 1.092 0.261 0.650 1.550 0.069 1.932 
SIZE 170 14.388 1.341 12.357 17.383 0.515 2.584 
POUT 170 33.509 20.779 0 68.560 -0.295 2.034 
LIQU 170 1.593 1.012 0.460 4.520 1.527 4.850 
GEAR 170 33.181 22.958 0 82.220 0.394 2.395 
GROW 170 0.090 0.131 -0.093 0.422 0.992 3.557 
ROCE 170 13.578 9.238 0.310 35.000 0.783 2.985 
Notes: FCERROR (0), FCERROR (1), FCERROR (2) = earnings forecast error in year 2011, 2012, 2013 
respectively, calculated by the absolute value of the difference between the mean forecast earnings per share and 
actual earnings per share, scaled by the absolute value of actual earnings; FCERROR§ (0), FCERROR§ (1), 
FCERROR§ (2) = earnings forecast error in year 2011, 2012, 2013 respectively, calculated by the absolute value 
of the difference between the median forecast earnings per share and actual earnings per share, scaled by the 
absolute value of actual earnings. 
FRD_total = total number of forward-looking risk disclosures include internal control risk management strategies; 
FRD_fr = total number of forward-looking financial risk disclosures; FRD_or = total number of forward-looking 
operational risk disclosures; FRD_sr = total number of forward-looking strategic risk disclosures; FRD_b= total 
number of forward-looking bad risk news disclosures; FRD_g= total number of forward-looking good and 
neutral risk news disclosures; FRD_qn= total number of forward-looking quantitative risk disclosures; FRD_ql= 
total number of forward-looking qualitative risk disclosures;  
EQ1 = standard deviation of firm j’s cash residuals; EQ2 = average of the absolute value of firm j’s discretionary 
accruals; EQ3 = earnings variability, measured by the standard deviation of the firm j’s earnings per share; EQ4 = 
common factor score derived from the factor analysis of EQ1, EQ2, and EQ3; EQ5 = standard deviation of 
discretionary revenues. 
NBROKER = natural log of the number of brokers issuing stock recommendations in Hemmington-Scott database; 
RISK = beta from London Business School’s Risk Management Service; SIZE = natural log of total assets; POUT 
= dividend payout; LIQU = current ratio, using total current assets divided by total current liabilities; GEAR = 
natural log of equity gearing, calculated by total debt over total capital; GROW = asset growth, calculated by log 
of TAt/TAt-1, where TA is the book value of total assets; ROCE = return on capital employed.  
 
Focusing on risk disclosure measures, the average level of voluntary forward-
looking risk disclosures (FRD_total) of my sample is 129 sentences. There is a 
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comparatively large variation of FRD across the sample which is reflected in the 
standard deviation of 60.942, with a minimum disclosure of 28 sentences, and a 
maximum of 420 disclosure sentences. It reflects the massive difference in firms’ 
risk disclosure approaches. Breaking down the FRD_total into different component 
categories, I first find that firms are less likely to disclose financial risks in narrative 
sections of annual  reports (with only 18 average sentences in FRD_fr, much smaller 
than 53 average sentences in FRD_or and 43 average sentences in FRD_sr. The 
main reason can be financial risk disclosure is commonly compulsory disclosure by 
accounting regulations and are frequently disclosed in ‘financial statements’, 
managers thus have less intension to voluntarily disclose these information in 
narrative sections of annual report. I also observe a clear dominance of ‘good news’ 
and ‘qualitative news’. This reveals that managers are more confident at reporting 
‘good news’ (194 sentences) over ‘bad news’ (34 sentences), and prefer to use a 
more descriptive (‘qualitative’) form of disclosure (120 sentences) over ‘quantitative’ 
disclosure (8 sentences), which presumably provides more flexibility in how these 
may be interpreted by investors and other users of accounts. The manually collected 
FRD count in this thesis is insignificantly different from normal distribution by 
observing the values of skewness and kurtosis. 
Turning to earnings quality proxies, I first find that the average estimate of 
earnings quality matrix EQ1 (the standard deviation of cash flow residuals) 0.040 in 
my sample, is larger than the average accruals quality (AQ) estimates presented by 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) 0.028, Francis et al. (2005) 0.026, and Francis et al. 
(2008) 0.0159, which apply the same method. These differences may be due to the 
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different sample selection and time period used to calculate the earnings quality27. 
The standard deviation of EQ1 is 0.030, indicating considerable cross-sectional 
variation in this variable. The other metrics for earnings quality, EQ2 (average of 
absolute value of abnormal accruals), EQ3 (standard deviation of earnings per share), 
EQ5 (standard deviation of discretionary revenues)28, reveal similar distributional 
properties as EQ1: their standard deviations (0.034, 0.048, and 0.022 respectively) 
are large compared with the mean values (0.066, 0.056, and 0.014 respectively), 
suggesting nontrivial within-sample cross-sectional variation in earnings quality29.   
As to other control variables, the average value for the logarithm of number of 
brokers (NBROKER) is 1.993 with standard deviation of 0.494. The average value of 
firm size (SIZE) of the present sample is 14.388, and the average return on capital 
(ROCE) is 13.578. It can be argued that the sample over represents successful firms, 
which might cause survivorship bias, but considering that my focus is risk disclosure, 
larger firms are more likely to offer a richer and more diverse set of potential risk 
disclosures. Despite the potential bias towards large surviving firms, the standard 
deviations of firm size and return on capital are consequential: 1.341 (SIZE) and 
9.238 (ROCE), suggesting sufficient variation in my sample.  
Table 4.3 reports the Pairwise correlations between forecast error 
(FCERROR(Y)), forward-looking risk disclosures (FRD_total), and earnings quality 
measures (EQ) as well as other influential factors that might affect analyst earnings 
                                                          
27 I select the non-financial institutions that were constituents of the FTSE100 and Mid-250 indices 
during the period 2000-2011. Dechow and Dichev (2002) obtain their sample for 1,725 firms across 
136 industries between 1987 and 1999. Francis et al.’s (2005) sample covers 27 years from 1975 to 
2001 for an average of 1,475 firms per year. Francis et al. (2008) use 677 US firms between 1991 and 
2001. 
28 EQ4 is the common factor of EQ1, EQ2 and EQ3, it is obtained by ‘factor analysis’ using Stata. 
Factor analysis is a statistical technique for data reduction. It reduces the number of variables in an 
analysis by describing linear combinations of the variables that contain most of the information and 
that hopefully admit meaningful interpretations.  
29 Due to the unavailability of quarterly revenue data, EQ5 has fewer observations than EQ1-EQ4. 
 
 
187 
 
predictability. Correlations between forecast error estimates of three horizons are 
substantial, ranging from 30% to 65% (all significant at 5% level). Correlations 
between the four alternative proxies of accruals quality also exhibit large coefficients, 
in no case below 43% (all significant at 5% level except for EQ5)30. The common 
factor EQ4 exhibits high correlations with all underlying proxies suggesting that EQ4 
is a meaningful representation of the alternative earnings quality proxies31, and that 
my main results should not be affected when choosing different metrics.  
                                                          
30 EQ1 - EQ4 are estimates of accruals quality, EQ5 is computed by discretionary revenue. 
31 EQ4 is used in the baseline model in the main regressions.  
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Table 4.3 
Correlation matrix 
 FCER
ROR 
(0) 
FCER
ROR 
(1) 
FCER
ROR 
(2) 
FRD_ 
total 
EQ1 EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 
NBR
OKE
R 
RISK SIZE POUT LIQU GEAR GROW ROCE 
FCERROR(0) 1.00                 
FCERROR(1) 0.43* 1.00                
FCERROR(2) 0.30* 0.65* 1.00               
FRD_total -0.06 -0.09 0.07 1.00              
EQ1 0.33* 0.44* 0.16* -0.20* 1.00             
EQ2 0.25* 0.28* 0.18* -0.10 0.66* 1.00            
EQ3 0.26* 0.41* 0.27* -0.22* 0.70* 0.43* 1.00           
EQ4 0.33* 0.46* 0.25* -0.20* 0.92* 0.79* 0.84* 1.00          
EQ5 0.20* 0.10 0.05 -0.11 0.13 0.10 0.02 0.09 1.00         
NBROKER -0.09 -0.22* -0.19* -0.05 -0.07 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 1.00        
RISK 0.06 0.11 0.14 -0.03 0.07 0.02 0.15 0.13 -0.21* -0.09 1.00       
SIZE 0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.53* -0.28* -0.23* -0.27* -0.30* -0.02 0.00 0.03 1.00      
POUT -0.35* -0.35* -0.34* -0.02 -0.25* -0.18* -0.21* -0.26* 0.12 0.05 -0.13 -0.02 1.00     
LIQU 0.27* 0.28* 0.25* -0.16* 0.36* 0.07 0.28* 0.29* 0.09 -0.17* 0.00 -0.17* -0.26* 1.00    
GEAR -0.09 -0.23* -0.20* 0.22* -0.26* -0.16* -0.27* -0.28* -0.03 0.01 -0.07 0.20* 0.04 -0.45* 1.00   
GROW 0.13 0.28* 0.33* 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.19* 0.17* 0.01 -0.11 -0.05 0.00 -0.19* 0.31* -0.34* 1.00  
ROCE -0.01 -0.13 -0.04 -0.08 0.15 0.01 0.22* 0.15 0.07 -0.06 -0.16* -0.26* 0.08 0.10 -0.09 0.27* 1.00 
Notes: variable definitions see Table 4.2. I report the pairwise correlations between forecast error (FCERROR), total volume of forward-looking risk disclosure (FRD_total) and earnings quality 
proxies (EQ) as well as firm-specific variables. * indicates significance at 5% level.  
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I also observe a negative association between FCERROR (Y) and FRD in one-
year and two-year ahead forecast horizon, which supports the hypothesis of a 
negative association between analyst forecast accuracy and a firm’s forward-looking 
risk disclosures, indicating that a higher level of risk disclosures looking forward 
contributes to a lower forecast error, and that this predicted power is short-term. The 
predicted sign denotes a positive association between all of the five earnings quality 
metrics32 and forecast error in three forecast horizons, in most cases significant at 5% 
level, which supports the hypothesis that higher earnings quality leads to lower 
forecast error or higher earnings predictability and that the predictive power of 
earnings quality is long-term.  
The correlations between FRD and five EQ metrics are all negative, which 
supports the notion of a complementary relationship between the two variables (i.e., 
Francis et al., 2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Dye, 1985; Jung and Kwon, 1988) in that 
firms with low (high) earnings quality disclose less (more) information, because 
investors treat the disclosures of such firms as less credible. 
Another figure worth noting is the correlation between SIZE and FRD, 0.53 
significant at 5% level. This is in line with previous literature which indicates that 
larger firms face more regulatory and social pressures and thus are inclined to release 
more diverse risk information. Other correlation coefficients present in Table 3 are 
comparatively low, within the tolerance of multicollinearity. 
 
4.6.2. Regression results 
                                                          
32 All the EQ metrics are inverse measures of earnings quality, so larger value of EQ indicates lower 
earnings quality.  
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Considering the potential complimentary or substitutive relationship between FRD 
and EQ,  which is suggested in previous literature and is used for information risk 
proxies, I apply the univariate and multivariate analysis to test the two hypothesized 
relationship between FRD/ FCERROR(Y) and EQX /FCERROR(Y). Another variable 
I test separately is firm risk (RISK) measured by beta. In Chapter 3 (pp.132) I report 
a significant negative association between FRD and Beta after controlled for various 
firm-specific characteristics; therefore, to avoid the problem of multicollinearity, I 
test firm risk factor separately in the baseline model, the results are presented in 
Table 4.4.  
In Table 4.4, columns I, V, IX report negative associations between FCERROR 
and FRD consistently for the three forecast horizons, unconditional on firm’s 
earnings quality and risk level. For forecast errors calculated for one-year ahead and 
two-year ahead period horizons, my main variable of interest FRD exhibits negative 
coefficients, significant at 5% level in 2011 and 10% level in 2012. However, I do 
not observe a negative relationship for the three-year ahead forecast horizon. The 
coefficient estimates on FRD, -0.0001 or -0.01% (one-year ahead and two-years 
ahead) is subtle and does not show much variation in the two years, but the 
significance level declines from 5% to 10%. After controlled for earnings quality and 
risk factors, results are still consistent. These findings indicate that forward-looking 
risk disclosure has a subtle but significant effect on improving forecast accuracy in 
short-term period, and the reducing effect on earnings forecast error decrease 
dramatically when the prediction periods increase, supporting Hypothesis 1. 
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Table 4.4 
Regression results (baseline model) 
Notes: variable definitions see Table 2. I report the coefficient estimates and p-values (in parentheses) obtained from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of FCERROR on FRD and EQ, 
conditional on other factors expected to affect forecast accuracy. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Industry dummies are included in all specifications but 
not reported in this table.   
 FCERROR (0) FCERROR (1) FCERROR (2) 
Main variables: I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII 
FRD_total -0.0001**  -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001*  -0.0001* -0.0001* 0.00004  0.00004 0.00004 
 (0.035)  (0.042) (0.039) (0.088)  (0.082) (0.071) (0.720)  (0.725) (0.702) 
EQ4  0.012** 0.013** 0.013**  0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030***  0.018* 0.017* 0.017* 
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.017)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.061) (0.063) (0.085) 
Control variables:             
RISK    -0.001    -0.012    0.009 
    (0.953)    (0.499)    (0.775) 
NBROKER -0.017* -0.016* -0.015 -0.015 -0.029**  -0.023** -0.022** -0.022* -0.024 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 
 (0.052) (0.087) (0.103) (0.104) (0.014) (0.036) (0.051) (0.051) (0.203) (0.270) (0.265) (0.268) 
SIZE 0.007** 0.006** 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.001  0.001 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.005 
 (0.038) (0.043) (0.007) (0.007) (0.841) (0.740)  (0.287) (0.258) (0.648) (0.304) (0.426) (0.441) 
POUT -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001***  -0.0004* -0.0004* -0.0004** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.004) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.003) (0.053)  (0.057) (0.044) (0.003) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) 
LIQU 0.014** 0.013** 0.012* 0.012* 0.006  0.002 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.026) (0.043) (0.052) (0.053) (0.248) (0.766)  (0.849) (0.909) (0.576) (0.890) (0.881) (0.860) 
GEAR 0.0003 0.0003* 0.0004** 0.0004* -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.109) (0.083) (0.049) (0.051) (0.219) (0.259)  (0.410) (0.377) (0.230) (0.280) (0.270) (0.290) 
GROW -0.007 -0.018 -0.014 -0.014 0.071  0.047 0.051 0.048 0.074 0.068 0.067 0.070 
 (0.841) (0.638) (0.715) (0.715) (0.110) (0.248)  (0.229) (0.270) (0.215) (0.234) (0.243) (0.234) 
ROCE 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.0004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.447) (0.550) (0.515) (0.526) (0.070) (0.017)  (0.021) (0.020) (0.654) (0.538) (0.531) (0.592) 
Intercept -0.050 -0.053 -0.078 -0.077 0.169** 0.126** 0.101 0.114* 0.088 0.036 0.045 0.036 
 (0.346) (0.302) (0.127) (0.170) (0.030) (0.037) (0.112) (0.084) (0.453) (0.748) (0.700) (0.787) 
Adj. R2 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.25 
Obs. 163 163 163     163  160 160 160 160 157 157 157 157 
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Columns II, VI and X in Table 4.4 present the regression results for testing 
Hypothesis 2. I observe a consistent and significant positive relationship between 
EQ4 and FCERROR across the three forecast horizons which supports H2. This 
finding suggests that higher earnings quality can assist analysts in improving 
earnings predictability for a longer forecast horizon. I next report the results, 
excluding the risk factor in view of the potential multicollinearity between FRD and 
Beta. The results are presented in columns III, VII and XI. I observe that coefficients 
between FCERROR and FRD and EQ indicate no significant differences. In columns 
IV, VIII and XII, I present results for the full model, including the risk factor for 
further consideration. I find consistent results in all circumstances, suggesting results 
do not suffer from multicollinearity and are robust. Overall, the evidence indicates 
forward-looking risk disclosures can mitigate forecast error for a short-run horizon, 
while in longer term, earnings quality is more effective in reducing forecast error.   
Table 4.5 presents regression results for the baseline model after replacing EQ4 
with four alternative earnings quality metrics EQ1, EQ2, EQ3 and EQ5. I tabulate 
results for the three forecast horizons, and find the four earnings quality metrics 
follow the similar pattern of those reported in Table 4.433.  
Table 4.6 reports the results after replacing FCERROR (Y) with FCERROR§ 
(Y), where I change the mean value of earnings forecast to the median value of 
earnings forecast when I compute the estimates of forecast error. Dorestani and 
Rezaee (2011) use medians to compute the analyst forecast error and argue that 
when a distribution is skewed, the median can be regarded as a superior measure of 
the mid-point. In the first column of one-year ahead forecast horizon, I observe that 
                                                          
33 Although the coefficients on EQ1 and EQ2 are not precisely determined, they are consistently 
significant on EQ3 and EQ5 for FCERROR (2). 
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FRD is significant negatively related to forecast error34. The coefficient (-0.0001) 
remains unchanged as in Table 4.4 column IV. Figures in column two and three (of 
two-year and three-year ahead forecast horizons respectively) do not show a 
significant association between FRD and FCERROR§, suggesting a short-term 
predictive power of FRD. In respect of earnings quality metrics, the results are 
robust with those reported in Table 4.4 and 4.5, which further support Hypothesis 2. 
Table 4.5 
Replace EQ4 by 4 other earnings quality proxies 
 FCERROR (0) FCERROR (1) FCERROR (2) 
Panel A:    
FRD -0.0001** -0.0001* 0.00005 
 (0.035) (0.078) (0.686) 
EQ1 0.375** 0.903*** 0.190 
 (0.031) (0.000) (0.561) 
Adj. R2 0.29 0.41 0.23 
Obs. 163 160 157 
    
Panel B:    
FRD -0.0001** -0.0001* 0.00004 
 (0.027) (0.059) (0.757) 
EQ2 0.269* 0.412** 0.328 
 (0.067) (0.014) (0.187) 
Adj. R2 0.29 0.32 0.24 
Obs. 163 160 157 
    
Panel C:    
FRD -0.0001* -0.0001 0.00006 
 (0.06) (0.158) (0.585) 
EQ3 0.185** 0.533*** 0.384** 
 (0.038) (0.001) (0.040) 
Adj. R2 0.28 0.39 0.26 
Obs. 163 160 157 
    
Panel D:    
FRD -0.0001* -0.0001* 0.00001 
 (0.081) (0.053) (0.909) 
EQ5 0.550*** 0.416* 0.484** 
 (0.005) (0.094) (0.047) 
Adj. R2 0.25 0.21 0.22 
Obs. 140 140 140 
Notes: variable definitions see Table 4.2. I report the coefficient estimates and p-values (in parentheses) obtained 
from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of FCERROR on FRD and EQ, conditional on other factors 
expected to affect forecast accuracy. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Industry dummies are included in all specifications but not reported in this table. 
                                                          
34 Although the coefficient on FRD is not precisely determined for FCERROR (0) in Panel C, it is 
consistently significant in other panels. 
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Table 4.6 
Replace FCERROR (X) by FCERROR§ (X) 
 FCERROR§ (0) FCERROR§ (1) FCERROR§ (2) 
Panel A:    
FRD -0.0001* -0.0001 0.00004 
 (0.080) (0.119) (0.712) 
EQ1 0.386** 1.072*** 0.264 
 (0.012) (0.000) (0.382) 
Adj. R2 0.28 0.31 0.20 
Obs. 163 160 157 
    
Panel B:    
FRD -0.0001* -0.0001 0.00003 
 (0.063) (0.105) (0.776) 
EQ2 0.2298* 0.4101** 0.322 
 (0.082) (0.050) (0.163) 
Adj. R2 0.26 0.22 0.21 
Obs. 163 160 157 
    
Panel C:    
FRD -0.0001 -0.0001 0.00006 
 (0.130) (0.226) (0.606) 
EQ3 0.163** 0.631*** 0.387** 
 (0.040) (0.001) (0.034) 
Adj. R2 0.26 0.29 0.23 
Obs. 163 160 157 
    
Panel D:    
FRD -0.0001* -0.0001 0.00004 
 (0.088) (0.110) (0.725) 
EQ4 0.012** 0.035*** 0.018** 
 (0.012) (0.000) (0.049) 
Adj. R2 0.27 0.32 0.22 
Obs. 163 160 157 
 
Panel E:  
 
 
FRD -0.0001* -0.0002* 0.00003 
 (0.077) (0.060) (0.813) 
EQ5 0.530*** 0.547* 0.462* 
 (0.006) (0.074) (0.060) 
Adj. R2 0.28 0.13 0.21 
Obs. 140 140 140 
Notes: variable definitions see Table 4.2. I report the coefficient estimates and p-values (in parentheses) obtained 
from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of FCERROR§ on FRD and EQ, conditional on other factors 
expected to affect forecast accuracy. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Industry dummies are included in all specifications but not reported in this table. 
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4.6.3. Additional analyses 
4.6.3.1. Detailed Risk Categorises on FCERROR 
The detailed data construction in the present research allows I to present additional 
evidence regarding the sensitivity of forward-looking risk disclosures to analyst 
forecast accuracy varies for different risk categorises. I disaggregate the total number 
of forward-looking risk disclosures into: financial risk (FRD_FR), operational risk 
(FRD_OR) and strategic risk (FRD_SR) disclosures according to the content of risk 
information. Linsley and Shrives (2006) report significant differences in the 
frequencies of reported ‘good news’ and ‘bad news’ risk disclosures. I follow their 
approach and further classify forward-looking risk disclosures as good news 35 
(FRD_G), or bad news (FRD_B), and whether they are quantitative (FRD_QN) or 
qualitative (FRD_QL) in nature. In Table 4.7, the coefficients of FRD_FR (Panel C) 
and FRD_SR (Panel E) are both significant for a one-year ahead horizon, with the 
sensitivity of the former (-0.0006) three times that of the latter (-0.0002). This 
suggests voluntarily disclosing more forward-looking financial risks helps drive 
down forecast errors in a more effective way. As noted earlier, forward-looking 
operational and strategic risk disclosures constitute the vast majority of total risk 
disclosures, and are much more frequent than financial risk disclosures. The main 
reason is most of the sample firms put financial risks in the “Notes to the Financial 
Statement” (compulsory disclosures per accounting regulations36); few voluntarily 
release this information in narratives within annual reports. The lack of financial risk 
disclosures makes them more valuable to investors. The higher elasticity of financial 
risk disclosures can also be explained by the nature of this risk category: financial 
                                                          
35 Good news includes both positive and neutral risk information. 
36 For example: The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) whose primary purpose is to establish and improve 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in the public's interest.  
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risks have an immediate effect on assets and liabilities of a monetary character, and 
are the key forms of information analysts would incorporate in evaluation of a firm’s 
value. I also observe a short-term significant negative association between FRD_SR 
and FCERROR. Strategic risk encompass the macro operating environment of the 
company that can directly impact on firm’s assets and liabilities, and can also impact 
on cash flow and profits. However, the coefficient on FRD_OR is not precisely 
determined for FCERROR (0). Operational risks exclusively pertain to firm-specific 
internal risks which are under the control of the executive board; this information has 
been found to be effective in reducing firm risk (empirical results are presented in 
Chapter 3, pp.132), but might not contribute as much as financial and strategic risks 
in enabling analysts to assess firm value, which is the essential information in 
analyst earnings forecast process.  
The coefficients of FRD_G are significant for both one-year and two-year 
forecast horizons, at 5% level (Panel A). In addition, FRD_G exhibits higher 
elasticity -0.0002 than FRD_total (-0.0001). This result is consistent with my 
previous finding (empirical results in Chapter 3, pp.135) that good news signals 
profit, promoting opportunities in the future which can effectively reduce firm 
systematic risk, therefore improving earnings predictability. However the 
coefficients of FRD_B are not significant neither in short-term nor long-term 
forecast horizon. This can be explained that bad news covers potential threats that 
might harm firm value and expose a firm to uncertainties, more uncertain 
circumstances will inevitably increase the unpredictable factors in earnings forecast, 
and increase forecast error accordingly. On the other hand, when more bad news is 
released, analysts are informed about the firm’s real operation performance and can 
better evaluate the risk impact in their portfolio formation, which is useful in 
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generating a more accurate earnings forecast. These two effects cancel out each other 
and are explainable for the insignificance of FRD_B on FCERROR.  
In view of the nature of risk disclosure, I observe that after quantifying the risk 
information, the elasticity changes dramatically from -0.0001 (FRD_QL) to -
0.001(FRD_QN), and the sensitivity lasts for a two-year forecast horizon. -0.001 is 
also the highest coefficient compared with FRD_total and other detailed risk 
categories. This indicates that forecast error can be significant reduced if the size of 
the risk can be quantified so as to enable analysts estimate the potential monetary 
impact of said risk in a precise way. This finding is in line with previous literature 
that quantification of a project can improve its persuasiveness among investors since 
the project credibility is greatly enhanced (Kadous et al., 2005). Likewise, the 
difficulties in quantifying future risks make them more valuable to analysts. For fear 
of being held responsible for legal claims when irretrievable errors in judgment 
occur based on erroneous estimations of future risks, directors are more inclined to 
avoid discussing unpredictable speculative bad news in a quantitative manner.  
Overall, the detailed risk categorises are consistent with findings for the 
aggregate risk disclosures FRD_total, with a lowering effect on forecast error in the 
short term. 
 
4.6.3.2. Results for EQ on FCERROR, Conditional on Different Risk Categories 
In Table 4.7, I find significant positive associations between EQ4 and FCERROR 
conditional across different risk categories, and the predictive power of earnings 
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quality is both long term and consistent when I change earnings quality metrics37. 
This result supports Dhaliwal et al.’s (2012) finding that their financial opaqueness 
measure (scaled accruals) is significant and positively associated with forecast error 
in all three horizons after controlling for the level of voluntary disclosure. In 
addition, I observe a higher sensitivity of EQ4 on FCERROR in the short term (up to 
a two-year forecast horizon) that declines for a three-year forecast horizon. Dhaliwal 
et al. (2012) suggest a complementary relationship exists between non-financial 
disclosures and accruals which can be depicted by the co-instantaneous slop 
coefficients increase of disclosures. I support that notion and add that earnings 
quality, as proxied by accrual quality and discretionary revenue, has long-term 
predictive power relative to earnings, incremental to the short-term predictive power 
relative to FRD disclosures. 
 
Table 4.7 
Forecast error and detailed risk disclosures 
 FCERROR (0) FCERROR (1) FCERROR (2) 
Panel A:    
FRD_G -0.0002** -0.0002** 0.00003 
 (0.042) (0.045) (0.863) 
EQ4 0.126** 0.030*** 0.017* 
 (0.017) (0.000) (0.086) 
Adj. R2 0.30 0.42 0.25 
Obs. 163 160 157 
Panel B:    
FRD_B -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.204) (0.474) (0.486) 
EQ4 0.012** 0.030*** 0.017* 
 (0.020) (0.000) (0.080) 
Adj. R2 0.29 0.41 0.25 
Obs. 163 160 157 
Panel C:    
FRD_FR -0.0006* -0.0004 0.0002 
 (0.084) (0.390) (0.716) 
                                                          
37 I replace EQ4 with 4 other earnings quality metrics: EQ1, EQ2, EQ3, EQ5; the results are robust 
in all circumstances. 
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EQ4 0.013** 0.030*** 0.017* 
 (0.013) (0.000) (0.090) 
Adj. R2 0.30 0.42 0.25 
Obs. 163 160 157 
Panel D:    
FRD_OR -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003 
 (0.604) (0.338) (0.204) 
EQ4 0.012** 0.030*** 0.018* 
 (0.023) (0.000) (0.072) 
Adj. R2 0.28 0.41 0.26 
Obs. 163 160 157 
Panel E:    
FRD_SR -0.0002** -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.047) (0.127) (0.302) 
EQ4 0.013** 0.031*** 0.017* 
 (0.015) (0.000) (0.073) 
Adj. R2 0.29 0.42 0.25 
Obs. 163 160 157 
Panel F:    
FRD_QN -0.001* -0.002*** 0.001 
 (0.098) (0.004) (0.385) 
EQ4 0.013** 0.032*** 0.016 
 (0.013) (0.000) (0.102) 
Adj. R2 0.30 0.44 0.25 
Obs. 163 160 157 
Panel G:    
FRD_QL -0.0001* -0.0001 0.00003 
 (0.053) (0.131) (0.806) 
EQ4 0.012** 0.030*** 0.017* 
 (0.018) (0.000) (0.084) 
Adj. R2 0.29 0.42 0.25 
Obs. 163 160 157 
Notes: variable definitions see Table 4.2. I report the coefficient estimates and p-values (in parentheses) obtained 
from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of FCERROR on detailed FRD and EQ, conditional on other 
factors expected to affect forecast accuracy. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. Industry dummies are included in all specifications but not reported in this table. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
To the best of my knowledge, the present research may represent the first attempt to 
gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between forward-looking risk 
disclosures, earnings quality and analyst forecast accuracy. I use a coded index to 
count FRD in the narrative sections of annual reports and also seek to disaggregate 
the total number of FRD into various subcategories from the perspective of risk 
content (financial risk, operational risk, and strategic risk), the nature of disclosures 
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(quantitative and qualitative), and the type of news (good/ bad). The results suggest a 
significant positive relationship between the extent of FRD disclosures and analyst 
forecast accuracy, and the lowering effect on forecast error appears strongest in the 
short-term horizon. The detailed risk construction also confirms the association 
identified for aggregate risk disclosure. This finding is consistent with Wang and 
Hussainey (2013) and Dhaliwal et al. (2012). In respect of earnings quality, I observe 
a significant negative association between earnings quality and forecast accuracy; 
these results are robust when I change to alternative EQ metrics. Further, I show EQ 
has long-term predictive power regarding earnings, with this earnings predictability 
declining when the forecast horizon increases. I also extend the earnings forecast 
literature by highlighting the complementary and simultaneous impact of FRD and 
EQ on forecast accuracy, consistent with Verrecchia’s (1990) theoretical model that 
an increase in the quality of information on earnings available to mangers contributes 
to more disclosures on their part (i.e. they engage less in earnings management). 
These findings have implications for regulatory bodies’ efforts in encouraging 
firms to augment information quality, with the aim of motivating managers to meet 
earnings expectations. To the extent that investors incorporate analysts’ earnings 
forecasts in their portfolio investment and respond to revisions of those forecasts, my 
results provide insights into understanding what role information risk plays in 
investors’ decision-making.  
One limitation of the present research is I collect FRD for a single year. I 
recognize the benefits of collecting data beyond a single time period to produce a 
panel of data; however, the time-intensive nature of this project applies inevitable 
constraints and so my analysis is cross-sectional only. I would therefore recommend 
a time-series analysis of FRD and its impact on long-term earnings forecast as an 
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avenue for future research; it would also be worthwhile to conduct separate research 
focusing on the modelling of the relationship between disclosure quality and 
earnings quality, and consider whether and how their simultaneous interactive 
relationship may explain time-series earnings predictability. Additionally, future 
research could shed light on the extent to which my results are applicable to other 
international settings.  
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Appendix 4.138 
Elements in FCERROR model:   
EPS1MN-Earnings per share mean FY1 for a 
company 
(EPS2MN, EPS3MN) 
Mean value of all estimates for a company 
derived by the majority of contributing analysts 
for fiscal year 1. 
The arithmetic mean of estimates for the fiscal 
year indicated (𝑀𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑌 ) is calculated as follows: 
         
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
 
Where: 𝑥𝑖 = individual analyst’s forecasts 
       n  = number of estimates 
EPS1MD-Median value of all FY1 estimates for 
a company 
(EPS2MD, EPS3MD) 
The value that falls in the middle of the defined 
range of estimates when arranged in ascending 
order. That is, the value within the sample that 
has an equal number of estimates both greater 
and less than itself. If the sample has an equal 
number of estimates, it is the average of the two 
middle values. Median values are less affected by 
outlier forecasts than mean values. 
A##EPS-Actual annual EPS Actual value for Earnings per share for year 
ending '##' 
W05001-Market price year end Represents the closing price of the firm’s stock at 
their fiscal year end. 
  
Elements in EQ models:   
WC02999-Total assets Represents the sum of total current assets, long 
term receivables, investment in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant 
and equipment and other assets. 
 
WC02201- Current assets total Represents cash and other assets that are 
reasonably expected to be realized in cash, sold 
or consumed within one year or one operating 
cycle. 
 
WC02005- Cash & cash equivalents generic Represents Cash & Due from Banks for Banks, 
Cash for Insurance Companies and Cash & Short 
Term Investments for all other industries 
                                                          
38 Variable definition according to DataStream. 
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WC01001-Revenues Represents gross sales and other operating 
revenue less discounts, returns and allowances.  
 
WC03101- Current liabilities total Represents debt or other obligations that the 
company expects to satisfy within one year. 
 
WC02301- Property, plant and equipment gross Represents tangible assets with an expected 
useful life of over one year which are expected to 
be used to produce goods for sale or for 
distribution of services. 
WC03051- Short term debt & current portion of 
long term debt 
Represents that portion of debt payable within 
one year including current portion of long term 
debt and sinking fund requirements of preferred 
stock or debentures. 
 
WC01151- Depreciation, depletion and 
amortization 
DEPRECIATION represents the process of 
allocating the cost of a depreciable asset to the 
accounting periods covered during its expected 
useful life to a business. It is a non-cash charge 
for use and obsolescence of an asset. 
DEPLETION refers to cost allocation for natural 
resources such as oil and mineral deposits. 
AMORTIZATION relates to cost allocation for 
intangible assets such as patents and leasehold 
improvements, trademarks, bookplates, tools and 
film cost. 
 
WC01551- Net income before extra items Represents income before extraordinary items 
and preferred and common dividends, but after 
operating and non-operating income and expense, 
reserves, income taxes, minority interest and 
equity in earnings. 
WC02051- Receivables Represents the amounts due to the company 
resulting from the sale of goods and services on 
credit to customers (after applicable reserves). 
Notes: appendix explains the codes I use to obtain data from I/B/E/S and DataStream to compute FCERROR and 
EQ: (numerical figure 1, 2, 3 in the column refers to fiscal year (FY) 1, 2, 3 data type, in my sample refer to fiscal 
year 2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively). Descriptions are consistent across all fiscal years.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
5.1. Summary of the findings  
This thesis represents the first attempt, to the best of my knowledge, to obtain a 
deeper understanding of firms’ forward-looking risk disclosure patterns, and their 
determinants from the perspective of corporate governance issues and ownership 
structure, and impact on firm risk and analyst forecast accuracy. In order to test these 
relationships, I manually coded a sample of non-financial institutions that were 
members of the FTSE100 and Mid-250 indices during 2010, as identified by 
Thomson Reuters.  
One of the main findings of the present research is the significant role that 
corporate governance characteristics play in explaining the extent of firms’ forward-
looking risk disclosure. All the three board attributes: Board composition (measured 
by the proportion of non-executive directors on a board), board independence 
(measured by the proportion of independent directors on a board), and board size are 
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significant positively associated with the level of forward-looking risk disclosures. 
The composite measure of audit committee effectiveness (defined here as audit 
committee independence, size, expertise and commitment) shows equal importance 
regarding improved risk disclosure as board characteristics. These findings are 
consistent with the hypothesized theoretical benefits of effective corporate 
governance, and provide empirical evidence to bolster the arguments for 
improvement to UK corporate governance structure. Conversely, share holdings by 
investment institutions and inside employees are negatively related to forward-
looking risk disclose. These results support the argument regarding proprietary costs, 
in that institutional shareholders (often characterized by their large, stable ownership 
position) and inside employees (defined as those strategic shareholders of 5% or 
more who are employees, or individual investors) have better access to insider 
information about their portfolio companies; therefore disclosure is less important in 
monitoring firms and profitable trading opportunities could be lost if more 
disclosures provide an alternative resource for inside information. Collectively, the 
findings would account for the lack of disclosures in those companies embroiled in 
accounting scandals: Non-effective corporate governance structures that cause poor 
monitoring by the informed executives, and inappropriate shareholding structures 
which enable senior executives to focus on short-term profits whilst sowing the 
seeds of future crises. 
In respect of the impact of forward-looking risk disclosure on firm risk, I 
reports a significant negative association between the total quantity and level of firm 
risk; however, one standard deviation increase in forward-looking risk disclosures 
only leads to a slight decrease of the beta value. This supports stake-holder agency 
theory in that if managers selectively publish limited forward-looking risk 
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information, and therefore fail to meet the requirements of external stakeholders, 
investors may consider the company a risky investment because this might later 
incur costly explicit claims (i.e. a risk of litigation). Additionally, stakeholders may 
perceive an inefficient level of internal risk control and a restricted ability of 
managers to obtain financing resources at consistent rates (Salama et al., 2011). The 
detailed risk construction allows I to present some additional evidence on different 
categorises of forward-looking risk disclosure in relation to their impact on risk 
reduction. Specifically, the present results indicate that disclosing more forward-
looking operational risks helps drive down firm risk levels in a more effective way. 
This is consistent with prior literature that has suggested institutional investors place 
more value on firm-specific risks than on general market risks which all firm would 
confront. In addition, the more ‘good news’ and quantitative news that is forward-
disclosed, the stronger the effects on reducing firm risk. These results support the 
resource-based view and quality signalling theory, which suggest that one way to 
improve the quality of firms’ risk disclosure is by increasing the release of 
operational, ‘good news’ and quantitative risk information. Such disclosures are less 
easily replicable for weaker opponents, and transmit valuable, rare, inimitable and 
non-replicable risk management superiority signals to potential investors.  
In respect of the impact of forward-looking risk disclosure on analyst forecast 
accuracy, I reports a significant positive relationship between the extent of forward-
looking risk disclosures and analyst forecast accuracy; the reduction effect on 
forecast error appears strongest in the short-term horizon. The detailed risk 
construction also confirms the association identified for aggregate risk disclosure. 
This finding is consistent with the disclosure studies of Wang and Hussainey (2013), 
Dhaliwal et al. (2012) and Dorestani and Rezaee (2011) which examine forward-
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looking disclosures, corporate social responsibility disclosures, and key performance 
indicator disclosures respectively. In testing the relationship between forward-
looking risk disclosure and analyst forecast accuracy, I also controls for earnings 
quality, as this is another commonly-used proxy for information risk and is widely 
referenced as a determinant of earnings predictability. I also finds a significant 
negative association between earnings quality and forecast accuracy; the results are 
robust when using alternative earnings quality metrics. Further, I shows earnings 
quality has long-term predictive power regarding earnings, with this earnings 
predictability declining when forecast horizons increase. The present study also 
extends the earnings forecast literature by highlighting the complementary and 
simultaneous impact of forward-looking risk disclosure and earnings quality on 
forecast accuracy, consistent with Verrecchia’s (1990) theoretical model that an 
increase in the quality of information on earnings available to managers contributes 
to more disclosures on their part (i.e. they engage less in earnings management).  
 
5.2. Implications of the study 
One of the main findings in this study is the significant role that the board plays in 
explaining variation in UK firms’ risk disclosures. Both the independence of the 
board and the activity of the board are associated with improved risk disclosure. 
While these findings are consistent with the hypothesized theoretical benefits of 
board independence and activity, this study provides an empirical validation of this 
and helps bolster the arguments for improvements to UK board structure. Greater 
board independence and greater board activity (board size and audit committee 
effectiveness) are recommended to help improve risk disclosure. I also find evidence 
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that shareholdings by inner employees plays a significant role in determining 
forward-looking risk disclosure. This further stresses the value of monitoring role 
played by shareholders. Due to their stable and lasting shareholding and non-conflict 
interests with firm’s finance divisions, these inner investors are likely to pressure the 
board to release incomplete and segmented risk information as those privately held 
information can be too costly. This shareholding structure in a firm might weaken 
the monitoring role played by shareholders, which market makers want to change to 
enhance the disclosure quality as to serve the general information receivers.  
This study represents the first attempt to gain a deeper understanding of the 
relationship between forward-looking risk disclosures and firm risk (proxied by 
systematic risk). Evidence of the effect of disclosure within the annual reports on 
capital market (assessed by cost of equity capital) is tenuous, and in the few studies 
that intend to address this issue including Botosan (1997) and Francis et al. (2008), 
mixed evidence are presented. While previous studies typically focus on integrated 
data panel (total disclosure quantity), this study has comprehensive construction of 
risk disclosure measures: I test whether the business focus of disclosure (financial, 
operational, strategic risk) would impact on the effect of voluntary disclosure on firm 
risk reduction; I also test whether the disclosure tone (good news, bad news, neutral 
news) and numerical nature (quantitative, qualitative disclosure) would affect the 
hypothesized relationship. This provides in depth empirical evidence that is distinct 
from prior research on understanding the content of disclosure on reducing firm’s 
market risk. Results imply that investors value more about ‘operational’, ‘good news’ 
and ‘quantitative’ risk disclosures that are forward-looking, which suggest firm’s 
executives an applicable way of improving investors’ confidence through voluntarily 
releasing more of those risk disclosures.  
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This study also provides a detailed and forensic examination of how narrative 
risk disclosures with a future horizon aid market participants (financial analysts) in 
their assessment of future corporate performance (earnings). Prior officially 
published documents (ICAEW, 1998, 2000, 2002) raised the concerns regarding 
narrative risk disclosure deficiencies and urged UK firms to disclosure risk-related 
information in more depth. More than a decade later there are still major concerns 
regarding the usefulness of risk disclosures, with a recent UK survey by Abraham 
and Shrives (2014) characterising many of these disclosures as little more than 
‘symbolic window dressing’. As there is limited evidence of which forms of risk 
disclosures are most useful to professional users of accounts (e.g. analysts), this 
study intend to address this issue directly via an empirical examination of how 
different types risk disclosures aid financial analysts in their assessments of future 
corporate earnings. From these results I draw inferences regarding the relative 
usefulness of risk disclosures to the users of accountings, from which I derive some 
tentative suggestions which may aid accounting standard setters in better focusing 
their guidelines to company executives. Several recent studies on narrative 
disclosure, for example corporate social responsibility disclosures by US firms by 
Dhaliwal et al. (2012) and forward looking disclosures by UK firms by Wang and 
Hussainey (2013) provide evidence that narrative disclosures help market 
participants to better anticipate future earnings. These conclusions are based on 
evidence from stock price changes rather than a direct examination of earnings 
forecasts. The increased insight into future earnings numbers is inferred rather than 
being directly observed. This research contribute to the literature on narrative 
disclosures in providing evidence that forward-looking risk disclosures can aid 
analysts in their assessment of future earnings. The importance of forward-looking 
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narratives reiterates the findings of Wang and Hussainey (2013) but this research 
provides a direct link between these disclosures and analysts’ earnings forecasts 
rather than merely inferring such insight from studying share price movements. By 
focusing directly on analysts’ forecasts it shows that the utility of forward-looking 
risk disclosures relate to one-year-ahead forecast horizon only. On average, such 
disclosures provide insignificant improvements in longer term earnings forecast. 
Disaggregating Total into different subcomponents reveals many interesting findings: 
financial risk disclosures have the strongest impact on reducing forecast error. 
Strategic risk disclosures are also associated with significantly reduced forecast 
errors, although the slope is smaller than for financial risk disclosures. However, 
operational risk disclosures exhibit no significant explanatory power. This has some 
intuitive appeal. Strategic disclosures help understand how a firm will develop while 
operational disclosures help understand how a firm has developed. This finding 
makes a linkage with Arnold and Moizer’s (1984) identification of information that 
is provided by firms (or sought by analysts) to aid the understanding of the financial 
statements. It also provides direct empirical support for Coram et al.’s (2011) survey 
findings that analysts value financial disclosures most when they are shedding light 
on bad news events.  
The examination of the disclosure tone and numerical nature of forward-
looking risk disclosures reveal that more good news and quantitative risks disclosed 
can significantly improve forecasting accuracy. Which is consistently with the 
findings in Chapter 3. This research provides a detailed insight into understanding 
what types of voluntary risk disclosures are most helpful to investors and financial 
analysts with regard to forecasting future earnings. It can be recommended that 
relevant accounting bodies encourage a forward-looking risk disclosures section with 
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the focus on financial and strategic risk disclosures, and testable favourable and 
quantitative risk disclosures. This study also provide managers with clearer 
guidelines as to precisely what types of forward-looking risk disclosures to include 
in their annual reports, for the benefit of analysts and investors. This guidance could 
be issued almost immediately and would not require time for ‘bellwether companies’ 
to change their practices and to then for other firms to ‘feel obliged to mimic their 
behaviour’ (Abraham and Shrives, 2014, pp.104).  
 
5.3. Limitations of the study  
The sample in this thesis relates to one year and so my focus is on explaining cross-
sectional variation in forward-looking risk disclosures. Time-series trends in 
disclosure are not considered. This approach is typical of empirical studies analysing 
risk disclosures (Botosan, 1997; Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 
2007) and means that the sample is free of variations in disclosure that are the result 
of changing regulations or political environments. Given the time-intensive nature of 
the data collection in this study (manual), a time-series dimension is not a practical 
option. Another limitation is the adoption of a manual content analysis approach; 
thus, subjectivity is unavoidable. I thus uses UNIX perl code to assist with manual 
coding, which greatly decreases the subjectivity of content analysis. The 
combination of manual and computer-assisted content analysis provides a testable 
framework for future risk disclosure studies. The present research examines the 
quantity of forward-looking risk disclosures using sentence-counting, which is 
consistent with the majority of disclosure studies. Although, over the years, 
researchers have indicated that the quality of disclosures is more valuable than their 
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quantity, disclosure-quality research is still very much in its infancy mainly due to 
lack of consensus regarding the assessment of the quality of risk reporting 
(traditional approaches include some form of disclosure checklist, professional 
institutions disclosure quality ranking). This may also be a limit of the present 
research.  
 
5.4. Recommended avenues for future research 
I recommend the following avenues for future research:  
A longitudinal or time-series analysis of forward-looking risk disclosures and 
their impact on future measures of uncertainty and risk, with additional examination 
of potential interaction of these variables over time. 
A series of structured and semi-structured interviews with preparers of 
accounts, to investigate the incentives and inhibitions that determine the extent of 
risk disclosure and their informativeness to users of accounts.  
Comparative cross-country studies of risk disclosure approaches. These will be 
of particular value. When conducting investigations in other countries, however, 
attention must be paid to legislation requirements and accounting standards and 
cultural attitudes (as well as translation issues) that might have potential influence on 
firms’ risk disclosure. 
Research that investigates forward-looking risk disclosure within specific 
industries might also bear considerable results. Future work could also be undertaken 
to examine whether the results of this research are replicable for financial institutions.  
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Further development of the use of multi-equation frameworks to assess the 
determinants of disclosure, perhaps employing new variables and models to measure 
firm risk and earnings predictability. 
Application of the insights provided in this thesis to other disclosure studies, 
such as corporate social environmental disclosures, compulsory financial statements, 
and specific corporate governance disclosures, to test whether results are replicable.  
Future research using modelling approaches to measure risk disclosure quality 
will be of particular value. 
Risk information could be collected from a variety of sources including firms’ 
websites, financial analysts’ reviews, media reports, regulators’ statements, etc., 
rather than exclusively based on corporate annual reports.  
“Technological innovation, changes in the business economics of audit firms 
and analysts, globalization of capital markets, and changes in disclosure channels 
and the number and type of information intermediaries continue to reshape 
disclosure and financial reporting practices” (Kothari, Li and Short, 2009, pp. 1667). 
Future risk disclosure studies could test these factors as determinants of the 
disclosure approaches of individual firms.  
The data collection technique adopted in this research is a combination of 
manual content analysis and UNIX pearl code, which is argued to greatly reduced 
subjectivity in the coding process while increase the credibility of tested data. 
However, due to the time-intensive nature of this methodology, it is generally 
impractical to be applied to more time-line researches. Therefore, future research 
could reply on NVIVO that count the frequencies of key words, or profasional 
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database such as: annual filings in the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering Retrieval 
(EDGAR) database, to see whether in time-series tests the results obtained in this 
research still holds.  
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